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 Gender stereotypes permeate peer groups, often functioning as the norms, or 
conventions, which contribute to group identity.  Little is known about the conditions 
under which children will resist the norms of their peer groups, including norms that 
reflect stereotypic expectations.   This study investigated  this issue by measuring how 
children  responded to members of their gender groups who disagreed with the group 
about gender stereotyped aggressive behaviors (female stereotype: relational aggression, 
male stereotype: physical aggression) as well as about  social activities (football and 
ballet).  Social domain theory as well as social identity theory provided the basis for 
formulating the design and the hypotheses. It was expected that children and adolescents 
would expect their peers to challenge the group, but that they would be concerned about 
the consequences of challenging the group in terms of social exclusion. Participants (N = 
292, 9-10 and 13-14 years of age) assessed members of same-gender peer groups who 
disagreed with their group.  The findings revealed that children and adolescents generally 
expected that their peers will resist the group’s gender stereotypic norms surrounding 
aggression, but that this may be more difficult for boys when voicing their counter- 
stereotypic opinions.  Further, participants themselves believed that they would be less 
influenced by gender stereotypes than would their peers. They asserted that they would, 
individually, be more likely to resist the group than they expect a peer would be.  This 
research also revealed important barriers to resisting the group.  Specifically, children and 
adolescents expected that group members who dissent from or resist the group are likely 
to be excluded from the group for voicing their dissent.  This stands in sharp contrast to 
much research which indicates that children are not accepting of exclusion. Rejecting the 
behavior of one’s peer group, especially when that behavior has negative intrinsic 
consequences for others, is a key step towards changing the culture of peer groups more 
broadly.  However, the findings indicate that, while children and adolescents are 
optimistic about their peers challenging the peer group, they also see exclusion as a very 
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Children form groups from an early age, and decisions about group membership 
often create conflict among friends.  One way to better understand children’s conflicts is 
to study the decision-making process behind their group interactions.  When do children 
think it is okay to be different from the group? When do children believe that it is okay to 
let the group know that they want to change the activity of the group?  The overall focus 
of this research is on how children evaluate peer group decisions to include and exclude 
others. The contexts examined for this study were those associated with gender 
stereotypic expectations about aggressive behavior.  Specifically, the research question 
focused on the legitimacy of excluding someone from a group based on gender, and when 
children expected groups to condone different forms of aggressive behavior due to the 
gender stereotypes surrounding different types of aggression.   Gender-associated 
aggressive behavior refers to behavior that is associated (perhaps only through 
stereotypes) with boys, such as physical aggression, and with girls, such as relational 
aggression (e.g., gossiping, teasing, with negative intentions) (see Card, Stucky, 
Sawalani, & Little, 2008; Crick & Grotpeter, 1995; Ostrov & Godleski, 2010 for a 
summary of research on gender differences in aggression). The empirical question 
centered on when children view these forms of aggression to be condoned in the context 
2 
 
of peer group dynamics, and when children viewed it as legitimate to challenge the group 
norms that perpetuate aggressive behavior (relational or physical).  
A further consideration is how children will respond to members of their gender 
group who disagree with or dissent from the group based on gender stereotypic 
expectations. Gender-associated forms of aggression and gender-stereotypic activities 
were included for analysis in this project and were: 1) gendered forms of aggression, 
physical (male) and relational (female) ; and 2) gendered types of activities, football 
(male) and ballet (female).   
It is important to note that the research literature has recently shown that, across 
many cultural contexts and in many studies, in fact, boys engage in more physical 
aggression than do girls, but that there are no differences in mean levels of relational 
aggression between boys and girls (Card et al., 2008; Lansford et al., 2012).  However, 
the stereotype indicating that girls engage in more relational aggression and boys engage 
in more physical aggression persists. For instance, even the most recent research on 
gender and aggression often relies upon these stereotypes as a foundation behind the 
research design (Kochel, Miller, Updegraff, Ladd, & Kochenderfer-Ladd, 2012).  This 
continued reliance upon gender stereotypic conceptions of aggression is problematic and 
this research aims to examine if children actually do perceive these behaviors as 
stereotypic and if they use such stereotypes in evaluating their peers.   
Thus, the aim of this study is to examine how children react to changes within the 
group, specifically when group members challenge the stereotypic expectations of their 
group. The findings from this project will help to provide information that can guide 
teachers and counselors in establishing classroom and school environments where 
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children feel comfortable in their group interactions, even when this involves challenging 
or resisting stereotypes.  This is a critically important research area, as confidence in 
challenging group behaviors, which are unacceptable because they are founded upon 
stereotypes or exhibit prejudicial or biased attitudes, or group behaviors, which cause 
harm to others, is the first step towards child-led forms of social justice where children 
influence their peers to change group behaviors. 
This study draws from theories and methodologies in social development which 
have investigated  children’s and adolescents’ evaluations of social exclusion (Killen & 
Rutland, 2011), specifically social domain theory (Killen, 2007; Turiel, 2006) and 
developmental subjective group dynamics (Abrams & Rutland, 2008). This study will 
extend previous research by examining resistance to norms which also involve widely 
held stereotypes.  Previously, researchers have shown that children view deviating from a 
group as acceptable when the group distributes resources unequally or breaks social 
conventions about dress codes (Killen, Rutland, Abrams, Mulvey, & Hitti, 2012), but no 
research has examined what children think about the costs of resisting group norms, or 
whether it is okay to challenge a group when the norms are about gender appropriate or 
gender stereotypic expectations. The general aim of this research is to examine whether 
children consider resistance to gender-stereotypic behaviors to be grounds for exclusion 
from a group. The goals are to:  1) to examine evaluations of exclusion from groups 
which hold norms that are related to the gender identity of the group, and 2) to examine 
the role of social-cognitive skills, such as theory of mind, in evaluations of resisting 
stereotypes and gender exclusion.  
4 
 
In order to understand how children respond to resistance to peer group norms, or 
behaviors, this study employed hypothetical scenarios involving groups that adhere to 
and resist gender stereotypes.  Participants made judgments about members of these 
groups who disagree with their group in the context of physical aggression, relational 
aggression, and gender stereotypic activities (football and ballet). As an example, do 
children think it is okay for a girl to tell her girls’ group that gossiping (relational 
aggression) is not okay when the group has been known to gossip?   Or a boy to tell his 
boys’ group that pushing and shoving (physical aggression) is not okay when the group 
has been known to act rough?  These questions are important because children encounter 
these types of situations, and how children construe the norms of groups in these contexts 
is not known.  To compare participants’ evaluations of different “gendered” forms of 
aggression with other activities associated with gender, evaluations of resistance 
regarding general social activities associated with gender were also studied in this project 
(e.g., football and ballet). Thus, gender stereotypic activities surround choices about 
activities for social interactions, while physical and relational aggression involve 
psychological decisions about behaviors that are potentially harmful to others.  While 
some research has examined children’s reactions to peers who engage in physical 
aggression, relational aggression and social conventional violations (cheering for a 
different team), this research only assessed participants’ favorability towards these peers 
and did so in gender neutral contexts (Atkin & Gummerum, 2012). 
What factors contribute to children’s judgments about resisting group norms, 
particularly in contexts in which the norms may be wrong from a moral perspective (e.g., 
inflicting harm on others)?  One aspect of children’s evaluations which has received 
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attention recently has to do with theory of mind, which is a form of perspective taking.  
In fact, research indicates that theory of mind abilities are related to exclusion judgments 
(Abrams, Rutland, Pelletier, & Ferrell, 2009), as well as to understanding of gender 
discrimination (Brown, Bigler, & Chu, 2010) and moral transgressions (Killen, Mulvey, 
Richardson, Jampol, & Woodward, 2011). Additionally, some research indicates that 
holding gender stereotypes may impact one’s ability to take others’ perspectives (Kelly, 
Mulvey, Hitti, Moin, & Killen, May 2011; Terwogt & Rieffe, 2003)   
Understanding the relation between theory of mind competence and evaluations 
of peer group interactions is important, as theory of mind is developing at the same time 
as children are becoming more experienced in group contexts.  Little is known, however, 
about how theory of mind may impact how children perceive peers who challenge group 
norms.  Are children with greater or more sophisticated theory of mind skills better able 
to understand the perspective of the child who disagrees with the group?  Can they also 
understand the group’s perspective?  If children, themselves, hold gender stereotypic 
expectations will this impair their ability to understand others’ perspectives?  
Understanding more about the relation between theory of mind competence and 
evaluations of peers who challenge stereotypic group norms will provide insight into how 
teachers, parents and group leaders can better guide children towards successful peer 
relationships.   Thus, assessments of theory of mind will be compared to participants’ 
exclusion judgments in order to determine the relation between understanding group 
dynamics surrounding gender stereotypes and social-cognitive skills.   
In sum, the first aim of this research is to better understand evaluations of social 
exclusion in the context of complex peer group interactions where stereotypes come into 
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play, group norms are clearly delineated, and resistance to these norms is experimentally 
manipulated. Additionally, the second aim of this research is to identify relations between 
social-cognitive judgments in peer relationships and social-cognitive skills. 
Theoretical Rationale 
As children engage with peer groups, they frequently encounter situations in 
which they must balance information about their social worlds and make moral decisions.  
Very early in childhood, concepts of fairness and equality emerge, enabling even children 
as young as 2 ½ to 3 years of age to make moral judgments in social encounters.  At the 
same time, children are able to distinguish issues which involve rights, justice, welfare 
and harm from those which involve conventions, traditions or customs, and those which 
involve personal preferences (Nucci, 1981; Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 1983, 2006).  
Children’s differentiated understanding of social issues is reflected in their reasoning 
about moral and social decisions which they make.   
While children are developing concepts of fairness, they also develop a sense of 
group identity, and stereotypes and prejudicial attitudes about others unlike themselves 
(Rutland, Killen, & Abrams, 2010).  Quite early, children begin to understand group 
dynamics, and the complex interplay between distinct social groups (Abrams & Rutland, 
2008).  From as early as 6 years of age, children can and do differentiate between ingroup 
and outgroup members who either adhere to or resist the norms, or conventions, practices 
and beliefs of their groups.  Finally, during this time period, children’s social cognitive 
skills, such as theory of mind (Wellman & Liu, 2004), are increasing, as is their reliance 




Two distinct, yet complementary theoretical frameworks drive much of our 
understanding of how children balance their complex social worlds:  social domain 
theory (SDT), which distinguishes between the societal, moral, and psychological 
domains of knowledge used in making judgments (Turiel, 1983), and developmental 
subjective group dynamics (DSGD), which argues that children differentiate distinctly 
between ingroup and outgroup members who express deviant and normative views 
(Abrams, Rutland, & Cameron, 2003). Both frameworks include a recognition of the 
growing social-cognitive competencies of children, as well as the stereotypes and biases 
which they may bring to social interactions.   
Social Domain Theory  
Social domain theory provides a key framework for examining children’s social 
interactions and moral decision-making. Specifically, domain theory identifies three 
domains children use in making judgments: moral (fairness, justice, rights and welfare), 
societal (customs, conventions, group functioning, traditions) and psychological 
(personal preference, autonomy, intentions and understanding mental states) (Turiel, 
1983).  Over 30 years of research indicates that, in many situations, individuals clearly 
and systematically identify a single domain in their reasoning (for a review, see  Smetana, 
2006).  These are considered straightforward or prototypic scenarios.  As an example, 
children overwhelming identify hitting another person as wrong and justify this 
evaluation by referencing the intrinsic negative consequences of hitting (harm to 
another), classifying the event as a moral transgression.   
Whereas many events which children encounter are prototypic, and thus, easily 
identified as falling within one particular domain, increasingly, children also encounter 
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multifaceted situations, where children must weigh competing concerns from multiple 
domains in making an evaluation or judgment.  For instance, stereotypes are an example 
of a multifaceted issue: children may recognize the harmful or unfair nature of holding a 
stereotype about someone else (moral domain), while also acknowledging that some 
stereotypes may enable children to distinguish their group from others and to define their 
group’s customs (societal domain).  When individuals evaluate complex, multifaceted 
acts and issues, they must balance and weigh different considerations, reasoning, at times, 
using multiple domains.   
As early as age three, children clearly differentiate between moral acts, as those 
involving harm to others; societal acts, as those surrounding customs and traditions; and 
psychological acts as those which should not be regulated by others (Nucci, 1981; 
Smetana, 1983; Turiel, 1983).  Early in development, children clearly use moral 
reasoning when addressing issues involving physical harm.  Soon after, they also use 
moral reasoning for psychological harm.  And, by middle childhood or early adolescence, 
issues of group functioning begin to play an important role in how children conceptualize 
acts (Horn, 2003). While initial research using social domain theory focused on 
prototypic issues, in the past decade researchers have begun to examine more complex 
social interactions, including those involving intergroup components (Killen, Margie, & 
Sinno, 2006).   
The recent focus on intergroup relations by social domain researchers has 
involved, in particular, children’s assessments of inclusion and exclusion decisions 
(Killen, 2007).  This research provides a particularly effective means of understanding 
the intersection between children’s conceptions of intergroup relations, stereotypes and 
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biases, and the moral, societal and psychological domains.  Research on social exclusion 
has occurred around the world, finding that children, at times, view exclusion as 
acceptable, especially because of societal reasons such as traditions or group functioning, 
and at times, unacceptable, particularly when exclusion is based on group membership, 
such as gender or ethnicity (Hitti, Mulvey, & Killen, 2011).   
Developmental Subjective Group Dynamics  
 Developmental subjective group dynamics (DSGD) focuses on group identity and 
the relation between judgments about members of one’s ingroup and judgments about 
ingroups and outgroups generally (Abrams, Rutland, & Cameron, 2003; Abrams, 
Rutland, Cameron, & Marques, 2003). Specifically, DSGD examines children’s 
evaluations of ingroup and outgroup members who express deviant and normative 
attitudes towards the group (Abrams & Rutland, 2008). For example research in this field 
has examined group norms involving loyalty to the group, such as cheering for one’s 
ingroup sports team. Research has found that children prefer individuals who express 
normative, or loyal, ideas about the ingroup, regardless of their group affiliation and 
likewise express greater dislike for individuals who deviate from the group norms 
(Abrams, Rutland, Cameron, & Ferrell, 2007; Abrams, Rutland, Cameron, et al., 2003; 
Abrams, Rutland, Ferrell, & Pelletier, 2008; Abrams et al., 2009). Additionally, research 
on DSGD has shown that when evaluating moral or immoral peers versus loyal or 
disloyal peers, children use intergroup bias for group based evaluations (about loyalty), 
but not morality based evaluations (Abrams, Rutland, et al., 2008). DSGD has also 
revealed that older children adhere more to group norms than do younger children and 
rely more on group-functioning  in decision-making than do younger children (Abrams et 
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al., 2007). This has led researchers to examines children’s Theory of Social Mind 
(ToSM), or their understanding of how groups function (Abrams et al., 2009). ToSM 
predicts that support for exclusion is greater in those who better understand group 
functioning and that ToSM increases with age.  
 Thus, DSGD brings to the study of exclusion a focus on the salience of group 
identity and an understanding of how individuals evaluate ingroup and outgroup 
members who are either loyal or deviant towards group norms. SDT, additionally, brings 
a clear system for delineating different domains of reasoning, and a focus on the 
complexity of children’s social interactions to the study of exclusion.  Both of these 
frameworks provided the foundation for the current study.  
Study Rationale 
Challenging the Group:  Morality and Group Identity 
 A recent study was designed to focus on gender-based groups, assessing how 
children respond to deviance from group norms (Killen, Rutland, et al., 2012).  In this 




 graders) were asked to evaluate peer groups 
which either held conventional norms about dress or moral norms about distribution of 
resources.  Additionally, in some conditions, the group norm adhered to a generic norm, 
which is one that reflected societal conventions or moral principles (Abrams, Rutland, et 
al., 2008), and some adhered to a group-specific norm, which was counter to the generic 
norm.   
Thus, in the conventional domain, participants assessed a group that wanted to 
wear a club tee-shirt to a school event (traditional: conventional domain, generic norm), 
and a group that did not want to wear a club tee-shirt to a school event (non-traditional: 
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conventional domain, group-specific norm).  In the moral domain, participants assessed a 
group that wanted to distribute resources evenly between their group and another group 
(equal: moral domain, generic norm), and a group that wanted to keep more resources for 
their own group than they gave to another group (unequal: moral domain, group-specific 
norm).  In each condition, participants assessed members of the group who disagreed 
with or deviated from the group, and instead adhered to the opposite norm.  For instance, 
if the group held an equal norm, the deviant member would espouse an unequal norm, 
suggesting that the group should keep more resources for themselves.  
In contrast to findings from DSGD, which has previously only examined generic 
norms, children and adolescents were supportive of some forms of deviance.  
Specifically, while they asserted that groups would negatively evaluate all members who 
deviate from group norms, participants identified the equal and traditional deviant acts 
positively and asserted that they would individually like the equal and traditional deviant 
members (Mulvey, Hitti, Rutland, Abrams, & Killen, under review).  Further, participants 
did not see any of these forms of deviance to be grounds for exclusion from the group. 
Additionally, little ingroup bias was found.  When participants were asked to 
choose between including someone who shared the gender identity of the group, but 
resisted the group’s norm, or someone who did not share the gender identity of the group, 
but adhered to the group’s norm, they paid much greater attention to the group norm and 
the valance of that norm, than to gender identity.  Specifically, they were especially 
willing to include in the group a peer who did not share the gender of the group, but did 
share the group’s norm (for instance including an equal girl in an equal boys group), 
when the group norm was also a generic norm (equal and traditional).  Further, when they 
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did choose to include an ingroup member in a group, this was often when the group held 
a group-specific norm (unequal and non-traditional).  In these cases, they recognized, not 
the gender-identity of the individual they chose to include, but rather the generic nature 
of that individual’s norm (saying for instance that including an equal girl into an unequal 
girls group was the best choice because she was being fair).   
This study introduces a number of questions, however, regarding children’s 
willingness to accept deviance from group norms.  Whereas children and adolescents 
were willing to accept deviance if it adhered to generic norms, they were less willing to 
accept deviance that resisted generic norms.  Moreover, they still asserted that groups 
would not like deviant members, regardless of the valance of the deviance.  This study, 
further, was conducted in the context of gender groups, but the norms of the groups were 
free from gender stereotypes or gender-specific information.  In children’s everyday 
lives, however, gender stereotypes are abundant and can shape children’s thinking about 
their peer groups (Liben & Bigler, 2002).   
Types of Gender Stereotypes  
Thus, the current study was designed to extend this previous research by 
examining group norms which explicitly also involve gender stereotypes.  Understanding 
how children perceive resistance to gender stereotypes will provide key information that 
can be used to help children combat harmful stereotypes as well as to design 
environments where children will feel comfortable expressing resistance to gender 
stereotypes.  Challenging gender stereotypes can, in many situations, be vitally important.  
For instance, gender stereotypes about appropriate activities can lead to prejudice, bias 
and discrimination that extend through adulthood. Further, gender stereotypes condoning 
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aggression directly involve harm to others.  Such stereotypes may perpetuate societal 
condoned differences in academics, sports and the workplace, leading to unequal 
opportunities and differential expectations for each gender. 
This research was designed, then, to examine different types of gender 
stereotypes. Though stereotypes regarding conventions (such as choice of activities or 
clothing) are most commonly studied, not all gender stereotypes are conventional, or 
about traditions, customs and practices.  In fact, some gender stereotypes surround moral 
behaviors.  Specifically, aggression has been identified as male stereotype (labeled a 
“trait” stereotype by much of the literature, see Liben and Bigler (2002)).  Additionally, 
outside of the stereotyping literature, foundational findings from peer relations 
researchers have identified physical aggression as a male-typed form of aggression and 
relational, or social, aggression as a female-typed form of aggression (Crick & Grotpeter, 
1995).  Physical aggression is identified as behaviors such as hitting, and fighting, while 
relational aggression involves gossiping, excluding others, and saying mean things to 
others. More recent research findings are mixed, with some research indicating that boys 
engage in more of both types of aggression, and girls engage in more relational 
aggression (Ostrov & Godleski, 2010).  Other research indicates that the differences 
between genders in forms of aggression are minor, and that whereas boys do engage in 
more physical aggression than do girls, that there are no differences for relational 
aggression between genders (Lansford et al., 2012). Thus, it appears that associations 
between each gender and particular forms of aggression, are, in fact, stereotypes.  There 
is also some evidence that children who participate in gender non-conforming types of 
aggression are more at risk for externalizing problems (girls who are physically 
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aggressive and boys who are relationally aggressive) (Crick, Ostrov, & Werner, 2006).  
Further, recent research indicates that girls who are aggressive (physical or relational) are 
more likely to be rejected and excluded than are boys who are aggressive (Kochel et al., 
2012)  Thus, though recent research findings are mixed regarding actual mean differences 
between the genders regarding different forms of aggression, messages about gender-
appropriate forms of aggression are condoned by society and there are implications for 
non-conformity in terms of aggression.  Moreover, however, both physical and relational 
aggression have intrinsic negative consequences for the recipients of these forms of 
aggression (Buhs, Ladd, & Herald, 2006), and, thus, should be considered moral 
transgressions.  Finally, research indicates that aggressive behavior (physical) is very 
rare, but that it peaks by 27 months of age, and following this peak, children follow 
distinct and different trajectories, with some children showing persistent high levels of 
aggression throughout childhood and into adolescence (Brame, Nagin, & Tremblay, 
2001; Broidy et al., 2003; Hartup, 2005). Further, some children who are highly 
aggressive are also quite popular, while others are socially rejected (Estell, Cairns, 
Farmer, & Cairns, 2002).  
Whereas researchers examining gender stereotypes have less commonly examined 
forms of aggression, the peer relations findings indicate that children do perceive these 
aggressive behaviors to be linked to gender (Crick & Grotpeter, 1995). Physical 
aggression as a male stereotyped behavior and relational aggression as a female 
stereotyped behavior have primarily been examined within the peer relations literature, 
however it is important to examine these forms of aggression as involving gender 
stereotypes.  Examining these stereotypes about aggression will enable us to better 
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understand how children perceive these behaviors and, specifically, under what 
circumstances children will be willing to reject these behaviors as unfair or unjust.   
Further, more needs to be understood about how children respond to conventional 
gender stereotypes, such as those regarding after-school activities, both as a comparison 
to  stereotypes involving morally relevant behaviors and norms, and in light of the 
significant societal messages condoning gender segregated play and activities from 
childhood through adulthood.  Research has also established that strong gender 
stereotypes are held about choices of afterschool activities, and that deviating from 
gender stereotypic activities is perceived negatively (Horn, 2007).  
Thus, new research is needed, which extends the Killen, Rutland, et al. (2012) 
study, and examines how children and adolescents view gender stereotyped group norms, 
both moral (about physical and relational aggression) and conventional (about activities, 
such as football and ballet).  Extensive research indicates that groups do hold group 
norms, which are the conventions and practices of the group, including norms about how 
groups treat other individuals (Nesdale, 2008).  No research, however, to date has 
compared how children respond to moral and conventional gender stereotypic group 
norms.  This will clarify if, as found in the previous study, children attend more to the 
nature of the group norm than to group identity (gender), even in the face of stereotypic 
group norms.  Will children reject both forms of aggression from both boys and girls, or 
will gender stereotypes which condone different forms of aggression impact their 
evaluations?  This study will provide more information about if children and adolescents 
perceive group norms which involve gender stereotypes as salient and what pressures 
they experience to adhere to these norms.   
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Evaluating Resistance to Peer Group Behavior 
It is also important that new research identify exactly how likely children and 
adolescents think group members who disagree with their gender stereotypic group 
norms are to express their resistance to their groups.  Previous research has not assessed 
how likely children think resistance to group norms is, but, rather, has always established 
that resistance or deviance has occurred, and then asked children for their evaluations of 
the deviant group member (Abrams & Rutland, 2008).  Research examining peer 
influence, though, indicates how strong an influence peer groups are, particularly for 
young adolescents (Brechwald & Prinstein, 2011).  Additionally, research indicates that, 
with age, adolescents are better able to resist peer influence (Sumter, Bokhorst, Steinberg, 
& Westenberg, 2009).  Further, it has been documented that children and adolescents 
conform to a range of peer group norms, including those condoning or promoting 
aggressive behavior (Brechwald & Prinstein, 2011).  Research is needed, then, which 
clarifies under what conditions children and adolescents feel comfortable resisting their 
group.  This is important as challenges to gender stereotypes and aggressive behavior, 
which come from within the peer group may be an effective way to combat harmful and 
resilient gender stereotypes as well as aggression.  Thus, it is important to understand if, 
and in what circumstances, children will speak up, and work as the agents of change to 
resist gender stereotypes.   
Research has also identified a bystander effect, whereby individuals may not go to 
the aid victims (Latane & Darley, 1970).  Findings with children indicate the importance 
of bystanders, documenting that higher instances of defending victims is related to lower 
levels of aggression and bullying in classrooms (Salmivalli, Voeten, & Poskiparta, 2011).  
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Additionally, research has documented that higher classroom attitudes about collective-
efficacy (beliefs about a group’s ability to achieve a particular outcome) and, for girls, 
higher levels of empathy, are related to more instances of intervening in peer aggression 
(Barchia & Bussey, 2011).  Further, research on children’s evaluations of victim 
responses to unfair treatment reveals that, by age 7, children evaluate resisting 
victimization positively (Shaw & Wainryb, 2006). It is important to note that research 
which actually includes observations of bystander behavior is quite rare; much of this 
work instead documents self report of bystander behavior. Further, most of this research 
involves true bystanders, those who observe, but are not directly involved in a situation, 
or the victims, themselves.  It is often the case, though, that children and adolescents may 
directly be part of groups which engage in aggressive behavior or perpetuation of 
stereotypes. Further, research documents that if adolescents are part of groups which 
engage in antisocial behaviors, like aggression, talking about these behaviors actually 
increases instances of these antisocial behaviors (Piehler & Dishion, 2007).  This 
indicates that something like “deviancy training” occurs among adolescents as part of 
their conversations in their peer groups (Piehler & Dishion, 2007).  Less is known, 
however, about if peers can influence members of their own peer group in positive ways. 
Thus, new research is needed which examines if children view resistance to the norms of 
one’s own group as likely, or not.  This is particularly important given the pervasive 
influence of peers (Brechwald & Prinstein, 2011), on the one hand, and the positive 
impact that resisting aggression can have on future instances of aggression (Salmivalli et 
al., 2011).   
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Whereas the peer influence literature and developmental subjective group 
dynamics, generally, show how powerful the influence of peer group norms can be on 
children and adolescents, there is also research that shows little relation between the 
prejudices and stereotypes held by adolescents who are friends (Ritchey & Fishbein, 
2001).  This indicates that, while a peer group may hold a stereotypic norm, there may be 
individual members of that group who do not subscribe to that stereotypic belief.   
Further, research indicates that children do recognize the importance of personal 
opinion and personal choice: When asked to decide between a personal preference and a 
friend’s preference, younger children prioritized the friend’s preference across 
conditions, whereas adolescents asserted that fulfilling one’s personal prerogative was an 
acceptable decision (Komolova & Wainryb, 2011).  In these situations, however, neither 
gender stereotypes nor norms about aggression were involved.  Additionally, these were 
dyadic exchanges, where asserting one’s own preference or belief may be easier than in a 
group scenario.  This research does indicate, however, the importance of personal choice 
(Nucci, 1981) and autonomy for children, which suggests that children may, especially in 
the context of social-conventional norms involving gender stereotypes (such as which 
activity to participate in, football or ballet), see a role for autonomy and personal choice.  
Across all scenarios, the question remains, though, do children think that these dissenting 
members can and will voice their resistance?  Further, how will they, personally, evaluate 
such resistance, and how do they think groups will evaluate it? 
Repercussions for Resistance: Exclusion?  
 It may be that one of the key factors which determines if children think that 
resisting stereotypic group norms is likely will be their sense of what the repercussions, 
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or consequences, for resisting the group will be.  Children may be unwilling to express 
resistance when they are part of the group that is perpetuating stereotypes or aggression 
because of fear that changing the status quo may negatively impact their position in the 
group (Juvonen & Galván, 2008). Research with adults indicates that adults dislike peers 
who do not conform to negative group behaviors (“moral rebels”) (Monin, Sawyer, & 
Marquez, 2008), but research with children indicates that children like peers who resist 
the group in order to assert behaviors that align with moral principles (Killen, Rutland, et 
al., 2012).  It may be though, that while children, individually evaluate such forms of 
deviance positively, they also think that deviating from group norms will have 
consequences, making such deviance less likely.   
One potential, and particularly harmful, consequence for resisting the peer group 
is exclusion from that peer group.   Research has documented that social-exclusion can 
have significant impacts on children’s academic motivation and success in school, as well 
as on their mental health and well-being (Buhs et al., 2006).  Additionally, children who 
fail to adhere to social group norms are at risk for exclusion from those groups and 
rejection by their peers (Abrams & Rutland, 2008; Juvonen & Galván, 2008).  Finally, 
extensive research with children and adolescents indicates that children reject exclusion 
as unacceptable (Killen, Sinno, & Margie, 2007), but may use information about 
stereotypes (Killen, Pisacane, Lee-Kim, & Ardila-Rey, 2001), personality traits (Park & 
Killen, 2010), or group norms (Killen, Rutland, et al., 2012)  to justify exclusion.  
Further, while much research has focused on the social deficits of the target of exclusion 
or rejection from the peer group, exclusion can also occur because of one’s group 
membership.  A recent proposal urged researchers to consider the role that both 
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interpersonal and intergroup components could play in exclusion decisions (Killen, 
Mulvey, & Hitti, 2012).  In the context of challenging one’s peer group about gender 
stereotypes regarding aggression, little is known about if peers are concerned that they 
will be rejected from the group because they advocate for gender non-conforming 
behaviors (for instance, a boy urging his group to play nicely instead of rough).  One 
may, in fact, be excluded from a group with whom one shares group membership for not 
exhibiting normative (stereotypic) group behavior (in terms of gender, in this context). 
Thus, this research aims to identify whether exclusion is viewed as a likely 
consequence for resisting the group’s stereotypic and aggressive norms, and whether a 
relation exists between children’s judgments about the likelihood that exclusion will be a 
consequence for resistance and their judgments about the likelihood of resistance, itself.  
Previous research has assessed if participants would support exclusion as a consequence 
for a particular behavior, for instance resisting the group norm; no research to date, 
however, has assessed if participants think that groups would be likely to exclude 
someone because they challenge the group norm.  The difference here is that while 
children generally reject exclusion, they may, in fact, believe that groups would condone 
exclusion. Even if children evaluate exclusion as morally unacceptable, they may think 
that groups will use exclusion as a consequence for resisting the group.  Thus, it is 
important to assess if children and adolescents think that exclusion will be a consequence 
for disagreeing with the group.  If children do perceive exclusion to be a potential 
consequence for resisting gender stereotypic norms, will they be less likely to express 
their disagreement to the group?  Understanding this relation will provide key new 
information to aid teachers, policy-makers and group leaders in fostering peer group 
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relationships where resisting negative peer behavior is seen as a possibility and where 
children do not fear repercussions such as exclusion.   
Social-Cognitive Skills  
 The current study, thus, examines children’s evaluations of the likelihood of 
resistance, and of exclusion, as well as individual and group responses to resistance, in 
the context of group norms about social-conventional and moral gender stereotypes.  
While understanding children’s decision-making will prove insightful, it may be the case 
that underlying social-cognitive skills may impact children’s evaluations (Mulvey, Hitti, 
& Killen, 2013).  Specifically, research has identified the relation between theory of 
mind, the ability to recognize other’s intentions, beliefs and desires (Wellman & Liu, 
2004), and moral judgments (Killen et al., 2011). Further, research indicates that a 
relation may exist between perspective-taking and shared experiences (Chandler & Helm, 
1984), gender stereotypes and theory of mind (Kelly, Mulvey, Hitti, & Moin, 2011; 
Terwogt & Rieffe, 2003), between theory of mind and understanding of gender 
discrimination (Brown et al., 2010), and between theory of mind and evaluations of 
exclusion (Abrams et al., 2009).   Additionally, poor theory of mind skills have been 
linked to problematic outcomes: young children with poor theory of mind skills predict 
the likelihood that one becomes a victim, a bully or a bully-victim in later childhood 
(Shakoor et al., 2012) Thus, one aim of this study is to identify if children who exhibit 
theory of mind competence differ from children who do not exhibit theory of mind 
competence in their evaluations of group members who challenge gender stereotypic 
group norms.  This research will examine more complex forms of theory of mind.  While 
much research with theory of mind uses simple laboratory-based assessments, such as the 
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traditional false-belief tasks (Wellman & Liu, 2004), recent research indicates that, when 
assessed in complex peer interactions, including those involving a potential victim, it may 
be more challenging to employ theory of mind skills (Killen et al., 2011).  Further, this 
research indicates that employing theory of mind skills may be more challenging in 
complex social scenarios.  This will clarify if potential age-related differences are driven 
by social-cognitive development.  Specifically, it may be the case that possessing theory 
of mind skills will enable participants to better take into account both the perspective of 
the group and the perspective of the individual member, in evaluating the likelihood of 
resistance as well as the consequences for resistance in terms of exclusion.   
In sum, this research addresses under what conditions individuals view 
stereotypic expectations as legitimate or unfair and how children conceptualize the costs 
to challenging gender stereotypes, and the social-cognitive requirements for making such 
judgments.  How do children and adolescents weigh the negative moral nature of these 
gender-stereotyped aggressive behaviors with the prevailing social acceptance of these 
behaviors for each gender?  Can and do they recognize the value of breaking these gender 
stereotypes and how do they think their peer groups will respond to such resistance?   
Current Study: Design and Hypotheses 
Study Design 
  Two age-groups (9-10 year olds and 13-14 year olds) were chosen for this study 
as these groups span development from childhood to adolescence.  Additionally, as 
research indicates both that children become more flexible in their thinking about 
stereotypes with age (Arthur, Bigler, Liben, Gelman, & Ruble, 2008), and that they are 
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still quite unwilling to accept gender non-conformity through adolescence (Horn, 2007), 
examining both children and adolescents is theoretically of interest.   
  Participants assessed scenarios about groups that conform to and resist 
stereotypes about:  a) physical aggression, b) relational aggression, and c) gender 
stereotypic activities. Finally, participants completed an Interpretive Theory of Mind Task 
(Carpendale & Chandler, 1996) and a Stereotype Awareness Task, which was modified 
from Signorella, Bigler, and Liben (1993). See Appendix B, for an example protocol.  
 Participants evaluated how likely they think resistance to the group norm is, as 
well as how likely it is that they, personally, would resist the group norm. While research 
has examined how children respond to deviance from groups (Abrams & Rutland, 2008), 
less is known about if children and adolescents think that resistance is likely.  
Understanding more about likelihood of resistance will fill an important gap in our 
knowledge of children’s evaluations of social relationships.  Further, research indicates 
that children, individually, do not always agree with the decisions of group (Mulvey et 
al., under review), but less is known about if children will agree with an individual group 
member’s decision to resist a group norm in different contexts. 
  Additionally, participants made favorability judgments, assessing their 
expectations of how much the group would like a member who challenges the group and 
rating how much they would individually like such a member. These measures allowed 
for an examination of if participants are able to distinguish their own perspective from the 
group’s perspective and to assess instances in which children may recognize that the 
group may hold a belief which they do not share.   
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  Additionally, two measures assessed potential repercussions for resisting group 
norms involving gender stereotypes.  While previous research has most often assessed 
acceptability of exclusion, finding that children and adolescents are not willing to exclude 
others (Killen & Rutland, 2011), exclusion is still pervasive among children.   This study 
extended previous measures by assessing likelihood of exclusion.  This item measured 
not if participants approve of exclusion, but rather, if participants think a dissenting 
member will be excluded for expressing disagreement. Thus, in order to better understand 
this discrepancy, this study included an assessment of if participants think that exclusion 
will be a repercussion for challenging a group’s norms.    
  In many situations, children must choose between peers and only include one 
person.  The last measure required that participants make a forced choice inclusion 
decision.  This measure also assessed repercussions for resisting the group:  do 
participants think that a target should be denied entry into a group because he or she 
disagrees with the group?  Additionally, this measure assessed the relative weight that 
participants put on group identity (gender) and group norms in assessing who should be 
part of different social groups.   
  For each of these measures (except for the first two), reasoning was also assessed, 
drawing on social domain theory.  Measuring reasoning is particularly important, as it 
helps to identify why children and adolescents make the decisions they do and what is 
driving such decisions.  Little research which has examined children’s understanding of 
group dynamics has also assessed reasoning, yet reasoning can provide essential insight 
into precisely why children condone or reject certain behaviors in group contexts. 
Study Hypotheses    
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See Table 1 for an overview of hypotheses and analyses that were conducted. 
Overall, it was expected that participants would rely less on gender stereotypes for the 
moral conditions than for the conventional conditions.  Additionally, it was expected that 
participants will be more favorable to targets who resist aggressive behavior.  There may 
be a shifting standard (Biernat & Manis, 1994), whereby gender non-conformity 
(resisting gender stereotypes) will be less acceptable for boys than for girls, in both the 
moral and conventional domains.    
Likelihood of resistance and individual likelihood of resistance. It was 
expected that participants will be more likely to expect targets will resist the group when 
the group is stereotype non-conforming than when the group conforms to stereotypes.   
Further, resistance will be less likely for the gender stereotypic activities when the group 
adheres to stereotypes than when they do not.  It was expected that participants would 
least expect resistance from a boy who wants to do ballet when his group wants to do 
football, given the research on the shifting standard (Biernat & Manis, 1994).  
In terms of age group, it was expected that children would see deviance as more 
likely than will adolescents due to greater concern by adolescents for group functioning 
(Horn, 2003) and concern over peer influence (Brechwald & Prinstein, 2011).  Finally, it 
was an open question if participants would differ in their responses depending on if they 
are assessing their ingroup or their outgroup.   
It was expected that participants, themselves, would be more attuned to 
challenging aggressive behavior than they would expect their peers to be.  Thus, it was 
expected that participants would rate their own likelihood of resistance to aggressive 
norms to be higher than the ratings they provide for their peers.   
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Group favorability toward dissenting member. Participants would likely 
expect that groups will not like dissenting members, but this would vary if the dissenter is 
resisting or condoning aggression.  Further, groups would be more favorable to dissenting 
members who resist aggression, as aggression would likely be viewed as a moral 
transgression.  There may be a shifting standard, with participants asserting that groups 
would find deviance towards non-conforming behaviors as less acceptable, especially for 
boys who want to do ballet.  There would likely be differences in reasoning for this 
assessment as well, with participants citing group functioning and other societal 
justifications when asserting that the group would not like dissenting members who resist 
stereotypes.  Adolescents would be more likely to reference group functioning than 
would children. Additionally, some participants would likely justify their responses in 
terms of stereotypic concerns, particularly in the conventional context.   
 Individual favorability toward dissenting member.  While it was expected that 
group favorability judgments would be influenced by stereotypic expectations, it was 
expected that individual favorability toward the dissenting member would be more 
strongly influenced by the norm of the group, with participants supporting dissenting 
members who adhere to generic moral principles and resist aggression, regardless of their 
gender.  Status differences may emerge for the gender stereotypic activities, with non-
conformity being seen as more positive for girls, than for boys, because participants may 
believe that boys should not move down the status ladder to act in stereotypically female 
ways.   
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There would likely also be differences by theory of mind ability, with participants 
with more developed theory of mind skills more likely to positively evaluate members 
who challenge a group’s aggressive norms. 
There would likely be differences in reasoning used as well, with participants 
referencing moral reasons when supporting the dissenting members who avoid 
aggression, and referencing harm, in particular, when evaluating the dissenting members 
who engage in aggression more negatively.  Adolescents would likely focus on group 
functioning, particular in the context of gender stereotypic activities (football and ballet) 
and physical aggression during a sports game.  Finally, with age, participants would 
reference autonomy, saying that it is up to the dissenting member.   
Likelihood of exclusion. It was expected that, unlike prior research which has 
found that children view exclusion as unacceptable in most cases, children would identify 
exclusion as a likely repercussion for resisting the group.  Generally, children would be 
more likely to expect exclusion, as their social groups may be less fixed than adolescents’ 
and, thus, more malleable.  There may be a shifting standard, with participants expecting 
exclusion of the boy who wants to play ballet when the group wants to play football.  
Exclusion would be seen as more acceptable for the dissenting members who advocate 
for aggression (going against moral principles by gossiping and playing rough) than for 
those who resist aggression.   
Reasoning would likely vary based condition.  Finally, it was expected that 
participants may make more use of multiple domains in their reasoning for this question, 
recognizing the unfairness of exclusion by using the moral domain, but also noting the 
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likelihood of exclusion by referencing conventional forms of reasoning such as group 
goals and group functioning.   
Inclusion Choice.  Dissenting member who go against moral principles (by 
gossiping and playing rough) were less likely to be included.  On the other hand, 
participants would choose to include someone who does not share their group’s gender 
identity, but does share their group’s non-aggressive norms, for instance playing nice and 
being impartial.    
 Reasoning would likely focus on moral reasons when participants choose to 
include the non-aggressive target, regardless of if the target is conforming to or resisting 
stereotypes.  Participants with a higher awareness of stereotypes were expected to use 
conventional reasoning supporting stereotypes, including appeals to maintain the gender 
identity of the group.  Finally, participants may reference social justice and resisting 
stereotypes when choosing to include the non-stereotypic child in the group, regardless of 
the group norm.   
Implications 
Overall, this research will reveal new information about how children evaluate 
resistance to gender stereotypes, including those condoning different forms of aggression. 
Importantly, it will also reveal children’s views about the repercussions for challenging 
stereotypes, specifically in terms of exclusion. This research will have important 
implications for understanding how and under what conditions children choose to resist 
gender stereotypes, particularly about aggressive behavior.  Challenging groups about 
gender stereotyped aggressive behavior may not be easy for children, because of 
concerns about repercussion from the group in terms of exclusion.   
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Examining dissent from gender norms will provide insight into important social 
issues. Specifically, this study has implications for discrimination based on gender norms 
and expectations, and will provide insight into the developmental origins of moral 
judgments as well as prejudicial attitudes and behaviors. The findings will help to 
improve intergroup relations by informing educators, and parents of best practices for 
teaching tolerance, diversity, and acceptance of others, and for reducing stereotyping. 
This study will provide a greater understanding of how children and adolescents respond 
to gender stereotypes which can lead to interventions and curriculum to be used with 






As children and adolescents form social relationships and become part of social 
peer groups, they experience exclusion as well as opportunities to include or exclude 
others (Killen, Lee-Kim, McGlothlin, & Stangor, 2002).  Researchers in developmental 
and social psychology have studied social exclusion in a wide range of contexts, from 
situations in which exclusion occurs between dyads, individuals and groups. The focus of 
this review will be on gender exclusion, specifically when exclusion from peer groups 
occurs based on gender identity, as well as on the social-cognitive skills children bring to 
evaluations of gender exclusion.    
In the peer relationships literature, exclusion has often been studied in terms of  
individual differences, where peer rejection is identified as being an outcome of social 
competence deficits (e.g., aggression; social anxiety) (Rubin, Bukowski, & Parker, 2006).  
Exclusion does not always occur because of individual social deficits on the part of the 
excluded child, however. Rather, exclusion is often  based on stereotypes, or biases about 
a particular group, including stereotypes about gender (Killen, Mulvey, et al., 
2012).While exclusion based on gender has existed in cultures for millennia, only in recent 
decades has there been an explicit research focus in developmental psychology on gender 
exclusion, that is, how children and adolescents evaluate contexts in which girls or boys are 
excluded from a group based solely on gender. Research conducted on gender exclusion 
with children and adolescents in the U.S., Korea, Denmark, and Switzerland (to date) has 
revealed that gender exclusion is viewed as more acceptable than exclusion based on race 
and ethnicity (for a review see Hitti et al., 2011). Understanding exactly why and under 
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what conditions exclusion based on gender is still seen as legitimate will provide insight 
into the developmental origins of the societal conventions regarding education, occupation 
and gender roles that contribute to exclusionary decisions and outcomes.   Gender 
exclusion differs from many other forms of exclusion due to the societal affirmation of 
gender exclusion in sports, schools, and social contexts. Yet, how individuals evaluate it 
and the social-cognitive processes involved in this evaluation remain less well understood.  
Further, researchers have pointed out that more attention should be focused on how 
gender roles inhibit both girls’ and boys’ academic, athletic, and professional aspirations 
(Eccles, Roeser, Vida, Fredricks, & Wigfield, 2006; Ruble, Martin, & Berenbaum, 2006; 
Sinno & Killen, 2009). For instance, boys are often type-cast as aggressive, tough and 
sports-oriented, with little focus on their academic or artistic potential. Girls, on the other 
hand, are seen as fragile and non-athletic and continue to be excluded from athletic 
opportunities, despite Title IX legislation.  In fact, the gap between athletic opportunities 
for girls and boys has been widening in recent years (NCWGE, 2007).  Finally, gender-
segregated youth programming (for instance Girl Scouts and Cub Scouts) continues to be 
offered to children and research indicates that even into adolescence children most 
frequently socialize in single-sex groups (Maccoby, 2002). Further, socially-condoned 
messages about gender roles for girls and boys impact their self-esteem, as well as their 
motivation in a range of academic and social domains (Liben & Bigler, 2002; Ruble et al., 
2006). Gender based exclusion is complex, as it often begins in childhood in socially-
condoned, yet discriminatory, forms, and carries into adulthood in pernicious ways.   
One reason for the complexity of gender-based exclusion is that these forms of 
exclusion are not often explicitly labeled as based on one’s gender or adherence to gender 
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identity norms.  Rather, gender-based exclusion is often rather ambiguous. Research in 
the peer-rejection literature suggests that there is a significant amount of variation in how 
children respond to ambiguous instances of potential exclusion.  Specifically, Downey et 
al. (1998) found that some children are more sensitive to rejection than are others and that 
some children interpret many more scenarios as involving exclusion and rejection than do 
others.  This suggests that at least some children may have difficulty in anticipating, 
interpreting and understanding potential exclusion experiences based on gender.    
Children may differ in their responses to exclusion messages because of 
differences in their social-cognitive abilities due to their ages.  What it is not yet known is 
how children bring their cognitive skills and psychological knowledge into play when 
making evaluations about the likelihood of exclusion.  Specifically, exclusion decisions, 
particularly those centered on gender issues, often involve ambiguous situations which 
include stereotypes and require that children make a variety of judgments about others’ 
psychological states.  They need to balance a range of information in making exclusion 
decisions, including: a) the intentions of the target and the group that is potentially 
excluding the target; and b) the perspective of the target and the group that is potentially 
excluding (i.e. what do they think is happening).  Some children may not be able to 
attend to the multiple competing perspectives in making such exclusion decisions, 
however.   
This may be particularly challenging when considering gender-based exclusion as 
children may struggle to interpret the perspective and intentions of a group or individual 
who is of the opposite gender.  Additionally, some research suggests that stereotypes 
regarding behavior and activities for a particular gender may cloud social-cognitive 
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abilities (Kelly, Mulvey, Hitti, & Killen, May 2010; Terwogt & Rieffe, 2003). 
Understanding the varied perspectives and intentions of those involved and balancing this 
understanding in making judgments may rely upon social-cognitive skills, such as theory 
of mind (ToM), the ability to understand others’ intentions, beliefs and desires (Wellman 
& Liu, 2004). Thus, more research is needed which unravels how children and adolescents 
respond to instances of gender-based exclusion, and, in particular, what cognitive skills 
they bring to this task.  Better understanding of the cognitive processes surrounding 
decisions to include or exclude based on gender will provide insight into how gender-based 
exclusion should be addressed to reduce prejudice and discrimination.   
Overview of the goals of the paper 
In this review, current research on social exclusion and the development of social-
cognitive abilities will be discussed with the goal of pointing to new directions for future 
research which can address gaps in the literature. Two areas of research will be addressed: 
a) social exclusion and gender identity; and b) the potential links between socially-
relevant forms of theory of mind and evaluations of social exclusion.  This review will 
first briefly introduce the two focal areas, examine theoretical perspectives which 
influence research on evaluations of exclusion, review key studies examining children’s 
evaluations of exclusion, as well as research on children’s social-cognitive abilities, then 
conclude with an analysis of the current gaps in the literature, which can be filled with 
the current study.    
Research on gender exclusion in childhood 
Social exclusion from groups is multi-faceted. Sometimes exclusion is legitimate 
for group-functioning reasons and other times it is wrong because it is based solely on 
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group membership, including gender (Rutland et al., 2010).  For instance, while it may be 
legitimate to exclude a girl from a soccer team in an all-boys league, it might be viewed 
as wrong by some individuals to exclude a boy from a boys’ team because he did not 
adhere to male gender-stereotypes. While many forms of exclusion are acceptable for 
conventional or prudential reasons, exclusion can also be based on group membership 
alone.  This form of exclusion is problematic because it can be related to bias and 
prejudice (Killen et al., 2002).   Exclusion can have negative consequences on the mental 
health and future social interactions (Murray-Close & Ostrov, 2009; Rubin et al., 2006) 
and academic motivation and success (Buhs et al., 2006; Buhs, McGinley, & Toland, 
2010; Eccles et al., 2006) of those who are excluded. Moreover, as discussed above, 
research reveals that children and adolescents are more accepting of social exclusion 
based on gender than they are of other forms of social exclusion (Killen et al., 2007), 
which indicates the importance of continued focus on gender exclusion in particular.  
Further, the peer relations literature indicates that children are often excluded because of 
aggressive personality traits (Rubin et al., 2006), and that children may hold stereotypes 
condoning physical aggression for boys and relational aggression for girls (Crick & 
Grotpeter, 1995), even though this may not reflect actual behaviors for girls and boys 
(Card et al., 2008; Lansford et al., 2012).  Thus examining exclusion decisions in light of 
behavior which either aligns with or resists these gender stereotypes is important.  
Social exclusion often occurs in intergroup contexts, when children are interacting 
with others who do not share membership in the same gender, ethnicity or religious 
groups.  Thus, when children evaluate instances of exclusion their identification with 
their group and their sense of the group’s goals and norms (practices or conventions) 
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often come into play.  Additionally, in some instances, children may bring stereotypic 
knowledge of other groups to their intergroup interactions.  Research from a social 
reasoning developmental perspective within the field of developmental intergroup 
relations has examined the interplay between group identity, morality and social decision-
making (Rutland et al., 2010).  Research reveals that children often express a bias 
towards their ingroup and express derogation of the outgroup, and strive to uphold the 
norms of their ingroup.  Understanding how children interpret conflicts between 
conceptions of what is fair and their loyalty to their ingroup will be particularly important 
in studying gender based forms of exclusion as children do strongly identify with their 
gender ingroup (Liben & Bigler, 2002). 
The specific focus of this literature review will be to describe research on gender 
exclusion, gender group norms, and gender stereotypes, especially those related to 
aggression. Research on these dimensions of gender exclusion in childhood will provide 
insight into how children balance information about stereotypes, their understanding of 
what is fair and just, and their notions of group dynamics.  Additionally, this research has 
the potential to clarify why it is that gender exclusion is still seen as acceptable in many 
instances, and in particular, may clarify the continuing reliance upon gender roles in 
shaping academic, social and occupational trajectories.   
Evaluating exclusion: The role of social-cognitive abilities   
 Evaluations of exclusion have rarely been examined in light of children’s social-
cognitive capacities and the variety of forms of psychological knowledge that come into 
play in instances of social exclusion.  Traditional measures of social-cognitive abilities to 
evaluate intentions and others’ mental states are often laboratory-based and removed 
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from the rich social context of children’s lives.  Children’s ability to interpret the 
intentions, goals and emotions of those involved in exclusion scenarios involving gender 
may, however, hinge upon their social-cognitive development.  Recently, research has 
identified ways to examine social-cognitive skills, particularly theory of mind, in more 
contextualized and authentic ways.  Yet, these new means of measuring more socially-
relevant forms of theory of mind are rarely applied to children’s social-decision making 
processes and their evaluations of exclusion.  This research, however, does indicate that 
studying how this might play out within the context of gender stereotypes will provide 
insight into how children resolve tensions between their understanding of intentions, their 
own allegiance to their group and its goals, and stereotypes which they may hold 
regarding gender.  Thus, research examining social-cognition, and theory of mind, in 
particular, in socially-relevant ways, as well as research that suggests potential conflicts 
between social-cognition and gender stereotypes will be described.   
 This review, then, will examine research on gender exclusion with a new focus 
the role of the development of social-cognitive abilities and how these are related to 
social exclusion and moral judgments.  
A Framework for Studying Exclusion: Integrating Social Domain Theory, Social 
Identity Theory and Examinations of Theory of Mind 
While social exclusion research has been approached within many different 
contexts, two different, yet complementary frameworks have been drawn upon when 
studying inclusion and exclusion: Social Domain Theory, which distinguishes between 
the societal, moral and psychological domains of knowledge used in making judgments 
(Turiel, 1983), and Social Identity Theory (SIT), which argues that individuals strive to 
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maintain their ingroup identity by viewing  their own social group more positively than 
other social groups, and that individuals identify with social groups with positive or 
higher social status (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Recent research has begun drawing upon 
both of these frameworks, in order to examine both moral judgments about social 
exclusion as well as to recognize the importance children place on group identity and 
group norms in peer interactions (Killen, Mulvey, et al., 2012; Killen & Rutland, 2011; 
Rutland et al., 2010).  Children simultaneously develop moral beliefs about issues such as 
welfare, fairness and justice and a sense of group identity (Rutland et al., 2010).  In some 
instances, children, when balancing their developing moral beliefs and their sense of 
group identity, may turn to ingroup bias and prejudicial attitudes in making decisions to 
exclude others based on group membership.   
In making these decisions, children will necessarily have to weigh their 
understanding of the intentions, goals and desires of the potential target for exclusion, the 
group that may exclude, and individual members of this group (Mulvey et al., 2013).  To 
effectively balance these perspectives they may rely upon complex theory of mind skills, 
in recognizing others’ mental states (Wellman & Liu, 2004).  Thus, in understanding 
instances of exclusion when group identity and norms as well as issues of fairness are at 
play, research should draw upon theory of mind research, Social Domain Theory and 
Social Identity Theory.  The following section will provide a brief overview of these 
three frameworks for understanding social-cognition.      
Social Domain Theory  
 Extensive research within Social Domain Theory (Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 1983)  
has shown that children from a very young age (3 years) differentiate their experiences 
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within the social world, including experiences of exclusion, based on different domains: 
1) the moral domain, which includes concerns with welfare, fairness, justice and rights; 
2) the societal domain, which includes situations contingent on socially agreed upon rules 
that are alterable and that, if not present, will cause no direct harm to be inflicted on 
another; and 3) the psychological domain, which includes personal preferences and 
choices (Smetana, 2006).  Social Domain Theory has guided research revealing the 
importance of examining children’s reasoning when studying exclusion decisions and has 
provided support for the recognition that children distinguish, from very early ages, 
between decisions which inherently center on issues such as fairness and justice and 
those which, drawing on conventions, promote group functioning and social interactions 
(for a review see Killen et al., 2007).   
Social Domain Theory has been a primary framework for the study of exclusion, 
first in the United States, but also increasingly in other areas of the world, such as the 
United Kingdom, Spain, The Netherlands, Germany, Korea, Switzerland, China, and 
Japan (see Hitti et al., 2011, for a review). As will be described in greater detail below, 
exclusion based solely on group membership, including gender, is generally evaluated as 
unfair and judged as wrong by most children (Killen et al., 2002), however in complex or 
ambiguous situations children will often make exclusion judgments based on stereotypes 
about group identity (Killen et al., 2001). Additionally, children evaluate peer group 
exclusion based on gender as wrong, however many children still rely upon stereotypes 
when they reason that exclusion might be acceptable (Killen & Stangor, 2001).  Thus, 
Social Domain Theory has revealed the complexity involved in children’s reasoning 
about social exclusion based on group membership. 
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Social Identity Theory and Subjective Group Dynamics 
Exclusion has also been studied by drawing on Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979), particularly in Europe and Australia.  Attempts to see the ingroup in 
increasingly positive ways can lead to prejudice towards members of outgroups (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979).   Even very early research examining intergroup relations revealed the 
manifestation of intergroup bias in social interactions (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & 
Sherif, 1961).   Self-categorization theory (SCT; Turner, et al., 1987) suggests that, based 
on cognitive grouping, individuals develop a sense of how to identify one’s self (Nesdale, 
2004). Thus, people place themselves in a group that they view as most similar to 
themselves based on some classification label, which is cognitively contrasted with 
another classification. Such self-categorization emphasizes positive similarities between 
individuals of the ingroup, thus promoting ingroup bias, while also focusing on the 
negative differences of the outgroup, which may lead to outgroup prejudice. This process, 
then, creates opportunities for the development of stereotypes and acts of exclusion based 
on group membership (Abrams & Rutland, 2008).   
One extension of Social Identity Theory, Developmental Subjective Group 
Dynamics (DSGD), proposes that individuals differentially evaluate and include others 
based on their adherence to or deviance from group norms (Abrams & Rutland, 2008).  
As will be described in more detail below, research drawing on DSGD finds that children 
prefer outgroup members who deviate from their group norms and, thus, espouse the 
child’s ingroup norms more than they like ingroup children who deviate from ingroup 
norms (Abrams, Rutland, & Cameron, 2003; Abrams et al., 2009).  Thus, the framework 
of Social Identity Theory, and Developmental Subjective Group Dynamics, in particular, 
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has emerged as a way to focus exclusion research on attending to group norms and group 
identity.   
Intentionality, Theory of Mind and the Psychological States of Others  
In addition to social-cognitive theories of development, theories concerning the 
cognitive development of the ability to understand the psychological states of others will 
be important to consider when studying social exclusion.  This is in part because 
decisions about social exclusion involve a heavy cognitive load: children must balance 
information about all of the characters involved in the scenario, while also attending to 
these characters’ intentions, beliefs and desires (theory of mind) and to the group 
dynamics involved, including the role group identity might play, the norms or 
conventions held by the group, and stereotypes or assumptions they may hold about a 
particular group.  Two different theoretical approaches have been taken to understanding 
children’s developing theory of mind abilities.   
Some researchers suggest an “early competence” model, often called the Theory 
of Mind Mechanism/Selection Processing Model, which suggests that humans possess an 
innate capacity for theory of mind abilities which are triggered by environmental factors 
(Scholl & Leslie, 2001).  Essentially, this theory suggests that during the preschool years, 
children begin to selectively attend to mental states of others through a domain-specific 
mechanism, which enables them to begin understanding mental representations (Leslie, 
Friedman, & German, 2004; Scholl & Leslie, 2001).  While this theory has some support 
from empirical findings (Scholl & Leslie, 2001), others argue that it is either an 
unnecessary theoretical proposition (Stone & Gerrans, 2006) or that the empirical 
evidence does not support this theory because there does appear to be such a strong age-
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related pattern associated with the development of theory of mind (Wellman, Cross, & 
Watson, 2001). 
Gopnik and her colleagues have proposed that conceptual change during the 
preschool years enables children to understand that not all representations which 
individuals hold about the world are necessarily accurate (Gopnik & Wellman, 1994; 
Wellman et al., 2001). This form of conceptual change is thought to occur, according to 
Theory-Theory (Gopnik & Wellman, 1994), the primary framework which advocates for 
conceptual change as a driving force behind development of understanding of things like 
others’ mental states, because children approach the world like scientists, testing 
hypotheses, observing evidence, and refining their understanding based on what they 
discover (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997). Evidence within the theory of mind research 
provides support for the conceptual change model as research suggests that children do 
show age-related improvements in theory of mind ability and can successfully complete 
different tasks at different ages, which may reflect improvement of their conceptual 
understanding of others’ lives with age (Wellman & Cross, 2001; Wellman et al., 2001).  
What has not fully been addressed by theory of mind researchers are the mechanisms of 
change. Carpendale and Lewis(2006) have proposed that peer interactions facilitate 
change in the ability to understand mental states.  More research is needed to examine 
this aspect of developmental social cognition. 
While both theories continue to be debated in the research literature, what remains 
uncontested is that children develop the ability to understand others’ mental lives. These 
abilities are most commonly studied in laboratory experiments that are fairly removed 
from children’s authentic lives.  This is despite early research which indicates that 
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improvement in perspective-taking abilities occurs in situations in which children have 
opportunities for rich social interaction with their peers, in particular, through shared 
experience (Chandler & Helm, 1984). Theory of mind abilities, though, have significant 
implications for children’s ability to make judgments about others desires, intentions and 
motivations, all of which play an important role in evaluating social exclusion.  There has 
been a call in the research literature for more work which examines the real-world 
implications of the development of theory of mind competence (Astington, 2001).  
Within this review, research which has taken on that challenge will be examined and 
proposals for new ways in which theory of mind can be applied to studies of social 
exclusion, and gender based exclusion in particular, will be explored.     
Gender Stereotypes 
In popular culture, gender stereotypes regarding behavior abound, with physical 
aggression by boys excused as “boys will be boys,” and books and television shows like 
“Gossip Girl” reinforcing and even glorifying the idea that gossip is appropriate for girls. 
From a very early age, children develop stereotypes about gender (Liben & Bigler, 2002; 
Mulvey et al., 2010). At the same time, even very young children are capable of making 
moral decisions (Turiel, 1983). Gender stereotypes about behavior permeate peer groups, 
often functioning as the norms, or conventions, which shape groups.   
A large body of research on gender stereotypes exists, and identifies the early 
emergence of gender stereotypes, as well as the pervasive influence of gender stereotypes 
on children’s behavior and self-understanding.  There are a number of different 
theoretical models which address how children begin to understand gender, and the 
relationship between understanding gender and gender stereotyping.  As an example, 
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Martin and Halverson (1981) propose a gender scheme theory, indicating that children 
learn gender and gender-appropriate activities, behaviors, and objects through interaction 
with their social worlds: they hear peers, adults and the media indicate what behaviors 
and activities are appropriate for each gender and begin to act in ways which reflect those 
societal messages.  More recently, Arthur et al. (2008) have proposed a developmental 
intergroup theory for explaining the emergence of stereotyping in young children.  They 
argue that children are able to perceptually distinguish males from females, even as early 
as infancy, that differences in the proportions of each gender taking part in specific 
activities (for instance few boys attend dance lessons) heightens their understanding of 
males and females as different, that explicit labeling of gender (for instance by teachers 
who ask all the girls to line up and then all the boys to line up) reinforces stereotypes, and 
that implicit differentiation by adults (for instance through segregation of boys and girls 
during some activities) further enhances children’s understanding of gender stereotypes.   
Trautner et al. (2005) found that gender stereotypes increase during early childhood, 
with children peaking in their rigidity by approximately age 7, but that stereotypes 
continue to play a strongly influential role for children beyond age 10, even though most 
children are much more flexible in their thinking about gender stereotypes by this time.  
Further, research on gender stereotypes has examined stereotypes in a range of unique 
domains, including activities, occupations, and traits (Liben & Bigler, 2002).   
 One particular area in which gender stereotypes abound is in regards to aggressive 
behavior.  Research on peer relationships has extensively examined gender differences in 
frequency of physical and relational aggression for boys and girls, at first concluding that 
boys engaged in more physical aggression and girls in more relational aggression (Crick 
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& Grotpeter, 1995), and more recently determining that, in fact, boys engage in more 
physical aggression but that there are not differences, or there are scant differences, in 
mean rates of relational aggression between boys and girls (Card et al., 2008; Lansford et 
al., 2012).  What has not yet been examined closely is if and how children use these 
stereotypes about gender and aggression when evaluating their peers and making social 
decisions in groups. 
Stereotypes and Exclusion  
 One result of children’s rigid adherence to stereotypes is denial of opportunity.  
Specifically, if children hold rigidly to stereotypes, they may deny children who do not 
adhere to such stereotypes with the opportunity to engage in gender non-conforming 
activities.  For instance, research indicates that preschool children may rely upon 
stereotypes about activities (playing with dolls and trucks), and willingly exclude 
someone who does not match a gender stereotype (Theimer, Killen, & Stangor, 2001), 
but that older children may be more attuned to issues of equity, and reject straightforward 
exclusion of gender non-conforming children because of moral reasons (Killen & 
Stangor, 2001).  This is important as research indicates that as children spend more time 
playing in single-gender groups, they become increasingly invested in playing with 
gender conforming toys (Martin & Fabes, 2001).  In more complex scenarios, however, 
when children are asked to weigh information about skill and gender stereotypes, 
children are more likely to exclude a non-conforming target, justifying their decision 
through references to group functioning (Killen & Stangor, 2001).  Across these studies, 
however, exclusion based on gender was seen as more acceptable than exclusion based 
on race, thus children may attend to societal messages condoning gender stereotypes.  For 
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instance, research indicates that adolescents do not accept gender non-conformity in 
behavior and activities (Horn, 2007).  Further, there is some indication that willingness to 
exclude others is related to social-cognitive abilities, in particular, theory of mind 
(Abrams et al., 2009). Thus, research on these different types of stereotypes has firmly 
established that children hold such stereotypes and use them in their everyday lives, less 
is known about when children are willing to resist such stereotypes and the social-
cognitive abilities that they may bring to such evaluations. 
Children’s and Adolescents’ Reasoning About Exclusion Because of Group 
Membership 
Returning to the foundational manner in which social exclusion has been studied 
will provide insight into what is already known about children’s reasoning about 
exclusion as well as suggest potential areas for future research.  Much of the foundational 
literature on exclusion explored children’s judgments of exclusion because of group 
membership, including gender.  Children can be excluded from groups or activities 
because of their gender, ethnicity, religion, school affiliation, or nationality (Killen, 
Mulvey, et al., 2012).  The research reviewed here will focus on exclusion due to gender 
and ethnicity, because the majority of research conducted thus far focuses on these forms 
of group membership.  
Theimer, Killen and Stangor (2001) analyzed European-American preschool 
children’s (N= 50) evaluation of inclusion in an activity based on gender-stereotypic 
expectations of peer activities (e.g., doll-playing, truck-playing) and peer roles (e.g., 
deciding who will be the teacher and firefighter). Participants evaluated straightforward 
exclusion scenarios based on gender (for instance a boy wants to join a group of girls 
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playing with dolls), as well as multifaceted exclusion scenarios, where participants were 
given information about the experience of the child who wants to join the group.  In the 
equal experience context, participants were asked to choose between a gender stereotype 
consistent child (e.g., a boy wanting to join a group of boys playing with a truck) and a 
gender stereotype inconsistent child (e.g., a girl wanting to join a group of boys playing 
with a truck) when both children were experienced with playing with the target toy or 
performing the target role.  In the unequal experience context, participants were asked to 
choose between a gender stereotype consistent and a gender stereotype inconsistent child 
when the gender stereotype inconsistent child has no experience playing with the target 
toy or performing the target role.      
Results indicated that participants were generally un-accepting of exclusion in the 
straightforward context and used moral reasoning to justify these decisions.  In the 
multifaceted context, children chose to include the child who did not fit the stereotype 
more often in the unequal experience context.  In the equal experience context, more than 
in the unequal experience context, children did use stereotypes to justify exclusion (e.g., 
“girls don’t like to play with trucks”). Even in this case, the majority of children did not 
use stereotypes in making exclusion judgments.  This research reveals the complexity of 
children’s reasoning about gender exclusion and suggests the important role of 
stereotypes in inclusion and exclusion decisions.  






 graders, Killen and Stangor (2001), 
found a slightly different pattern. In this study, which looked at both gender and 
ethnicity, the children generally chose the non-stereotyped child in the equal skill context 
multifaceted situation, which suggests active inclusivity.  These findings are different 
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from the Theimer, Killen and Stangor (2001) study, where the pre-school aged children 
primarily chose the stereotyped child in the equal context.  Thus, older children may be 
more sensitive to issues of equity.  The reasoning used in choosing the non-stereotyped 
child was moral reasoning, focused on issues of fairness and equal opportunity, 
suggesting that with age children may be more attuned issues of diversity and more 
willing to reject stereotypes in favor of equal access.  
This body of research provided important information about the use of gender-
stereotypes in making exclusion decisions in everyday contexts.  Additionally, the 
researchers coded stereotypes when they were mentioned, but did not prompt children to 
consider gender stereotypes in their responses.  Thus, although many children did not use 
stereotypes, a surprising number did spontaneously turn to stereotypic information when 
making these decisions.  In particular, it appears that in the absence of other information, 
and when forced to make a decision, children are particularly likely to rely upon 
stereotypes about which activities are appropriate for each gender.  This suggests that 
more research needs to be conducted on use of gender stereotypes in understanding 
groups.  While this research suggests that children do hold stereotypes about gender-
appropriate activities, it does not reveal under what circumstances children see those 
stereotypes as inflexible.   
Additionally, in this paradigm, the group was described as participating in a 
gender-appropriate activity, and potential new members who were gender stereotype 
consistent or inconsistent asked to join the group.  What is not yet known is how children 
will respond if a child who is already a member of the group rejects the gender 
stereotypic activity of the group and asserts that the group should not conform to the 
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stereotype.  Understanding deviant behavior (rejecting a norm that your group adheres to) 
from within the group will provide greater insight into the range of exclusion experiences 
surrounding gender group membership.  Additionally, what is also not yet known is how 
children will react if the group itself rejects the gender stereotype and engages in gender 
non-conformist behavior or activities.  Understanding groups which both adhere to and 
resist gender stereotypes will improve our knowledge not just about gender stereotypes, 
but will have significant implications for understanding group dynamics and norms.   
Further, the type of gender stereotype must be considered. This research has 
examined gender stereotypes about traditional social (play) activities, but there are also 
firm gender norms in place about a range of other types of activities and behaviors, for 
both girls and boys.  For instance, there are strong gender stereotypes associated with 
types of aggressive behaviors, with early research suggesting that girls engage in more 
relational aggression and boys engage in more physical aggression (Crick & Grotpeter, 
1995).  While meta-analyses have indicated that these patterns are not as strong as once 
believed (Card et al., 2008) and examinations across a range of different cultural contexts 
have confirmed this (Lansford et al., 2012), Ostrov and Godleski (2010) recently 
proposed a gender-linked model of aggression sub-types, which suggests that girls and 
boys do still associate relational aggression with girls and physical aggression with boys.  
Moreover, their model suggests that children would prefer to express gender-normative 
forms of aggression and that they would also see gender-consistent forms of aggression 
as more wrong than gender-inconsistent forms.  Additionally, they call for research which 




One area about which little is known, but which the current study addresses, is 
whether children think that one should be excluded for advocating gender-consistent or 
gender-inconsistent aggression.  Research has shown that when considering relational 
aggression, in particular, adolescents reference relationship maintenance as an important 
consideration (Goldstein & Tisak, 2010), suggesting that further research exploring the 
consequences in terms of group acceptance for aggressive behavior should be explored.  
This is particularly important considering research that shows continuity in aggressive 
behavior (especially physical aggression) from childhood through adolescence (Broidy et 
al., 2003).  Finally, this type of research could have significant impacts on how parents 
and educators talk with children about gender stereotypes and the rigidity of gender roles.   
An additional area of concern, though, is the role of peer-influence on children’s 
exclusionary decision-making.  In social scenarios, children must weigh their own 
interpretation of the scenario with their expectations about the view and norms of the 
group.  Thus, while some children did reference stereotypes in the study by Theimer and 
colleagues (2001), it is unclear if they would continue to apply those stereotypes when 
faced with peers who disaffirm stereotypes or vice versa. Thus, in order to address these 
additional questions, Killen, Pisacane, Lee-Kim and Ardila-Rey (2001) counter-probed 
children about their inclusion decisions by offering them an alternative reason to include 
the child they did not pick, one that reflected a peer’s view about the inclusion decision.  
This technique tested children’s conviction in their decision and investigated age 
differences (3 to 5 year olds, N=72) in assessing children’s use of stereotypes in 
reasoning about similar inclusion scenarios as those used in Theimer, Killen and Stangor 
(2001).   
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Most children who initially used stereotypic information to make their decision 
changed their decisions to focus on moral judgment when given the opportunity (after a 
probe by the interviewer in which the fairness of turn-taking was mentioned), while those 
who initially focused on the moral aspects of the situation did not change their decisions 
to consider the stereotypic argument as often (after a probe by the interviewer in which 
the stereotype about who plays with toys was mentioned). The study also showed that 
younger children were more likely than older children to choose the stereotypic child 
prior to probing, and were more likely to base their judgment on stereotypic expectations.  
The strong impact which probing had on reducing use of stereotypes suggests the 
very important influence of peers on children and the potential deficits that very young 
children may have in judging the beliefs and desires of those around them.  This is 
confirmed by research on bullying, which indicates that bystanders can play a vital role in 
reducing aggressive behavior of their peers (Salmivalli et al., 2011).  Less is known, 
however, about how peers who are actually part of a group that engages in stereotypic or 
aggressive behavior might influence the group if they resist the group’s norms. Further, 
also assessing theory of mind ability in these studies would have been insightful as it may 
be the case that children who have theory of mind were better able to anticipate and take 
into account the potential response of the peer group.  This may be especially important 
when studying gender-based stereotypes, as children do encounter socially-sanctioned 
gender stereotypes in a range of contexts.  
Understanding the peer group’s perspective and intentions when evaluating 
exclusion decisions may, thus, impact the exclusion evaluation that is made, either 
because children will want to align themselves with the peer group or because they may 
51 
 
be more skilled at recognizing that this perspective may not be the best or the right 
perspective at times (for instance, if it is based on stereotypes) and want to reject this peer 
group perspective.  Thus, research on group membership and social exclusion suggests 
that future studies should include information about the intentions of those involved in 
the scenario as well as measures of ToM.    
This body of research on exclusion because of group membership, including 
gender, reveals the complexity of children’s social reasoning about exclusion. While 
children are, in general, unwilling to accept exclusion and advocate for inclusivity using 
moral reasoning, children do view some forms of exclusion as acceptable.  In particular, 
many of the studies reviewed thus far reveal that children are more accepting of exclusion 
based on gender than exclusion based on race or ethnicity (Killen et al., 2007). When 
children view exclusion as acceptable, this may be due to a reliance upon stereotypes or 
assumptions about appropriate activities for members of different groups.  For instance, a 
child might support exclusion of a girl from a football time by arguing that girls should 
not play certain sports (Park, Lee-Kim, Killen, Kim, & Park, 2011).  Supporting 
exclusion of another because of his or her group membership may lead to more serious 
forms of prejudicial behavior and treatment of others.   
While we know that children do at times support exclusion for reasons associated 
with stereotypes, including gender stereotypes, we do not yet have a clear picture of why 
they think that this form of exclusion is acceptable.  On the one hand, they could be 
simply relying upon stereotypes and ignoring the potential harm to the victim that may 
occur because of this exclusion.  On the other hand, they may be putting more weight on 
issues of group functioning and be thinking that including someone from another group 
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will be disruptive.  Research on social exclusion should be designed to unpack these 
alternative explanations, as gender exclusion may often also involve stereotypes about 
behavior or appearance.  Stereotypes could be invoked by the excluder implicitly or 
explicitly when the exclusion occurs, or the child who is excluded could infer a reliance 
upon stereotypes which may or may not be present.  For instance, research with ethnic 
minority students reveals that even when exclusion is not explicitly about race, they are 
concerned that the target of exclusion may interpret the exclusion as being race-based 
(Margie, Killen, Sinno, & McGlothlin, 2005).  Research should examine if this is also the 
case for exclusion in situations which invoke gender stereotypes.  This is particularly 
important in light of findings which indicate that children with more sophisticated 
interpretative theory of mind skills are less likely to infer the presence of gender 
discrimination than those without such skills (Brown et al., 2010). 
Is Exclusion Always About Group Membership? 
While exclusion is often based upon group membership, as often, exclusion is 
based on personal traits, such as individual characteristics or features of one’s 
personality.  For instance, a group may exclude a child who is shy from the debate team 
because they assume that someone shy will not be comfortable in this context. Forms of 
exclusion not based solely on group membership are a unique area for research, as 
children may evaluate these forms of exclusion as more legitimate because of 
conventions or norms of the group.  Thus, exclusion based on personality traits may be 
viewed by the group as legitimate. It is possible, however, that those who are excluded 
may struggle in interpreting the intentions of a group or individual who excludes them 
because of a personality trait and over-attribute negative intentions to the excluders. 
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Specifically, the child who is excluded from the debate team for being shy may interpret 
this exclusion as malicious (for instance, exclusion of her because of assumptions about 
girls’ ability to engage in such debates) when the team may have simply intended to 
prevent the excluded child from experiencing what they might have assumed would be an 
uncomfortable environment for someone shy. Thus, it is important to examine research 
which has explored both group (or category) and personal reasons for exclusion.  
Research has begun to examine if there are differences in how legitimate 
exclusion based on group membership is versus exclusion based on personality traits, 
such as shyness or aggression. Park and Killen (2010) conducted a cross-cultural study 
(Korea and the USA) that assessed exclusion due to group membership as well as 
individual characteristics. The sample included 10 and 13 year old children (N = 333 
from the United States of America and N = 397 from Korea).  The aims of the study 
included examining if evaluations of exclusion based on personality traits (shy or 
aggressive) and group characteristics (gender or nationality) vary based on social context 
and type of exclusion.  Specifically, the study included an intergroup, interpersonal, and 
intrapersonal context. The intergroup context was a peer-exclusion scenario where a child 
is excluded from a group working on a group project in school, the interpersonal context 
was a friendship-rejection scenario where one child does not want to be friends with 
another, and the intrapersonal context involved a victimization scenario where one child 
is picked on because of a group or personality trait.   
All participants received stories presenting all contexts and all personality and 
group characteristics, with the personality and group characteristics counter-balanced.  
Participants judged the acceptability of exclusion and provided justifications.  Using just 
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two assessments and choosing two (judgment and justification) which have been highly 
validated within Social Domain research (Smetana, 2006) provided a simple, clear way to 
assess both group and personal types of exclusion using the same measures.    
The findings included that, across all contexts and both cultures, girls were less 
accepting of exclusion than were boys.  Additionally, the victimization context was seen 
as the least acceptable form of exclusion by all participants.  In terms of personality and 
group characteristics, it was seen as most acceptable to exclude aggressive peers, and 
Americans were more willing than Koreans to justify exclusion of an aggressive peer.  
Generally, participants viewed exclusion based on group characteristics (gender and 
nationality) as unfair because of moral reasons. Additionally, perhaps due to greater 
experience with people from different nationalities, Americans were more inclusive of 
different nationality peers than Koreans. Older children were more likely than were 
younger children to endorse exclusion because of aggression and reject exclusion based 
on nationality. Findings suggest different degrees of acceptability by context, as well.  
Friendship rejection was the most acceptable, followed by group exclusion and then 
victimization  
Thus, this research suggests that children may perceive exclusion because of 
group membership as less legitimate than exclusion because of personality traits. This 
raises the additional question, however, of how children will respond to and anticipate 
exclusion when group membership intersects with stereotypes about personality traits.  
For instance, how do children evaluate exclusion which occurs because a girl is 
physically aggressive, essentially engaging in a form of aggression which does not 
conform to gender stereotypes for girls? Further, this research does not clarify, however, 
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how those children who are excluded for these different types of reasons will experience 
the exclusion.   
Nesdale and colleagues (2007) were able to test this, however, by having 
participants undergo a simulated exclusion experience.  In this study, exclusion was 
either because of personal reasons (lack of drawing skill) or group membership reasons 
(referred to in the study as “category” reasons, i.e. being a member of a particular 
school).  In particular, the study assessed 6 and 8 year old Anglo-Australian children (N = 
160) using a modification of a minimal-group paradigm (the same methodology as is 
used in a number of studies including Nesdale, Maass, Durkin, & Griffiths, 2005; 
Nesdale, Maass, Griffiths, & Durkin, 2003).  Participants were first assigned to a group.  
Then participants in the experimental condition were told that they were rejected from 
their group because of either personal (drawing skill) or categorical (member of a certain 
school) reasons.  Participants in the control condition were next told that the experimenter 
remembered that the first group was full.  Following this, participants were reassigned to 
a new group which either held an inclusive or exclusive group norm towards others.  
Finally, researchers measured participants’ affect (using the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory for Children) and attitudes towards the original, and new groups as well as an 
outgroup.  Attitudes towards the groups were measured using three items: like, trust and 
desire to play with the group.   
Results revealed that across the conditions, younger children expressed more 
negative affect than did older children and more positive group attitudes.  Children in the 
group with the inclusive norm expressed more positive group attitudes than did children 
in the group with the exclusive norm.  When rejected for a category reason, children’s 
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attitudes were more negative than when rejected for a personal reason.  Thus, not only do 
children appear to differentiate between exclusion because of group membership and 
exclusion based on personal characteristics as was shown by Park and Killen (2010), but 
their future attitudes are also impacted in a similar way, with group membership rejection 
resulting in a stronger impact on attitudes.  This suggests that, in fact, children who are 
excluded because of group membership reasons do perceive this as less legitimate than 
exclusion based on personality traits.  Additionally, all participants who experienced 
rejection (as opposed to participants in the control condition), held much more negative 
attitudes towards the outgroup after rejection.  This suggests that rejection can create a 
cycle of negative intergroup relations (Killen, Mulvey, et al., 2012). 
These two studies reveal that personality traits or personal characteristics are seen 
as more legitimate bases for exclusion than is group membership, and that exclusion 
based on group membership can have significant impacts on outgroup prejudice and 
negative attitudes.  However, as mentioned above, often personality traits are conflated 
with group membership.  Children may hold stereotypic beliefs about particular groups’ 
personality traits (for instance, children in the Park and Killen (2010) study may have 
thought that Korean children are also shy based on stereotypes about the reserved nature 
of Asians or may have thought that boys are more aggressive than girls based on 
stereotypes about behavior for each gender).  
This is particularly concerning when examining issues of gender-conformity 
(Horn, 2007).  While a boy may express personality traits which are traditionally 
considered more feminine, children may conflate this with group membership and 
exclude this boy based on negative stereotypes that they hold toward homosexuals (see 
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Horn, 2008).  This would be problematic on three counts: 1) the boy may not actually 
identify as homosexual; 2) the group is relying on stereotypes about a particular group 
(homosexuals); and 3) the group is expressing prejudice towards this group.  On the other 
hand, when a girl wishes to engage in a stereotypically male activity (for instance playing 
football), she may be excluded because of stereotypes about girls’ strength, 
aggressiveness or skill in athletics.  In both of these instances, children may justify 
exclusion based on a personality trait which is assumed to be present because of an 
underlying stereotype about a particular gender. Research which finds a relation in 
middle childhood between social acceptance and gender appropriate forms of play, 
particularly among boys  (Moller, Hymel, & Rubin, 1992) supports the fact that 
underlying stereotypes about gender may play a role in how children justify inclusion and 
exclusion of peers. Thus, future research should aim to carefully probe children’s 
reasoning about exclusion to attempt to determine whether underlying stereotypes or 
biases are involved in exclusion decisions which appear to be focused on personality 
traits. 
Research on Conflating Personality Traits with Group Membership 
Some research already has examined how children might use external cues, such 
as behavior or appearance, which would likely be markers of personality traits, in making 





students (N = 264) about their judgments of how acceptable same-sex peers were who 
varied in terms of their conformity to gender norms about appearance and activity 
choices and who varied in terms of their sexual orientation (homosexual or heterosexual). 
Participants, thus, evaluated gender-conforming and non-conforming peers who were 
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both straight and gay.  For instance, for females, the gender non-conforming activity was 
football and the conforming activity was volleyball.  For males, the gender non-
conforming appearance was wearing eyeliner and nail polish and the gender conforming 
appearance was “acting and dressing like most of the other guys”.    
The results indicated that appearance and activity choice had a significant impact 
on judgments. Both straight and gay or lesbian targets who were gender non-conformist 
were rated as less acceptable by their peers than were the gender conforming targets.  
Additionally, the boys rated the straight individual who was non-conformist as least 
acceptable.  Thus, choice of outward appearance and activities, which might be thought 
of as features of one’s personality, were used by adolescents as legitimate bases for 
making judgments.  This suggests that appearance and choice of activities may at times 
be the source of powerful stereotypes and that children and adolescents may turn to these 
stereotypes in making judgments.  Additionally, while we know from this study how 
adolescents respond to gender conformity and non-conformity in making general 
judgments about others, we do not yet know how this will play out for younger children 
and in more complex contexts.  For instance, assessing gender conformity and non-
conformity in a group situation will be particularly insightful, as groups do often hold 
norms about behavior or appearance that are related explicitly to their identity as a group 
(for instance a group of girls may always play with their dolls together).   
Thus, the current research will examine groups which hold either gender-
conforming or non-conforming norms, in terms of appearance or activities, in order to 
elucidate this relationship between group membership and personality traits.  Assessing 
children’s reasoning about deviance from gender-conformist and gender-nonconformist 
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groups as well as their judgments about the acceptability of exclusion will clarify if 
children do conflate personality traits with group membership in stereotypic ways.  If so, 
children might, then, find exclusion of a non-conforming child from a conforming group 
as acceptable because this child may be viewed as part of a gender-identity outgroup due 
to appearance or behavior.  Likewise, they may be much less accepting of groups which 
are gender non-conforming because of stereotypes that they may hold. Thus, while 
research has begun to address the differences in judgments and experiences of exclusion 
based on group membership or other features, more work needs to be done that examines 
the interplay between stereotypes about group membership and personality traits.   These 
new lines of research may clarify what stereotypes children do hold about personality 
traits, norms and behaviors for different groups and how they may implicitly or explicitly 
rely upon these stereotypes in making exclusion decisions.   
The Role of Group Membership, Norms and Identity in Exclusion Decisions 
Understanding how children perceive deviance from group norms, in general, will 
help to explain what expectations children hold for individual members of groups. The 
research reviewed thus far has examined children who are excluded from groups.  A  
significant body of research drawing on Subjective Group Dynamics (Abrams & Rutland, 
2008), has examined evaluations of deviant members of groups and the group reaction to 
these members.  Individuals can deviate (reject or depart from) from many types of group 
norms (or practices, beliefs or conventions of a group) and can deviate in many ways.  
For instance, one can deviate from an explicitly stated norm (such as a group rule) or an 
implicit one (for example a convention that has just arisen over time but is not stated) and 
can deviate through simply voicing an alternate opinion or by actually acting in a manner 
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contrary to the group norm.  Children, who are developing a sense of self, may, at times, 
not want to go along with their group because they do not agree with the group practices, 
norms or opinions.  Children commonly experience deviance and opportunities for 
deviance from social groups, and, in particular, opportunities for deviance from gender-
based norms and expectations.  Thus, research which examines children’s evaluations of 
these types of deviance will shed light on the conditions under which exclusion because 
of deviance may be viewed as acceptable. This will be particularly important for 
examining exclusion based on gender as so many groups (formal and informal) which 
children are part of are single-sex groups. 
In one study, focused on summer school-based groups, which are minimal in that 
children have not had time to form strong bonds or relationships with their ingroup 
members, Abrams, Rutland, Cameron and Marques (2003), surveyed children (6-7 year 
olds and 10-11 year olds, N= 67) about normative and deviant members of summer-
school groups, assessing ingroup bias and favorability of normative and deviant group 
members.  Children were told about normative group members, who made positive 
statements about their summer school and deviant group members, who made positive 
statements about both their summer school and another summer school. Children 
evaluated normative and deviant members of both an ingroup (their summer school) and 
an outgroup (another summer school).  The deviant members supported the outgroup in 
both conditions (for instance, a deviant ingroup member expresses support for the other 
summer school, the outgroup). 
They found that participants showed a strong ingroup bias and were more 
favorable towards normative than deviant group members.  Additionally, participants 
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were more favorable towards deviant outgroup members than deviant ingroup members, 
especially with age. Older children were even more focused on differentiating their 
responses to loyal and deviant in- and outgroup members than younger children.  Thus, 
older children seem better able to consider the implications for deviance, which leads to a 
greater dislike for group members who deviate from their own ingroup norms and greater 
like for group members who support ingroup norms.  Older children, then, in some ways 
are able to overcome their conceptions of the outgroup, and value individual outgroup 
members who express deviant views, thus supporting the ingroup.   
From a Social Domain Theory viewpoint, this study only assessed general social-
conventional group norms (the normative and deviant group members made statements 
about general favorability towards the group).  In social interactions, however, children 
are faced with a range of types of group norms, both social-conventional group norms 
about the customs, traditions and rules of a group, as well as moral group norms, about 
issues of fairness, justice and welfare.  Additionally, groups can hold both positive and 
negative group norms (for instance, as an extreme example, a gang might hold a morally 
unacceptable group norm about fighting with rival gangs).  Children must negotiate their 
social worlds by making decisions about if they feel that group norms are reasonable and 
if deviance from group norms, may at times, be acceptable.   
Thus,  Killen, Rutland, et al. (2012) assessed deviance from both moral and 
social-conventional group norms when the deviance either aligned with general societal 
principles or group-specific principles.  Additionally, they evaluated exclusion 
acceptability more directly than had been done before in research using Subjective Group 
Dynamics.  Finally, this study examined gender-based groups, providing insight into how 
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grade children (N= 381). Participants evaluated vignettes in which groups excluded 
members who deviated from social conventional (e.g. wearing or not wearing a club 
shirt) or moral (e.g. equitable or inequitable distribution of funds) norms. 
Analyses revealed that children and adolescents differentiate between different 
types of deviance: deviance that is considered morally unacceptable (advocating unequal 
distribution of resources) and that is considered conventionally unacceptable (not wearing 
an assigned group tee-shirt) is judged as wrong and, potentially, as grounds for exclusion 
from groups, whereas morally acceptable and conventionally acceptable deviance is 
judged as appropriate and exclusion because of these forms of deviance is judged as 
inappropriate. Age-related differences were found, with children focusing strictly on 
issues of fairness, while adolescents recognized a role for both fairness as well as group 
functioning.  Additionally, analyses revealed that participants differentiated between their 
rating of the group favorability toward the deviant target and their own rating of 
favorability toward the deviant target.  In all conditions except when the deviant was 
advocating for unequal distribution of resources, participants judged that the group would 
rate the deviant less positively than how the participants themselves would judge the 
deviant.   
This research reveals the sophistication of children’s reasoning about group 
dynamics and exclusion decisions.  Additionally, it suggests that children do not always 
agree with their own groups and recognize that a group may hold different intentions, 
beliefs and goals than an individual.  Generally, children did not use gender ingroup and 
outgroup distinctions when evaluating the acceptability of the act or of exclusion, 
63 
 
however, children who decided that a same gender child who does not share the norm of 
the group should be included in the group over an opposite gender child who shares the 
norm of the group relied much more frequently upon gender stereotypes than did other 
participants in reasoning about this decision.  Thus, it appears that gender stereotypes do 
underlie some aspects of children’s decision-making about inclusion and exclusion. 
This body of research collectively reveals the importance of group norms to 
children and the large range of norms which influence children’s social reasoning and 
decision-making.  Generally, findings reveal that deviance from groups is considered 
negative: deviant ingroup members are liked less than deviant outgroup members. 
However, when the forms of deviance are aligned with general societal principles (for 
instance advocating for fair distribution of resources against a group’s norm of unequal 
distribution of resources), deviance from group norms is not judged as negative.   
The study described however, included only norms that did not relate to the 
group’s identity in terms of group membership (i.e. the groups were divided by girls and 
boys, but the norms did not relate to gender identity).  Research has also been conducted 
where the norms of the group have to do with the national identity of the group: for 
instance, a group of English children cheers for the English soccer team(Abrams, 
Rutland, & Cameron, 2003). This has not yet been done with group norms related to the 
gender identity of the groups.  
For instance, how will deviance from a female group which has a norm that they 
play ballet together be viewed if the deviant wants to play football?  Further, how might 
deviance in terms of moral behaviors which are gender-specific be seen?  For instance, 
girls are often associated with relational aggression and boys with physical aggression 
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(Crick & Grotpeter, 1995).  How might children respond when a girl advocates for 
engaging in physical aggression or a boy in relational aggression?  What if a girls’ group 
advocates for physical aggression and one member dissents and pushes for adherence to 
the stereotype (girls do not engage in physical aggression?  These forms of deviance from 
norms related to gender group membership may viewed as positive or negative.  Children 
who recognize the negative impacts of stereotypes may view these forms of deviance as 
positive as they may see the group norms as being based on stereotypes which may be 
holding the group back.  On the other hand, children may view these forms of deviance as 
negative, if they hold tightly to stereotypic expectations about groups.  Further, the moral 
principles may matter, with children supporting behaviors which are morally acceptable 
(resistance of physical and relational aggression) regardless of gender.  Examining 
deviance involving norms related to forms of aggression which are gender-typed is 
particularly important, as research indicates that children who participate in gender non-
conforming types of aggression are at risk for externalizing problems (Crick et al., 2006).  
Evaluations of these forms of deviance, however, are necessarily complex.  
An important component of how children will evaluate these forms of deviance 
and exclusion will be their own social-cognitive abilities. Social relationships require 
balancing information about justice, group identity, group norms and societal 
expectations and stereotypes, as well as interpreting the social cues of those around you 
(Rutland et al., 2010).  As children develop the ability to recognize that others may not 
have access to the same knowledge or that they may think and judge situations 
differently, they will use this information in interpreting social relationships.  Thus, 
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understanding children’s developing ability to recognize other’s goals, intentions, desires 
and beliefs will clarify some of the age-related changes in making exclusion decisions.  
Judging Others’ Intentions 
  When evaluating an exclusion decision, understanding intentions is a central part 
of determining whether exclusion is legitimate or wrong.   Returning to the idea that 
some forms of exclusion may be viewed as legitimate and others as illegitimate, 
intentionality could play an essential role in making different judgments.  For instance, if 
a child has a difficult time judging intentions, he or she may not perceive that some 
exclusion messages may have neutral intentions and instead perceive all messages as 
driven by negative intentions. Thus, examining closely at what point children are able to 
understand intentions accurately will clarify judgments that children make, particularly in 
exclusion scenarios.  This will be particularly important for the study of gender-based 
exclusion, as children often need to judge the intentions of those who are different (in 
terms of gender, or gender-norm conformity) than themselves.   
Early research on judging intentions suggested that younger children tend to focus 
on outcomes, while older children can coordinate between outcomes and intentions 
(Piaget, 1932).  Since that point, research has begun to recognize the complex 
development of children’s abilities to understand and appreciate the mental states of 
others, including their intentions. Young children (between the ages of 3-5) develop 
theory of mind (ToM), the ability to recognize that others have desires, intentions and 
beliefs different than one’s own (Wellman & Liu, 2004). Children follow a 
developmental trajectory for theory of mind abilities (Wellman & Liu, 2004), showing 
skill with increasingly cognitively complex forms of theory of mind with age. 
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Research has shown that a relation exists between early understanding of 
intentional actions and theory of mind competence (Wellman, Lopez-Duran, & 
LaBounty, 2008).  Thus, by 3-5 years of age, normatively developing children should 
have false belief theory of mind competence, and have skills in recognizing the intentions 
of others.  Application of these skills to social situations should enable children to 
accurately interpret the intentions of other individuals and groups in interactions 
including exclusion or rejection contexts.   
Research within the field of peer rejection sensitivity and social information 
processing, however, reveals that not all children interpret situations the same way, even 
in normative populations where children should exhibit theory of mind competence.  
Social information processing research indicates that there is variation in how children 
interpret the same scenario, with some children exhibiting a hostile attribution bias, 
which results in them attributing hostile intentions in ambiguous contexts (Crick & 
Dodge, 1996; DeWall, Twenge, Gitter, & Baumeister, 2009; Orobio de Castro, Veerman, 
Koops, Bosch, & Monshouwer, 2002).  Further, there is variation in how children 
interpret social situations and some children are acutely sensitive to rejection (Downey et 





(Study 1: N = 382, Study 2: N = 76, Study 3: N = 228).  In Study 1, participants 
completed the Children’s Rejection Sensitivity Questionnaire (CRSQ), which measures 
how likely children are to react to ambiguous scenarios as though they were rejected or 
disliked, how likely they are to overreact to being rejected and how angrily or anxiously 
they expect rejection.  In Study 2, children who had taken the CRSQ as part of Study 1 
were subjected to an experimentally manipulated rejection scenario.  They were told that 
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they could invite a friend to join them as part of the interview.  Then, they were told that 
the child they had chosen did not want to join them.  Children completed a measure of 
distress before and after the rejection manipulation.  Children who scored as high on 
angry expectation of rejection were more distressed in an experimentally manipulated 
rejection scenario.   Finally, Study 3 included self and teacher reports of aggression and 
victimization.  This study showed that sensitivity to rejection was related to reports of 
greater aggression.  Additionally, rejection sensitivity was shown to predict problems 
with teachers and peers.  
This research suggests that children who are less skilled at interpreting intentions 
in ambiguous potential rejection or exclusion scenarios struggle in a variety of ways.  
These children who are more sensitive to rejection also often experience rejection.  
Research has also shown that peer rejected children do not differ from non-rejected 
children, however, in performance on the traditional theory of mind tasks (Badenes, 
Estevan, & Bacete, 2000).  But, these children are showing some type of deficit in 
interpreting others’ intentions and actions.  Perhaps the traditional theory of mind tasks 
are so controlled and removed from social interactions that children who struggle with 
social-cognitive skills in real-world contexts are still able to succeed on these laboratory-
based tasks. Thus, while even very young children begin to interpret actions as 
intentional, accurately judging intentions as positive or negative is a more complex task 
than simply knowing that an action was done intentionally or successfully passing a 
simple task showing that one individual holds different beliefs than another.   
Rather, understanding what information children are attending to in social 
situations is essential.  Specifically, in making an exclusion decision or interpreting a 
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potential exclusionary interaction, children must balance information about the goals and 
norms of the group, the intentions of the individual who wants to interact with the group, 
the intentions of the group itself and the individual members within that group, 
stereotypes, biases or assumptions that individuals involved in the interaction may hold, 
the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the exclusion decision, and the prior information that 
children may have about the actors involved in the exchange.  Social interactions are 
rarely simple or straightforward.  ToM is usually measured in non-social scenarios, while 
exclusion and peer rejection occur in rich social environments.  What is not yet known is 
if ToM competence, when measured in a socially relevant manner, is related to ability to 
interpret exclusion scenarios.  Some research on theory of mind has begun to try to fill 
this gap.  
Intentionality, Theory of Mind and Social Relationships 
While theory of mind is often measured using simple, lab-based contexts, it is 
likely that children’s social-cognitive abilities do not function in the same way in 
controlled laboratory setting as they do in the social world, when children have to also 
balance information about groups, relationships and social expectations.  For instance, 
while a child may show theory of mind competence in traditional tasks, if he or she also 
holds strong gender stereotypes, these cognitive constructs may create dissonance and 
interfere with a child’s ability to judge intentions. Research is beginning to indicate that 
when children are making judgments about situations which involve stereotypes, 
including gender stereotypes, they may use those stereotypes to make attributions of 
intentions, regardless of their theory of mind abilities (Kelly et al., May 2010).  
Additionally, research indicates that when children evaluate the emotions of a child who 
69 
 
desires a gender stereotype nonconforming toy, they often misinterpret the child’s 
emotions when that child either receives the desired toy or the nondesired toy (Terwogt & 
Rieffe, 2003).  Specifically, even when the children exhibit diverse desires theory of 
mind competence, they misinterpret the emotions of the child, suggesting the child would 
be happy to receive the stereotype consistent toy and unhappy to receive the stereotype 
inconsistent toy (even when the child desires the nonconforming toy).   Additionally, 
research indicates that children with interpretative theory of mind are less likely to 
assume gender discrimination in ambiguous scenarios than are children without 
interpretative theory of mind (Brown et al., 2010). Thus, the relation between gender 
stereotypes and theory of mind may be complicated. How theory of mind abilities come 
into play, then, when gender stereotypes are activated in exclusion scenarios should be 
studied in more detail.  
Further, Shiverick and Moore (2007) showed that children and adults can 
distinguish their own understanding of a character’s intentions and the understanding 
held by an adult (a teacher) with different access to information about what has 
happened, and can use this information to inform their moral judgments. Specifically, in 
this study, participants assessed scenarios in which they had access to information about 
an actor’s intention (positive or negative) and the outcome of an event (neutral or 
negative).  Participants were asked to make their own moral judgments about the actor’s 
action.  Additionally, they were told about an authority figure who either had access to 
information about the intention only, the outcome only or both the intention and the 
outcome.  Participants also assessed the authority figure’s moral judgment (i.e. How good 
or bad does the teacher think the actor is?) and completed measures of second-order 
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theory of mind.  While younger children were more likely to attribute a belief about 
intentions that did not match the prior information given in the story, both children and 
adults were shown to use information about intentions and second-order mental states in 
making moral evaluations.   
Effectively judging others’ emotions and reacting to instances of exclusion, 
including those involving gender stereotypes, requires effective interpretation of social 
situations, including interpretation of intentions.  Research has begun to look at the ways 
in which theory of mind is measured and has tried to frame theory of mind competence 
within more socially-rich environments than is traditional.  Often, theory of mind tasks 
are devoid of social information.  Rather, in the traditional false contents task, for 
instance, a puppet or doll is described as concealing an unconventional item within a 
unexpected container (for instance placing Smarties candies inside a crayon box) and 
children are asked what another puppet or doll will think is in the container.   In many 
cases, though, no information is provided about the puppet’s motives or the relationship 
between the puppets.  Additionally, the scenarios are usually dyadic, while many social 
interactions involve groups of people.  Thus, research which has moved away from the 
traditional false belief tasks while still focusing on assessing intentions and interactions 
between social beings should provide a more authentic reflection of children’s social 
cognition.   
Drawing on Developmental Subjective Group Dynamics (DSGD) and previous 
findings that children show greater favorability to outgroup members who deviate by 
endorsing ingroup norms than by ingroup members who deviate from ingroup norms, 
Abrams et al. (2009) examined if more exclusive children and adolescents had a greater 
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sense of how groups function and a better ability to take the social perspective of others 
in intergroup contexts. Their aims were to examine whether children with greater social 
perspective taking abilities—which they called Theory of Social Mind (ToSM)— were 
more likely to exclude others, to examine if multiple classification skill (the ability to 
classify individuals using more than one trait or feature) led to decreased intergroup bias 
and to examine if greater exposure to a variety of groups led to better understanding of 
group norms. Finally, they aimed to identify age-related changes in these abilities and in 
exclusion judgments.  
Abrams et al. (2009) designed two studies focused on group identity in 
competitive groups, namely, groups of soccer fans from Britain and France (Study 1) and 
two imaginary teams (Study 2).  Both studies used primarily White British children (5-11 
years old, Study 1: N = 167, Study 2: N = 149).  Children were given scenarios about 
different ingroups and outgroups (soccer fans and invented Red and Green teams for 
Studies 1 and 2, respectively) and asked to make decisions about how much they liked 
each group (intergroup bias), how much they would like and thought an individual and a 
group would like a group member after they expressed loyal and deviant group norms 
(intragroup bias and understanding of ingroup bias).The multiple classification skill task 
asked children to group objects by their traits.  The ToSM task asked children to assess a 
situation involving a false evaluation of another character (how would a character feel 
about another character who secretly stole from him).  Abrams et al. (2009) found that 
social perspective taking was related to understanding group dynamics and, particularly, 
understanding of social inclusion and exclusion decisions. Interestingly, greater multiple 
classification skill was related to decreased intergroup bias. Greater exposure to groups 
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led to greater understanding of group norms. However, with age, children gain better 
multiple classification skill and greater ToSM. These stand in contrast to each other, 
because greater multiple classification skill leads to decreased intergroup bias, but greater 
ToSM leads to greater adherence to group norms, and thus greater exclusivity based on 
group norms. This study indicates future work should examine how exactly ToSM as 
well as multiple classification ability are used by youth.  While neither of these studies 
explicitly examined gender-based exclusion, the findings suggest that applying socially-
relevant forms of theory of mind to scenarios involving gender exclusion may provide 
greater information about why children willingly reject straightforward exclusion based 
on gender, but condone gender exclusion in more complex contexts.  Perhaps a focus on 
group perspectives and group dynamics leads to a prioritizing of the group goals over the 
potential harms of exclusion because of gender. 
Research examining morally-relevant theory of mind (Killen et al., 2011), which 
is an adaptation of the false belief tasks using scenarios which involve authentic social 
interactions between a transgressor and a victim, provides more evidence that theory of 
mind should be measured in a socially relevant manner and that it would be an important 
variable for studies of gender exclusion.  Specifically, in this study, participants aged 3-8 
years (N = 162) assessed prototypic and accidental transgressions as well as morally-
relevant and traditional theory of mind tasks.  In the accidental scenario, participants 
evaluated a situation in which an accidental transgressor threw out a cupcake, left in a 
bag by the protagonist (who went outside). In the prototypic scenario, participants 
evaluated a situation in which a deliberate transgressor pushed a victim off of a swing. 
The novel findings pertained to significant patterns between moral reasoning and theory 
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of mind (when age was covaried out). Participants with false belief ToM evaluated the 
accidental transgressor’s intentions as significantly more all right than they themselves 
evaluated the act. Participants without false belief ToM did not differ in their judgment 
about the transgressor’s intentions and the act itself, judging both as wrong.  All children 
judged the prototypic transgressor’s intentions and act as wrong.   Though children with 
false belief ToM evaluated the accidental transgression as wrong, they rated it more 
acceptable to punish a transgressor in the prototypic scenario than in the accidental 
scenario. Participants without false belief ToM did not differentiate punishment between 
the scenarios.   
 The findings demonstrate that theory of mind is necessary for a comprehensive 
evaluation of moral transgressions. Without false belief ToM, children are more likely to 
attribute negative intentions to an “accidental” transgressor than when children have false 
belief ToM. This error by children may contribute to interpersonal conflict given that 
misattributing negative intentions to others accounts for a large proportion of peer 
conflict.  Additionally, these more socially attuned measures of theory of mind suggest 
that there are greater relationships between theory of mind ability and ability to make 
moral judgments (including those about exclusion) and emotion judgments than 
previously thought and that when theory of mind tasks are embedded in morally-relevant 
contexts (involving a transgressor and a victim) theory of mind does not function in the 
same manner as when theory of mind is measured in a socially-removed manner as it is 
traditionally measured.   
Thus, these studies suggest that theory of mind is an important cognitive skill to 
measure when studying exclusion.  Understanding group goals and intentions aids 
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children in evaluating social situations.  Children with greater theory of social mind may 
be more exclusive due to their greater focus on group goals and group functioning.  
Additionally, children may struggle in interpreting the emotions and intentions of 
different actors in social exchanges which can impact their evaluations of a scenario.  
What is not yet known is how children interpret collective (group) excluders and balance 
their interpretation of the intentions and goals of both the excluders and those who are 
excluded.  ToSM, and morally-relevant ToM all move towards more socially-relevant 
ToM measures, however socially- relevant ToM needs to be tested more systematically, 
drawing on the strengths of these new ToM measures.  Socially-relevant ToM should 
relate to the ability to interpret exclusionary scenarios and to recognize that some forms 
of exclusion are warranted while others are unjustifiable.  Socially-relevant ToM will be 
particularly insightful for studies of gender exclusion as exclusion based on gender so 
often does involve norms about the behavior or appearance of each gender or stereotypes 
about typical activities or personality traits for each gender.  One’s ability to take the 
perspective of another or of a group in situations where complex gender dynamics are at 
play may be impeded, thus, measuring theory of mind and other social-cognitive abilities 
within authentic social contexts will provide a better sense of how social cognition plays 
a role in exclusion decisions surrounding gender.   
Yet another way in which research has moved towards assessing a more socially-
rich form of theory of mind is through interpretative theory of mind (Carpendale & 
Chandler, 1996), which requires that one recognize that when given the same 
information, two people can come to equally likely conclusions.  This form of theory of 
mind has been found to develop later than false belief understanding, typically by 8 years 
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of age (Carpendale & Chandler, 1996), though some findings suggest even more 
prolonged development (Mull & Evans, 2010).  Interpretative theory of mind requires 
that one consider social interactions and relationships to a greater degree than false belief 
theory of mind, however, it is still not fully socially-contextualized.  Research using 
interpretative theory of mind, however, suggests that this may be a particularly 
appropriate measure to use when examining use of gender stereotypes, as it has been 
shown that children with interpretative theory of mind are less likely to make accusations 
of gender discrimination in situations in which discrimination may have occurred (Brown 
et al., 2010).  They may have judged that while it was possible that gender discrimination 
had occurred, it was inappropriate to jump to conclusions about discrimination if the 
situation was somewhat ambiguous.   
Thus, some research suggests that theory of mind competence aids one in 
recognizing intentions and using this information to make moral judgments (Killen et al., 
2011); some research suggests that having theory of mind competence is related to 
greater exclusivity due to a better understanding of group dynamics (Abrams et al., 
2009); and some suggests that having theory of mind is related to being less willing to 
perceive gender discrimination in situations where it may have occurred (Brown et al., 
2010).  This suggests that social-cognitive abilities such as theory of mind are intimately 
involved in moral decision-making, including situations involving group membership, 
such as gender.  Further, the relation between such judgments and theory of mind is not 
yet clear.  Research should aim, then, to continue unpacking the connections between 
social-cognitive capacities and moral decision-making, particularly in situations 




The research reviewed here reveals that social cognition about exclusion/inclusion 
decisions is multi-faceted. Children can reason in complex ways about exclusion, 
including exclusion based on gender, and children must weigh information about group 
membership, the goals of the group, the reasons for exclusion and the norms of the group 
in making exclusion decisions.  Recognizing the importance of reasoning as well as 
interpreting intentions is essential in studying exclusion.  This review revealed that, while 
children do reject many forms of exclusion, they are more willing to accept gender-based 
exclusion than other forms of group-based exclusion, such as race or ethnicity.  
Additionally, as reviewed, research indicates that children and adolescents do 
differentiate between forms of exclusion, viewing some forms of exclusion as acceptable 
because of social-conventions.  Further, they distinguish between different forms of 
deviance from groups, seeing some forms of deviance positively, but do not condone 
exclusion of any deviant group members. The bulk of the research that has been 
conducted on exclusion, however, has assessed acceptability of exclusion.  What is still 
unknown is how likely children think that exclusion is in different contexts.  Further, 
what is still not known, however, is how children evaluate excluding someone or the 
likelihood of excluding someone who is already part of a group when they deviate from 
the social-conventions or moral practices of that group which surround gender identity.  
Thus, future research should continue to examine reasoning about exclusion in 
complex peer interactions.  This will provide greater insight into when and under what 
circumstances children view exclusion and exclusion messages as legitimate and 
illegitimate.  Understanding when children view exclusion as legitimate will aid 
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educators who work to resolve conflicts between children because it will provide them 
with tools for communicating with children when exclusion occurs and will guide them 
in finding ways to help children to only exclude in circumstances where it will not harm 
others and where it is based upon legitimate concerns.   This will be especially helpful in 
addressing issues of gender exclusion, where children may receive contradictory 
messages from society, parents and peers about appropriate behaviors, activities and 
appearance for each gender. 
Additionally, while research has revealed that group norms related to group 
identity can be important in a nationality context, what is not yet known is how such 
norms would play out when they relate to the gender group identity of the groups.  Thus, 
research should also examine deviance from group norms that relate to gender group 
membership, in particular research should focus on gender stereotypes about aggressive 
behavior, as group responses to deviance in terms of gender stereotypes about aggression 
is an understudied, but important area.  For instance, future research might examine 
group norms about what it means to be a girl or boy, for instance, and how children 
respond to deviance from group norms when the norms themselves either conform to 
traditional stereotypes about gender or move against traditional stereotypes about gender. 
This is an important new direction for research because of the strong ingroup biases that 
surround gender as well as the early emergence and pervasiveness of negativity towards 
those who do not conform to gender stereotypes.  Understanding how children respond to 
deviance from groups which conform to or resist gender stereotypes, especially those 
involving aggressive behavior,  will aid educators and counselors managing the complex 
conflicts that children have surrounding the development of their gender identity.   
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Finally, research needs to more fully explore the relation between exclusion 
decisions and understanding of intentions using more finely tuned measures of socially-
relevant theory of mind.  This new avenue of research will be particularly insightful as 
some research is beginning to reveal the complex and surprising ways that theory of mind 
competence is related to a range of types of moral judgment as well as how knowledge of 
and use of stereotypes may impact applications of theory of mind competence.  
Unraveling the relation between children’s social-cognitive abilities and their judgments 
will provide essential information that can help guide parents and educators as they find 
ways to encourage their children to take others’ perspectives and to fully assess the 
motives, desires and emotional states of those involved in potential conflicts.  This will 
be particularly important to study within the context of gender conformity and non-
conformity and exclusion due to gender because social-cognition within this context 
involves not only an assessment of others’ beliefs, intentions and desires, but also an 
assessment of group norms regarding gender identity and societal stereotypes about 
gender. 
Thus, within this review, new areas of research have been identified which, 
together, will help move research towards a more complete understanding of social 
exclusion, with the aim of better informing intervention programs designed to ameliorate 










 Participants (N = 292) included 90 9-10 year olds (M =  9.63 SD = 2.99, Range = 
9.40 years to 11.61 years), and 202 13-14 year olds (M =  13.95 SD = .43, Range = 13.05 
years to 15.88 years) from public elementary and middle schools in the Mid-Atlantic 
region.  Given the varied analyses of interest, and expecting medium effects at best, and 
with the desire to achieve power levels of .80, the a priori power analysis for a 2 group, 
2-tailed ANOVA test indicated an appropriate sample size would include at least 128 
participants. Participants were approximately evenly divided by gender (52.4% female), 
and were ethnically representative of the United States (school demographic information 
identified approximately 30% ethnic minority students in the schools).  Further, school 
demographic information indicates that participants were from low to low-middle income 
schools. Only students receiving parental consent (9-10 year olds) and providing student 
assent (all participants) completed the Tasks (see Appendix A for Institutional Review 
Board Approval and Consent forms).  
Design 
 The study involved between-subjects and within-subjects factors for an overall 
design that includes a 2 (Age Group: 9 - 10 and 13 - 14 years) X 2 (Gender: female, 
male) X 3 (Condition: activities, relational aggression, physical aggression) model with 
repeated measures on the last factor. Analyses included subsets of these variables, to test 
specific hypotheses.   
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Three tasks were administered. The Gender Exclusion Task included 2 versions.  
Each version included 3 conditions (neutral social activities, relational aggression, and 
physical aggression).  Each condition included 2 scenarios: one for a girls group and one 
for a boys group.  The scenarios varied in terms of the conformity norm, depending on 
the version.  Specifically, Version 1, (CRC: Conform, Resist, Conform) included groups 
which conform to the stereotype for neutral social activities and for physical aggression, 
but which resist the stereotype for relational aggression.  Version 2 (RCR: Resist, 
Conform, Resist) included groups which resist the stereotype for neutral social activities 
and physical aggression, but which conform for relational aggression.   The six scenarios 
in each version (12 total) were varied in order to systematically examine differences in 
reasoning about resisting group norms depending on the type of norm (conforming or 
not), the domain of the norm (moral or societal), and the condition (physical aggression, 
relational aggression, neutral social activities) (see Figure 1 for task design). 
Additionally, as male and female participants at both age groups evaluated both versions, 
differences based on age, gender, and ingroup or outgroup status were examined.   
The neutral social activities were either: football (stereotypic male activity) or 
ballet (stereotypic female activity).  The relational aggression scenarios were: gossip; 
speaking about non-present other peers (stereotypic female behavior), or impartiality; not 
speaking about non-present other peers (stereotypic male behavior).  The physical 
aggression scenarios were: rough; pushing and shoving in a soccer game (stereotypic 
male behavior), or nice; playing nicely in a soccer game (stereotypic female behavior). 
See Figure 1 for task design.   
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For each scenario, participants evaluated a member of the group who disagrees 
with or dissents from the group.  This resisting member either adheres to or resists a 
stereotype, depending on if the group is conforming or non-conforming to the stereotype.  
An Interpretative Theory of Mind Task (Carpendale & Chandler, 1996) and a 
Gender Stereotype Task (modified from Signorella et al., 1993) were administered to 
assess participants’ theory of mind competence and their adherence to gender stereotypes.  
Procedure 
 The three tasks were administered by a trained researcher in a quiet room at each 
school. Participants were told that there are no right or wrong answers and that all 
responses are anonymous and confidential.  Additionally, participants were told that their 
participation is voluntary and that they may choose to stop the assessment at any time. 
Participants were also given a warm-up task, which involved practicing using the Likert 
scale to be used in the survey. For 9 - 10 year old participants, the survey was read aloud 
by a trained researcher to small groups (3 - 4 participants) of participants of the same 
gender.  For 13 - 14 year old participants, the survey was administered by a trained 
researcher to larger groups (25 - 30 participants). The necessity to read the survey aloud 
to the younger participants accounts for the difference in sample size between the 9 - 10 
year old participants and the 13 - 14 year old participants.  For both age groups, 
participants recorded their answers.  Any questions the participants had were answered 
by the researcher.  The survey took about 40 minutes to complete.   
Measures 
 Participants completed three Tasks (see Appendix B). Participants first completed 
the Gender Exclusion Task, followed by the Interpretative Theory of Mind Task, and then 
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the Gender Stereotype Task. The Gender Exclusion Task  was modified from Killen, 
Rutland, et al. (2012). The coding categories for the Gender Exclusion Task were also 
adapted from Killen, Rutland, et al. (2012). The Interpretative Theory of Mind Task and 
the coding system were modified from Carpendale and Chandler (1996)   The Gender 
Stereotype Task was modified from Signorella, Bigler, and Liben (1993).  
Gender Exclusion Task 
 The Gender Exclusion Task consisted of twelve hypothetical scenarios (6 in each 
of 2 versions) in which a member of a group disagrees with his/her group about the 
group’s norm. Each child heard only six scenarios.  There were two scenarios for each of 
three conditions: social activities, relational aggression, and physical aggression.  For 
each condition, the two scenarios included opposite group norms and one of the scenarios 
was about a girls group and one was about a boys group.   For instance, for the relational 
aggression scenario, participants might have responded to a girls group with a norm of 
gossiping and a boys group with a norm of impartiality.  As described above, there were 
two versions.  Version 1 included groups which conform to the stereotype for neutral 
social activities and for physical aggression, but which resist the stereotype for relational 
aggression.  Version 2 included groups which resist the stereotype for neutral social 
activities and physical aggression, but which conform for relational aggression.   Note 
that this design is premised not upon the belief that there are differences in mean rates of 
aggression between girls and boys, but rather that there are stereotypes associating girls 
with relational aggression and boys with physical aggression. Approximately equal 
numbers of male and female participants from each age group completed each version. 
Females received surveys with the girls groups labeled as “your group” and the boys 
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groups labeled as “their group.” Males received surveys with the boys groups labeled as 
“your group” and the girls groups labeled as “their group.”   
 Dependent Measures for the Gender Exclusion Task.  For each scenario in 
both versions, the same assessments were given, to allow for a direct comparison 
between scenarios. The first assessment was: 1) Likelihood of resistance: What do you 
think the dissenter will do?  Participants had a dichotomous choice: Go along with the 
group, or tell them what he/she thinks.  This measure assessed if participants think that 
individuals who disagree with their group will express their disagreement to the group.  
The second assessment was: 2) Individual likelihood of resistance: What would you do?  
Participants had a dichotomous choice: Go along with the group, or tell them what he/she 
thinks.  This measure assessed if participants themselves would be willing to express 
disagreement with the group.  
 After this assessment, participants were told that the dissenting member chose to 
tell the group his/her thoughts.  Participants then rated: 3) Group favorability, dissenting 
member: How okay or not okay will they think what she says is?  This assessment was 
measured with a Likert scale with ratings from 1 = really not okay to 6 = really okay.  
This measure assessed how favorable participants think the group will be towards 
someone who is a member of the group, but vocally disagrees with the group.  This was 
followed by an assessment of 4) Reasoning in order to determine the reasons why 
participants believe a group will feel either favorable or not favorable to a dissenting 
member.  Reasoning data were coded using the Coding System, See Appendix C.  
Next, in order to compare how participants’ feel about this dissenting member to 
how participants think groups will feel about this dissenting member, the survey included 
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a measure which asked participants for their own perspective.  Specifically, they 
assessed: 5) Individual favorability, dissenting member: When you hear her, how okay or 
not okay do you think what she says is?  This item was measured with a Likert scale from 
1 = really not okay to 6 = really okay.  This assessment provided participants’ own 
individual favorability towards the dissenting member.  Participants also completed 6) 
Reasoning. Reasoning was assessed in order to determine the reasons why participants 
feel either favorable or not favorable to a dissenting member.  Reasoning data were coded 
using the Coding System, See Appendix C.  
Next, participants were told that the group must decide how to respond to the 
deviance.  Participants then assessed 7) Intragroup exclusion likelihood, dissenting 
member: “Do you think the group will tell her she can’t be in the group anymore?” 
Participants first responded with a dichotomous choice between yes and no, followed by 
a Likert scale from 1 = very unlikely to 6 = very likely). This assessed perceptions of 
repercussions for dissent.  Specifically, it assessed if participants think that dissenting 
group members will be excluded from within their group, based on the group member’s 
dissent.  Participants also completed 8) Reasoning.  Reasoning was assessed in order to 
determine the reasons why participants believe that exclusion is either likely or not likely.  
Reasoning data were coded using the Coding System, See Appendix C. 
Finally, participants were told that the group can invite one more person to join 
their group and were asked to assess 9) Intergroup inclusion preference: “Who should 
the group include?”  They had a dichotomous choice between someone who agrees but is 
the opposite gender, and someone who disagrees but is the same gender. This assessed 
whether the participant shows any bias in terms of gender or norm, and what they 
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determined to be more important for the group: shared gender or shared beliefs.  
Additionally, 10) Reasoning was assessed.  Reasoning data were coded using the Coding 
System, See  
Appendix C.    
Coding categories for justifications.  A Coding System was established based 
on extensive pilot testing, and drawing on prior research (Killen et al., 2001; Killen, 
Rutland, et al., 2012). The Coding System included three broad categories, based on 
social domain theory: Moral, Societal and Psychological.  The subcategory for Moral 
was: Concern for Other’s Welfare (e.g. “If they gossip, they will hurt the feelings of the 
other kids.” or “Pushing and shoving could mean that someone could get badly hurt.” or 
“It is not fair for them to tell her she cannot be in the group just because she does not 
think that girls should do ballet.”). The subcategories for Societal were: Group 
Functioning (e.g., “Playing nice will mean that they can all work together to win the 
game.”), Inclusion of Diverse Perspectives (e.g., “She can teach them to all play nicely” 
or “it is better to include someone different”) and Gender Group Identity or Stereotypes 
(e.g., “Girls always gossip.” or “Well, it is a boys group, so they should pick another 
boy.”). The subcategories for Psychological were: Autonomy (e.g., “It is up to her what 
game she wants to play.”), and Identification with the Target (e.g., “I like football, too” 
or “Well, I also wouldn’t want to gossip.”).  Reasoning was be identified as Uncodeable 
if it is undifferentiated (e.g., “It’s bad.), inconsistent with the story, or incomplete. 
Interrater reliability was high, Cohen’s  = .92.    
Interpretative Theory of Mind Task 
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In order to assess participants’ theory of mind skills, the Interpretive Theory of 
Mind Task (Carpendale & Chandler, 1996) was used. Interpretive theory of mind 
assesses whether participants can recognize that two people who had access to the same 
information may come to different conclusions or interpretations of that information.  It 
typically develops by age 7 or 8 (Carpendale & Chandler, 1996), although some recent 
studies have found prolonged development past age 7 (Mull & Evans, 2010).  The task 
used is modeled upon the Carpendale and Chandler (1996) measures, with two changes.  
The measure was administered as part of a survey, but originally included puppets and 
was an interview. Participants first identified if they think that two people can come to 
different conclusions about the same information, as in the original task.  In the original 
task they were then asked about a third individual.  As some of the hypotheses of the 
current study involve understanding the perspective of a group, participants were not 
asked about a third individual, but rather about a group of same-gendered peers and their 
interpretation of the situation.  This provided a sense of if participants could accurately 
interpret the perspective of a group of peers. 
The Interpretive Theory of Mind Task involved 3 short scenarios.  In the first one, 
participants were told about two same-gendered children playing a game.  For instance, 
in the female version of the story, participants were told that: “Jill and Anna are playing a 
game.  They are supposed to “wait for a ring” before they take the next turn. Jill says they 
should wait for the telephone to ring. Anna says they should wait for a ring that you 
wear.”  In the second scenario, the participants were shown the classic “Duck-Rabbit” 
Image (Jastrow, 1899).  They were told: “Jill and Anna see this picture.  Jill says it is a 
duck.  Anna says it is a rabbit.”  In the third scenario, participants were shown 3 images 
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of cards.  Card 1 has a blue block on it.  Card 2 has a red triangle on it.  Card 3 has a red 
block on it.  They were told: “Jill and Anna need to find a penny, which is hidden under 
one of these three cards.  The penny is under the card with the block on it.  Jill says it is 
under card 1.  Anna says it is under card 3.” 
Dependent measures for the theory of mind task.  For each of the three 
scenarios, the same assessments were completed. The first assessment for each scenario 
was1) Explanation: Is it okay for Jill to say X and Anna to say Y?  and 2) Reasoning.  
For the Explanation assessment, participants were scored a 0 if they either answered 
“No” to Question 1 or did not provide reasoning for Question 2 which recognized that 
one could see either interpretation as legitimate.  They received a score of 1 if they 
responded “Yes” to Question 1 and also provided reasoning for Question 2 which 
recognized that either interpretation was legitimate.  The next assessment was 3) Group 
Prediction: Now a group of girls comes over and sees X.  What will they say, X, Y, or 
would you not know what they would say? And 4) Reasoning  For the Group Prediction 
assessment, participants were scored a 0 if they did not answer that they would not know 
what they would say to Question 3 or did not provide reasoning for Question 4 which 
recognized that one could see either interpretation as legitimate.  They received a score of 
1 if they responded that they would not know what the group would say to Question 3 
and also provided reasoning for Question 4 which recognized that either interpretation 
was legitimate.  For the scoring of the Interpretative Theory of Mind measure, Interrater 
reliability was high, Cohen’s  = .85. Scores for responses were summed across the 3 
scenarios (for a score of 0 = no interpretative theory of mind to 6 = full interpretative 
theory of mind).  
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Gender Stereotype Task 
The Gender Stereotype Task involved assessing gender stereotypes surrounding 
each behavior or activity in the survey: football, ballet, gossiping, being impartial, 
playing nice, and playing rough by pushing and shoving.  For each activity or behavior, 
participants completed stereotype measures.   
Dependent measures for the gender stereotype task. The first assessment, 
Stereotype Awareness, read 1) “Who usually does X?” with the choices of boy, girl, or 
both provided. This assessment provided information as to the participant’s awareness of 
gender stereotypes for each of the behaviors and activities. The second assessment was 2) 
Peer group experience: “How many of your friends do X?” with the choices of none, a 
few, some, or most. This assessment provided information about how commonly the peer 
group engages in the behavior or activity. The third assessment, 3) Personal Experience, 
was only measured for the activities (ballet and football) because of the moral valance 
associated with the behaviors, and the potential for answers reflecting social desirability.  
This assessment read 3) “Do you do X?” with a dichotomous choice of Yes or No. This 
assessment provided information about the participant’s own experience with the 
activities.  Finally, participants were asked 4) Peer Group Gender, “How many of your 
friends are X (same sex as participant)?”, with choices none, a few, some or most. 
Plan for Analysis 
 Data were analyzed using Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and repeated-measures 
ANOVAs to test hypotheses for between group differences, using age, gender, 
interpretative theory of mind competence, and stereotype awareness as the between group 
factors. The repeated-measures factors included stereotype norm (conforming or non-
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conforming), condition (physical aggression, relational aggression or afterschool activity) 
or type of assessment, depending on the specific hypothesis. Follow up tests were 
conducted using the Bonferroni Correction to control for Type I errors. Dichotomous 
responses were coded 0 or 1.  For ease, condition refers to the deviant group member’s 
behavior.  For instance, in the ballet condition, the deviant member advocates for doing 
ballet when the group wants to do football. Justifications were proportions of responses 
for each respective coding category, with the top three justifications analyzed for each 
question.  Regression analyses were run on the Interpretative Theory of Mind score, to 
assess if differences in theory of mind competence are related to differences in 
evaluations of challenging gender stereotypic peer group norms.  
 Results  
Gender Stereotypic Activities 
Stereotype Measure  
 Do children and adolescents hold gender stereotypes about who usually plays 
football or does ballet?  Descriptive statistics indicate that both children and adolescents, 
and boys and girls hold strong stereotypes about these behaviors, with over 75% of 
participants of each gender and age group affirming these stereotypes (See Table 2).   
Peer Resistance to Group Norms about Gender Stereotypic Activities 
 Since results confirmed that children and adolescents do hold stereotypes 
suggesting that ballet is an activity usually done by girls, and football by boys, the next 
question was: do children think their peers will resist these stereotypes and challenge 
their groups?  In order to address this question, two separate 2 (Gender: male, female) X 
2 (Age Group: 9, 13 year olds) X 2 (Version: conform, resist) ANOVAs were conducted, 
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one for the ballet and one for the football deviance conditions.   For the ballet condition, 
when a group member wants to do ballet when the group wants to play football, an age 
interaction was found, F (1,279) = 14.30, p < .001, η
2 
= .04, revealing that 9-year-olds (M 
= .76, SD = .43) were more likely to expect the group member to resist the group than 
were 13-year-olds (M = .56, SD = .50). Additionally, there was a version interaction 
effect, F (1,279) = 48.69, p < .001, η
2
 = .14, which showed that participants were more 
likely to expect that a girl who wanted to do ballet when the rest of her girls’ group 
wanted to play football would challenge the group (M = .81, SD = .39) than would a boy 
who wanted to do ballet when the rest of the his boys’ group wanted to play football (M = 
.43, SD = .50).  
 For the football condition, an age interaction was also found, F (1,282) = 11.73, p 
= .001, η
2 
= .04, revealing that 9-year-olds were more likely (M = .90, SD = .30) to expect 
that the group member who wanted to play football when the group wanted to do ballet 
would tell the group than were 13-year-olds (M = .72, SD = .45).   Thus, the results 
indicate that children are more likely to expect their peers to challenge the group about 
playing both football and ballet than are adolescents.   
 Next, in order to test the hypotheses that participants would be more likely to 
expect a group member would challenge the group to play football than ballet, a 2 
(Gender: male, female) X 2 (Age Group: 9, 13 year olds) X 2 (Version: conform, resist) 
X 2 (Condition: football, ballet) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor was 
conducted.  A main effect for condition was found, F (1,279) = 19.35, p < .001, η
2
 = .06, 
revealing that participants expected resistance would be more likely in the football (M = 
.78, SD = .42) than ballet condition (M = .62, SD = .49).  This was driven by a condition 
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by version interaction, F (1, 279) = 21.79, p < .001, η
2
 = .07, which revealed that 
participants perceived resistance to be equally likely when the group member was a boy 
who wanted to play football (M = .80, SD = .39) or a girl who wanted to do ballet (M = 
.81, SD = .39).  However, as expected, when a girl wanted to play football (M = .74, SD = 
.44), participants were much more likely to expect that she would speak up and tell her 
group than when a boy wanted to do ballet (M = .43, SD = .50).   Results revealed that 
participants may hold a shifting standard:  they asserted that it is equally likely for 
children to speak up and challenge their group when the group member’s desired activity 
aligns with stereotypes, but when that desire is stereotype non-conforming, participants 
were more likely to expect that a girl would challenge the group to play football than that 
a boy would challenge the group to do ballet.   
Individual Resistance to Group Norms about Gender Stereotypic Activities 
 Children and adolescents do expect that their peers will challenge the group, but 
this is dependent on the nature of the challenge.  It is harder for boys to challenge the 
group in gender non-conforming ways than it is for girls.  The next question is do these 
gender stereotypes that regulate expectations about behavior influence children’s and 
adolescents’ own assertions about challenging the group?   In order to answer this 
question, two separate 2 (Gender: male, female) X 2 (Age Group: 9, 13 year olds) X 2 
(Version: conform, resist) ANOVAs were conducted for individual likelihood of 
resistance in the ballet and football deviance conditions.  Individual likelihood of 
resistance measured if participants thought they would be likely to tell the group that they 
disagreed with the group’s chosen activity.   
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 For the ballet condition, a version interaction effect was found, F (1, 277) = 
32.747, p < .001, η
2 
= .10, revealing that participants were more likely to challenge the 
group when challenging the group conformed to gender stereotypes (M = .92, SD = .27) 
than when it resisted such stereotypes (M = .59, SD = .49).  Thus, participants, 
themselves, were influenced by gender stereotypes regarding ballet in similar ways to 
how they expected their peers to be influenced. 
 Next, in order to confirm that participants were also more likely to resist the peer 
group in order to play football than to do ballet, a 2 (Gender: male, female) X 2 (Age 
Group: 9, 13 year olds) X 2 (Version: conform, resist) X 2 (Condition: football, ballet) 
ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor was conducted on individual 
likelihood of resistance.  An effect for condition was found, F (1,277) = 25.51, p < .001, 
η
2
 = .08, confirming expectations that participants were more likely to challenge the 
group in order to play football (M = .91, SD = .29) than to do ballet (M = .75, SD = .43).  
Further, a condition by version interaction effect was found, F (1,277) = 24.96, p <.001, 
η
2
 =.08, revealing that this difference was driven by differences in how participants 
evaluated challenging a group by resisting stereotypes.  There were no differences 
between how they evaluated telling a girls group you want to do ballet (M = .92, SD = 
.27) or a boys group that you want to play football (M = .92, SD = .27).  However, 
participants were more likely to challenge a girls group to play football (M = .89, SD = 
.31) than a boys group to do ballet (M = .59, SD = .49).  Thus, stereotypes regarding boys 
doing ballet are especially strong and pervade participants’ own expectations about if 
they would challenge their peer group. 
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 Relationship between Peer and Individual Resistance to Group Norms about Gender 
Stereotypic Activities 
 Football. It was expected that participants would be more likely to resist the 
group by advocating for playing football than they would expect their peers to resist.  In 
order to test this hypothesis, a 2 (Gender: male, female) X 2 (Age Group: 9, 13 year olds) 
X 2 (Version: conform, resist) X 2 (Question: peer, individual resistance) ANOVA with 
repeated measures on the last factor was conducted for the football condition.  Results 
revealed that participants were more likely to challenge the group to play football than 
they expected their peers to resist the group, F (1,279) = 8.92, p < .01, η
2
 = .03.  Further, 
a question by age group interaction was found, F (1,279) = 11.17, p = .001, η
2
 = .03, 
revealing that while 9-year-olds did not differentiate between their own likelihood of 
resistance (M = .90, SD = .30) and their expectations for how likely their peer would be 
to resist the group (M = .91, SD = .29), 13-year-olds did differentiate (Peer Resistance: M 
= .72, SD = .45, Individual Resistance: M = .91, SD = .43). Thus, younger children may 
have more difficulty distinguishing between their own perspective and the group’s 
perspective than do adolescents.  Finally, a gender by question interaction was found, F 
(1,279) = 4.932, p < .05, η
2
 = .01 which revealed that while female participants asserted 
that they would be more likely to challenge their group to play football (M = .93, SD = 
.25) than they expected their peers would (M = .76, SD = .43), p < .001,  there were no 
differences for male participants (Peer Resistance: M = .80, SD = .40, Individual 
Resistance: M = .87, SD = .33).   This suggests that female participants may believe that 
others adhere more strongly to stereotypes about football than they, themselves do.   
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 Ballet. In order to assess if similar differences between individual and peer 
resistance to group norms were present for the ballet condition, a 2 (Gender: male, 
female) X 2 (Age Group: 9, 13 year olds) X 2 (Version: conform, resist) X 2 (Question: 
peer, individual resistance) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor was 
conducted for the ballet condition.  As in the football condition, results indicated that 
participants expected that their peers would be less likely to resist the group norm in 
order to advocate for doing ballet (M = .62, SD = .49) than would they, individually (M = 
.75, SD = .43), F (1,275) = 8.76, p < .01, η
2 
= .03.  Further, a question by age group 
interaction was found, F (1,275) = 4.55, p < .05, η
2 
 = .01, which showed that 9-year-olds 
did not differentiate between peer (M = .76, SD = .43) and individual (M = .81, SD = .39) 
likelihood of resistance, but that 13-year-olds did differentiate (Peer Resistance: M = .56, 
SD = .50, Individual Resistance: M = .73, SD = .45).  Adolescents may be more likely to 
expect that their peers will be influenced by stereotypes than do children. A question by 
gender interaction was also found, similar to in the football condition, F (1,275)= 8.85, p 
< .01, η
2
 = .03. Just as was found in the football condition, females differentiated more 
between individual (M = .81, SD = .39) and peer (M = .60, SD = .43) responses to 
challenging the group by doing ballet than did males (Peer Resistance: M = .65, SD = .48, 
Individual Resistance: M = .69, SD = .46).  Perhaps females have more personal 
experience with stereotypes limiting their opportunities and thus are both more attuned to 
the likelihood that others will use stereotypes as well as more likely to resist these 
stereotypes themselves.   
Group Favorability Towards the Deviant Group Member 
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 After participants assessed the likelihood of resistance, they were told that the 
group member who disagreed with the group did actually deviate from the group, telling 
the group that he or she wanted to do a different activity.  The next set of hypotheses 
involved how the group would respond to this deviant member.  Do children and 
adolescents think that groups will dislike group members who want to engage in different 
gender stereotypic activities and does the gender of the group and the type of activity 
matter? It was expected that groups would not like any members who deviated from the 
group, but that they would be particularly negative towards members who deviated from 
the group and also challenged gender stereotypes (for instance a girl who wanted to play 
football and a boy who wanted to do ballet).  Further, it was expected that groups would 
be least favorable towards a boy who wanted to do ballet, based on prior research 
indicating that gender non-conformity by boys is viewed as especially wrong (Horn, 
2007).  In order to test these hypotheses 2 separate 2 (Gender: male, female) X 2 (Age 
Group: 9, 13 year olds) X 2 (Version: conform, resist) ANOVAs were conducted for 
group favorability in the ballet and football deviance conditions.  Results for the football 
condition revealed a version by gender interaction, F (1,281) = 7.62, p < .01, η
2
 = .02, 
which showed that while female participants did not differ in their expectations for group 
favorability of a boy who wanted to play football and a girl who wanted to play football 
(Boy: M = 3.47, SD = 1.42, Girl: M = 3.67, SD = 1.42), male participants did differ.  
Male participants expected that groups would be more favorable to a boy who wanted to 
play football when his group wanted to do ballet than a girl who wanted to play football 
when her group wanted to do ballet (Boy: M = 4.15, SD = 1.46, Girl: M = 3.29, SD = 
1.29). Pairwise comparisons revealed that male and female participants differed 
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significantly in their responses to the boy who wanted to play football, p < .05 and that 
male participants differed significantly in their responses to the boy and girl who wanted 
to play football, p < .01. 
 For the ballet condition, a version effect was found, F (1,280) = 63.20, p < .001, 
η
2
 = .18, revealing that participants expected groups to evaluate the girl who wanted to 
ballet much more positively than the boy who wanted to do ballet (Boy: M = 2.46, SD = 
1.51, Girl: M = 3.73, SD = 1.23).  Thus, while participants generally expected that groups 
would not like deviant members, they were attuned to the stereotypes associated with the 
deviant behaviors.  All participants differed in their evaluations of a deviant member who 
wanted to do ballet, expecting that groups would be more favorable to a girl who wanted 
to do ballet when the group wanted to do football than a boy who wanted to do the same 
thing.  Further, male participants allowed stereotypes to influence their evaluation for the 
football condition, expecting that groups would be more favorable to a boy who wanted 
to play football than to a girl who wanted to play football. 
 In order to assess if children and adolescents expected groups to differ in their 
evaluations of a deviant member who wanted to play football or do ballet, a 2 (Gender: 
male, female) X 2 (Age Group: 9, 13 year olds) X 2 (Version: conform, resist) X 2 
(Condition: ballet, football) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor was 
conducted.  This revealed that participants expected groups would be more favorable to 
the deviant who wanted to play football than do ballet, F (1,279) = 22.70, p < .001, η
2
 = 
.07 (Football: M = 3.63, SD = 1.43, Ballet: M = 3.08, SD = 1.52).   Additionally, a 
condition by version effect was found, F (1,279) = 23.08, p < .001, η
2
 = .07, indicating 
that participants expected groups would be more favorable to the girl who wanted to play 
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football than to the boy who wanted to do ballet, p < .001, but that they did not differ in 
their evaluations of the boy who wanted to play football and the girl who wanted to do 
ballet. In summary, children and adolescents generally did not think that groups would 
like these deviant members, especially if they were deviating by also suggesting the 
group engage in a counter-stereotypic activity.  
Justifications for Group Favorability Towards the Deviant Member 
The next question involved reasoning: do children and adolescents expect that 
groups will use different reasons to justify how favorable they are towards these deviant 
members? Analyses were conducted in order to test hypotheses concerning differences in 
children’s and adolescents’ reasoning about the group’s favorability towards the deviant 
member by participants who thought the group would like versus would not like the 
deviant member.  Specifically, participant responses to group favorability towards the 
deviant member were divided into a dichotomous variable (okay, not okay) using a mid-
point split of 3.5. The top four forms of reasoning used by participants to reason about 
group favorability towards the deviant member were group functioning (“he isn’t going 
along with what they want to do”), autonomy (“it’s okay to be different and want to do 
something unique”), inclusion of diverse perspectives (“she can help them understand 
that football could be fun”), and gender identity or stereotypes (“they’ll think he is gay 
for suggesting they do ballet”).  Two separate 2 (Gender: male, female) X 2 (Age Group: 
9, 13 year olds) X 2 (Version: conform, resist) X 2 (Group Favorability: okay, not okay)  
X 2 (Justification: group functioning, autonomy, diverse perspectives, gender) ANOVA 
with repeated measures on the last factor were conducted, one for each condition 
(football and ballet).  
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Football. When the deviant member wanted to play football, participants used 
different forms of reasoning if they thought that the group would like the deviant member 
than if they thought the group would not like the deviant member.  Specifically, an 
interaction was found for participant reasoning by group favorability evaluation, F (3, 
846) = 13.44, p < .001, η
2
 = .04. This interaction revealed that participants who thought 
that the group would be favorable to the deviant member who wanted to play football 
used all four forms of reasoning, with no significant differences in amount of use.  They 
cited concerns about group functioning (M = .30, SD = .45), described the deviant 
member’s autonomy (M = .19, SD = .39), noted the benefits of including diverse 
perspectives (M = .18, SD = .37), and discussed the traditional gender stereotypes 
associated with playing football (M = .24, SD = .41).  Those participants who thought that 
the group would not like the deviant member who wanted to play football referenced 
primarily group functioning (M = .45, SD = .48) and gender identity and stereotypes (M = 
.38, SD = .46).  They referenced group functioning and gender identity and stereotypes 
significantly more than autonomy or the inclusion of diverse perspectives with ps < .001, 
and referenced group functioning more than gender identity and stereotypes with p < .05.  
There was no difference between the use of autonomy (M = .05, SD = .20) and the 
inclusion of diverse perspectives (M = .02, SD = .16). Thus, while those who thought the 
group would like the deviant member relied upon a range of different reasons, those who 
thought the group would not like the deviant member focused more on group issues, 
including group functioning and gender based expectations for group activities.   
 There was also an interaction for age group by group favorability evaluation by 
reasoning: F (3, 846) = 3.76, p < .05, η
2
 = .01.  This revealed that 9 year olds and 13 year 
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olds who thought the group would like the deviant member who wanted to play football 
reason differently about group functioning, p < .05, with 9 year olds using less group 
functioning reasoning (M = .20, SD = .40) than did 13 year olds (M = .34, SD = .46). 
 Ballet.  The ANOVA conducted for the ballet condition also revealed differences 
between participants who thought that the group would versus would not like the deviant 
member who wanted to play ballet, F (3, 843) = 17.63, p < .001, η
2 
= .05.  Similar to the 
football condition, participants who said that the group would like the deviant who 
wanted to play ballet cited a range of difference reasons, with no statistical difference in 
the proportion using each form of reasoning.  They referenced group functioning (M = 
.36, SD = .47), the positive effects of including diverse perspectives (M = .20, SD = .38), 
the importance of the deviant member’s autonomy (M = .21, SD = .39), and gender 
identity and gender stereotypes (M = .16, SD = .34).  Participants who thought that the 
group would not like the deviant member relied most about gender stereotypes (M = .47, 
SD = .47), with almost half of participants citing gender stereotypes, followed by 
concerns with group functioning (M = .32, SD = .46).  Very few participants referenced 
the inclusion of diverse perspectives (M = .06, SD = .22), or autonomy (M = .01, SD = 
.08).  Participants made more references to group functioning and gender stereotypes than 
diverse perspectives or autonomy, ps < .001.  There were no differences in the use of 
gender stereotypes and group functioning or in the use of diverse perspectives or 
autonomy.   
 Thus, overall, the reasoning results for group favorability in both the ballet and 
football conditions reveal that participants believe that groups who do not like deviant 
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members are concerned with how the deviant will impact group functioning and if the 
deviant behavior aligns with gender expectations or not.   
Individual Favorability Towards the Deviant Member 
 The results measuring group favorability towards the deviant member indicate 
that gender stereotypes play a strong role in how children and adolescents think groups 
will respond to deviant members.  Our next question was whether children attend to the 
same issues and concerns when individually evaluating how much they would favor 
deviant members.  We expected that they would, individually, be less influenced by 
stereotypes and would show more support for the deviant members. In order to test 
hypotheses concerning individual favorability of the deviant member, 2 separate 2 
(Gender: male, female) X 2 (Age Group: 9, 13 year olds) X 2 (Version: conform, resist) 
ANOVAs were conducted for individual favorability in the ballet and football deviance 
conditions. For the football condition, there were no significant effects for gender, age 
group or version.  For the ballet condition, there was a significant gender interaction 
effect, F (1, 279) = 6.16, p <.05, η
2
 = .02, which revealed that female participants were 
more favorable (M = 5.16, SD = 1.13) to the deviant who wanted to do ballet than were 
male participants (M = 4.91, SD = 1.23). Additionally, there was a version interaction 
effect, F (1,279) = 32.14, p <.001, η
2
 = .10, which revealed that participants were more 
favorable to the girl who wanted to do ballet (M = 4.94, SD = 1.19) than to the boy who 
wanted to do ballet (M = 3.92, SD = 1.71).  Thus, these findings indicate that, similar to 
the group favorability evaluations, gender stereotypes do influence how children and 
adolescents evaluate peers who challenge their group’s norms regarding gender 
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stereotypic activities and, further, reveal that challenging stereotypes is viewed as less 
acceptable for boys than for girls.  
 The next hypotheses concerned differences between individual favorability 
towards the deviant who wanted to do ballet and the deviant who wanted to play football.  
It was expected that participants would prefer the deviant who wanted to play football.  In 
order to assess if children and adolescents differed in their evaluations of a deviant 
member who wanted to play football or do ballet, a 2 (Gender: male, female) X 2 (Age 
Group: 9, 13 year olds) X 2 (Version: conform, resist) X 2 (Condition: ballet, football) 
ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor was conducted.  An effect for 
condition was found, F (1,278) = 46.10, p < .001, η
2
 = .14, which confirmed expectations 
that participants preferred the deviant who wanted to play football (M = 5.05, SD = 1.18) 
to the deviant who wanted to do ballet (M = 4.42, SD = 1.60).  There was, additionally, a 
version by condition interaction effect, F (1,278) = 24.42, p < .001, η
2
 = .08, which 
showed that participants were more favorable to the girl who wanted to play football (M 
= 5.00, SD = 1.30) than to the boy who wanted to do ballet (M = 3.92, SD = 1.71). There 
was no difference between the boy who wanted to do football (M = 5.10, SD = 1.10) and 
the girl who wanted to do ballet (M = 4.94, SD = 1.19).  Thus, the differences between 
the conditions were accounted for by a rigid adherence to stereotypic expectations 
suggesting that ballet is an activity only appropriate for girls. 
Justifications for Individual Favorability Towards the Deviant Member 
Analyses were conducted in order to test hypotheses involving differences in 
children’s and adolescents’ reasoning about individual favorability towards the deviant 
member by participants who liked versus did not like the deviant member.  As was done 
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for group favorability, participant responses to individual favorability were divided into a 
dichotomous variable (okay, not okay) using a mid-point split of 3.5. The top four forms 
of reasoning used by participants to reason about individual favorability towards the 
deviant member were group functioning (“if she wants to play something different it will 
mess up the group”), autonomy (“I like that he decided to do his own thing”), inclusion of 
diverse perspectives (“she will show them that everyone can play football”), and personal 
identification with the target (“I really like to play football, just like he does”).  Note that 
for individual favorability, gender stereotypes were not one of the top forms of reasoning 
used.  Two separate 2 (Gender: male, female) X 2 (Age Group: 9, 13 year olds) X 2 
(Version: conform, resist) X 2 (Individual Favorability: okay, not okay) X 4 
(Justification: group functioning, autonomy, diverse perspectives, personal identification) 
ANOVAs with repeated measures on the last factor were conducted, one for each 
condition (football and ballet).    
 Football.  For the football condition, an effect was found for individual 
favorability evaluation by reasoning, F (3, 846) = 3.56, p < .05, η
2
 = .01.  This revealed 
that participants who like the deviant member who wanted to play football primarily 
referenced autonomy (M = .41, SD = .47) and their personal identification with the target 
(M = .20, SD = .38).  They also referenced the importance of including diverse 
perspectives (M = .16, SD = .34) and the role of group functioning (M = .10, SD = .29).  
Pairwise comparisons revealed that they used more autonomy reasoning than any other 
form of reasoning, ps < .001, that they used more reasoning referencing the inclusion of 
diverse perspectives than they did group functioning, p < .05, and that they used more 
references to including diverse perspectives than they did to group functioning, p < .01.  
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Participants who did not like the deviant member who wanted to play football made the 
most references to their personal identification with the target (i.e., “Well I wouldn’t want 
to play football, so I don’t like that she was telling my group to play,” M = .26, SD = .44).  
They also referenced group functioning (M = .15, SD = .36), autonomy (M = .11, SD = 
.30), inclusion of diverse perspectives (i.e., “even though he would bring a new activity 
to the group, I still don’t like him”, M = .08, SD = .25). Pairwise comparison revealed 
that the only significant difference was found between inclusion of diverse perspectives 
and personal identification with the target, p < .05. Thus, participants focused on a range 
of difference concerns when indicating that they did not like the deviant member who 
wanted to play football, while they were more focused on autonomy and their personal 
identification with the target if they did like the deviant member. 
 Ballet. As expected, differences were found between participants who liked the 
deviant member who wanted to do ballet and participants who did not like this deviant 
member, F (3, 840) = 12.43, p < .001, η
2 
= .04. Specifically, almost half of participants 
who liked the deviant member who wanted to do ballet focused on autonomy (M = .48, 
SD = .49), with a smaller proportion focusing on group functioning (M = .12, SD = .32), 
the inclusion of diverse perspectives (M = .13, SD = .32), or personal identification with 
the target (M = .11, SD = .29).   The use of autonomy differed from the use of each of the 
other forms of reasoning at p < .001.  For participants who did not like the deviant 
member reasoning was more centered on their personal identification with the target (M = 
.22, SD = .41), with almost no participants referencing autonomy (M = .05, SD = .19) and 
a small number referencing group functioning (M = .11, SD = .31) and the inclusion of 
diverse perspectives (M = .10, SD = .30).  Participants made significantly more references 
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to their personal identification with the target than to autonomy at p < .05.  Note that 
participants who did not like the deviant member who wanted to do ballet were divided in 
their reasoning, referencing a number of different reasons.  
Relation between Group and Individual Favorability Towards Deviant Members in 
the Context of Gender Stereotypic Activities 
 Were there differences, then, between participants’ evaluations of how groups 
would respond to these deviant members and how they would personally respond? It was 
expected that participants would rate group favorability towards the deviant members 
who wanted to play ballet and football less than individual favorability, as they would 
expect that groups would rely more upon stereotypes about gender appropriate activities 
than would participants, themselves.  In order to test for these differences 2 separate 2 
(Gender: male, female) X 2 (Age Group: 9, 13 year olds) X 2 (Version: conform, resist) 
X 2 (Question: peer, individual resistance) ANOVAs with repeated measures on the last 
factor was conducted for the football condition and the ballet condition.  The ANOVA 
conducted for the football condition revealed that participants were more favorable (M = 
5.05, SD = 1.18) to the deviant member who wanted to play football than they expected 
groups to be (M = 3.63, SD = 1.43), F (1,280) = 280.59, p < .001, η
2
 = .42.  The ANOVA 
conducted for the ballet condition revealed, similarly, that participants were more 
favorable (M = 4.42, SD = 1.6) to the deviant member who wanted to do ballet than they 
expected groups to be (M = 3.08, SD = 1.52), F (1,277) = 168.57, p < .001, η
2
 = .37. 
Likelihood of Exclusion of the Deviant Member 
 The next set of hypotheses surrounded the likelihood that the deviant member 
would be excluded from the group because of the member’s decision to resist the group 
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norm. Do children and adolescents believe that peers who deviate from group norms 
involving gender stereotypic activities will be kicked out of the group for challenging the 
group? It was expected that participants would perceive exclusion as most likely for the 
boy who wanted to do ballet.  In order to test these hypotheses, 2 separate 2 (Gender: 
male, female) X 2 (Age Group: 9, 13 year olds) X 2 (Version: conform, resist) ANOVAs 
were conducted for likelihood of exclusion in the ballet and football deviance conditions.  
For the football condition, a gender by version interaction was found, F (1, 279) = 6.48, p 
< .05, η
2
 = .02, indicating that male participants did not differ in their expectations about 
the likelihood of exclusion of a girl (M = 3.08, SD = 1.57) or a boy (M = 2.73, SD = 1.58) 
who wanted to play football.  Female participants, however, did differ (p < .05), and were 
more likely to expect that a boy (M = 3.49, SD = 1.51) would be exclude for playing 
football than would a girl (M = 2.93, SD = 1.52).  Thus, female participants may believe 
that boys groups are more likely to exclude than are girls groups, showing a form of 
ingroup preference.  For the ballet condition, an effect was found for version, F ( 1,275) = 
19.58, p < .001, η
2
 = .06, revealing that, as expected, participants thought that it was more 
likely that a boy (M = 3.98, SD = 1.63) would be excluded for wanting to do ballet than a 
girl (M = 3.10, SD = 1.59).     
It was expected, additionally, that participants would believe that the member 
who deviated by wanting to play football would be less likely to be excluded than the 
member who wanted to do ballet.  In order to test this hypothesis, a 2 (Gender: male, 
female) X 2 (Age Group: 9, 13 year olds) X 2 (Version: conform, resist) X 2 (Condition: 
ballet, football) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor was conducted.  This 
confirmed the expectation, F (1,272) = 22.72, p < .001, η
2
 = .07, revealing that, while 
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participants were generally ambivalent about the likelihood of exclusion of either 
member, they thought that the deviant member who wanted to do ballet (M = 3.55, SD = 
1.67) was more likely to be excluded than the deviant member who wanted to play 
football (M = 3.07, SD = 1.56).  Further, a condition by gender interaction, F (1,272) = 
6.30, p < .05, η
2
 = .02, revealed that while female participants did not differ in their 
evaluations of these two deviant members, male participants were more likely to expect 
that the deviant member who wanted to do ballet (M = 3.65, SD = 1.72) would be 
excluded than the member who wanted to play football (M = 2.92, SD = 1.57), p < .001.   
Additionally, a condition by version effect, F (1,272) = 17.22, p < .001, η
2
 = .06, revealed 
that participants did not differ in their evaluations of the girl and the boy who wanted to 
play football (girl: M = 3.01, SD = 1.54, boy: M = 3.14, SD = 1.58), but that they were 
much more likely to expect that the boy who wanted to do ballet (M = 3.98, SD = 1.63) 
would be excluded than the girl who wanted to do ballet (M = 3.10, SD = 1.59), p < .001, 
see Figure 2.  
Justifications for Likelihood of Exclusion of the Deviant Member 
  Analyses were conducted in order to test hypotheses involving differences in 
children’s and adolescents’ reasoning about the likelihood of excluding the deviant 
member, using a dichotomous variable (yes, no) for participants who though the deviant 
should be versus should not be excluded.  This variable was computed using a mid-point 
split of 3.5. The top three forms of reasoning used by participants to reason about the 
likelihood of excluding the deviant member who wanted to play football were group 
functioning, gender stereotypes and inclusion of diverse perspectives.  For evaluations of 
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the deviant member who wanted to ballet, the top three forms of reasoning were group 
functioning, gender stereotypes and autonomy. 
 Football.  In order to assess differences in reasoning about the likelihood of 
exclusion of a deviant member who wants to play football, a 2 (Gender: male, female) X 
2 (Age Group: 9, 13 year olds) X 2 (Version: conform, resist) X 2 (Likelihood of 
Exclusion: yes, no) X 3 (Justification: group functioning, gender stereotypes, diverse 
perspectives) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor was conducted.  This 
revealed that participants did differ in their proportional use of reasoning, F (2,560) = 
74.61, p < .001, η
2 
= .21.  They used primarily group functioning (M = .56, SD = .48), 
with a smaller proportion referencing gender stereotypes (M = .16, SD = .44), and the 
inclusion of diverse perspectives (M = .07, SD = .25).   All groups differed significantly 
at ps < .001. There was no difference between participants who thought the deviant 
member would versus would not be excluded. 
Ballet.  In order to assess differences in reasoning about the likelihood of 
exclusion of a deviant member who wants to do ballet, a 2 (Gender: male, female) X 2 
(Age Group: 9, 13 year olds) X 2 (Version: conform, resist) X 2 (Likelihood of 
Exclusion: yes, no) X 3 (Justification: group functioning, gender stereotypes, autonomy) 
ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor was conducted.  This revealed that 
participants who thought that the deviant member would be excluded used different 
forms of reasoning than those who thought the deviant member would not be excluded, F 
(2,552) = 11.58 p < .001, η
2 
= .04. Specifically, there were no differences in the use of 
group functioning, all participants frequently referenced group functioning (Likely: M = 
.35, SD = .47, Not Likely: M = .52, SD = .47).  However, participants who thought that 
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exclusion was likely (M = .42, SD = .48) used much more reasoning involving gender 
stereotypes than those who did not (M = .15, SD = .34), p < .01, and used much less 
reasoning about autonomy (M = .03, SD = .17) than did those who thought the deviant 
would not be excluded (M = .12, SD = .32), p < .05, see Figure 3.  
Inclusion Decisions 
 Our last question regarding gender stereotypic activities involved who 
participants would choose to include in a group.  If asked to choose between someone 
who matches the gender identity of the group or who wants to engage in the same activity 
of the group, what will children and adolescents decide? It was expected that participants 
would be more likely to include an outgroup member (by gender) who wants to do the 
same activity as the group into a group when the group plays football than when they do 
ballet.  In order to test this hypothesis, a 2 (Gender: male, female) X 2 (Age Group: 9, 13 
year olds) X 2 (Version: conform, resist) X 2 (Condition: ballet, football) ANOVA with 
repeated measures on the last factor was conducted. This analysis confirmed 
expectations, revealing that participants were more likely to include an outgroup member 
who wanted to play football into a group that was playing football (M = .80, SD = .40), 
than an outgroup member who wanted to do ballet into a group that was doing ballet (M 
= .60, SD = .49), F (1,265) = 31.52, p < .001, η
2
 = .10.  It is important to note that 
participants were, in fact, quite willing to include a child of the opposite gender into a 
group that wanted to play football, indicating that gender divisions may not be in place 
for all typically gender stereotypic activities. 
Gendered Forms of Aggression 
Stereotype Measure  
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 The results presented so far reveal that children and adolescents do attend to and 
use gender stereotypes about activities when evaluating group members and group 
decisions.  The next set of questions involved not gender stereotypic activities, but rather 
gendered forms of aggression.  The first question was: do children and adolescents 
actually hold stereotypes indicating that physical aggression is connected to boys and 
relational aggression to girls?  Descriptive statistics indicate that children and adolescents 
do hold stereotypes linking boys to physical aggression with almost 75% of participants 
endorsing this stereotype, but that fewer participants hold a stereotype linking girls to 
relational aggression (gossip, in this context) (See Table 2).  These descriptive statistics 
suggest that children and adolescents hold stronger stereotypes about gendered forms of 
aggression for boys than for girls. 
Relation between Peer and Individual Resistance to Group Norms about Aggression 
 Our first question involving group norms about aggression was: do children think 
that their peers will challenge group norms about aggression and would they, 
individually, challenge these norms?  In order to address this question, 4 separate 2 
(Gender: male, female) X 2 (Age Group: 9, 13 year olds) X 2 (Version: conform, resist) 
X 2 (Question: peer, individual resistance) ANOVAs with repeated measures on the last 
factor were conducted, one for each condition (nice, rough, impartial, and gossip).  When 
the group wanted to play rough and a group member wanted to play nice, participants 
asserted that they thought that the group member would speak up to challenge the group 
(M = .69, SD = .46), but that they would be even more likely to do so (M = .86, SD = 
.35), F (1,278) = 23.06, p < .001, η
2
 = .07, see Figure 4.  There were no differences, 
however, when the group wanted to play nicely and a group member wanted to play 
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rough, n.s.: both peer (M = .74, SD = .44) and individual resistance (M = .80, SD = .40) 
were evaluated as likely, see Figure 4. 
 Similarly, when the group wanted to be impartial and a group member wanted to 
gossip, both peer (M = .71, SD = .46) and individual (M = .72, SD = .45) resistance were 
evaluated as likely, there were no differences, n.s..  When the group wanted to gossip and 
a group member wanted to be impartial, participants asserted that they thought that the 
group member would speak up to challenge the group (M = .69, SD = .46), but that they 
would be even more likely to do so (M = .88, SD = .33), F (1.278) = 34.08, p < .001, η
2
 = 
.10, see Figure 4. Overall, then, participants did believe that their peers would stand up to 
groups and challenge their norms.  They also asserted that they would do the same.  
However, when the group was engaging in aggressive behavior, participants, 
individually, asserted that they would be even more likely to challenge the group than 
they expected their peers to be.   
Group Favorability Towards the Deviant Group Member 
 How do children and adolescents think that groups will respond to peer group 
members who do challenge the group about group norms involving aggression?  It was 
expected that participants would assert that groups would not like deviant members, but 
that there would be variation based on the deviant member’s action, with lower ratings 
for deviants who advocate for the group to engage in aggression.  In order to test these 
hypotheses, repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted comparing responses to group 
favorability in the different conditions. 
 First, a 2 (Gender: male, female) X 2 (Age Group: 9, 13 year olds) X 2 (Version: 
conform, resist) X 2 (Condition: rough, nice) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last 
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factor was conducted for group favorability.  This revealed that participants thought 
groups would be more favorable toward a deviant member who wanted to play nicely (M 
= 3.44, SD = 1.57) than a deviant member who wanted to play rough (M = 2.95, SD = 
1.62), even though both of these actions went against the group norm, F (1,278) = 18.23, 
p < .001, η
2
 = .06.   
Similarly, a 2 (Gender: male, female) X 2 (Age Group: 9, 13 year olds) X 2 
(Version: conform, resist) X 2 (Condition: impartial, gossip) ANOVA with repeated 
measures on the last factor was conducted for group favorability.  This revealed that 
participants thought groups would be more favorable toward a deviant member who 
wanted to be impartial (M = 3.27, SD = 1.58) than a deviant member who wanted to 
gossip (M = 2.55, SD = 1.53), F (1,281) = 35.88, p < .001, η
2
 = .11.    It is important to 
note, however, that generally, participants thought that groups would not like any of these 
deviant members: none of the means cross above the mid-point of 3.5.   
Two separate ANOVAs were also conducted to assess differences in group 
favorability for the different types of aggressive and non-aggressive behaviors.  Did 
participants view one form of aggression as more acceptable to the group than another?  
First, a 2 (Gender: male, female) X 2 (Age Group: 9, 13 year olds) X 2 (Version: 
conform, resist) X 2 (Condition: rough, gossip) ANOVA with repeated measures on the 
last factor was conducted for group favorability.  This revealed that participants expected 
that groups would be more favorable to a deviant who wanted to play rough than a 
deviant who wanted to gossip, F (1, 278) = 9.589, p < .01, η
2
 = .03.   The 2 (Gender: 
male, female) X 2 (Age Group: 9, 13 year olds) X 2 (Version: conform, resist) X 2 
(Condition: nice, impartial) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor which was 
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conducted revealed no differences between the nice and impartial conditions.  Thus, 
participants may have recognized the benefit of playing rough to the group when 
considering playing rough versus gossiping, but not seen similar distinctions between 
playing nice and being impartial. 
Justifications for Group Favorability Towards the Deviant Member 
Children do evaluate group favorability towards different types of deviants 
distinctly, but do children and adolescents expect that groups will use different reasons to 
justify how favorable they are towards these deviant members? Analyses were conducted 
in order to test hypotheses concerning differences in children’s and adolescents’ 
reasoning about the group’s favorability towards the deviant member by participants who 
thought the group would like versus would not like the deviant member.  As was done for 
the social activities, participant responses to group favorability towards the deviant 
member were divided into a dichotomous variable (okay, not okay) using a mid-point 
split of 3.5. The top four forms of reasoning used by participants to reason about group 
favorability towards the deviant member were group functioning, autonomy, welfare 
(“someone could get hurt if they play rough”) and gender identity or stereotypes (“girls 
don’t play rough, so they won’t like her”).  Four separate 2 (Gender: male, female) X 2 
(Age Group: 9, 13 year olds) X 2 (Version: conform, resist) X 2 (Group Favorability: 
okay, not okay) X 2 (Justification: group functioning, autonomy, welfare, gender) 
ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor were conducted, one for each 
condition (rough, nice, gossip and impartial). 
The ANOVA for the rough condition, when the group wanted to play nicely and 
the deviant wanted to play rough revealed a main effect for reasoning, F (3, 840) = 24.71, 
113 
 
p < .001, η
2
  = .08, indicating that participants focused on both group functioning and 
welfare in their reasoning, relying less on references to autonomy and gender stereotypes, 
see Table 3. Pairwise comparisons showed that use of both group functioning and welfare 
differed significantly from use of both autonomy and gender stereotypes at ps < .001. 
Participants were centered on the fact that the deviant was both going against the group 
and doing something that could hurt others. 
Did reasoning also differ for the deviant who wanted to play nicely when the 
group wanted to play rough?  The ANOVA conducted for the nice condition showed a 
main effect for reasoning, F (3, 417) = 38.65, p < .001, η
2 
= .21, and an interaction effect 
for reasoning split by group favorability judgment, F (3, 417) = 6.51, p < .001, η
2  
= .04.  
The main effect showed that participants relied primarily upon group functioning 
reasoning, p < .001.  The interaction effect revealed that when they thought that the group 
would like the deviant member, they used less group functioning and more autonomy 
than when they thought the group would not like the deviant member who wanted to play 
nicely, ps < .001, see Table 3. Thus, participants believe that, at times, groups may value 
individuality and autonomous thinking in their members.  
When the deviant wanted to gossip when the group wanted to be impartial, there 
was also a main effect for reasoning, F (3, 846) = 11.60, p < .001, η
2 
= .03, and an 
interaction effect for reasoning by group favorability evaluation, F (3, 846) = 11.98, p < 
.001, η
2 
= .04. The main effect revealed that they relied primarily upon group functioning 
and welfare reasoning, with less use of autonomy and gender.  Pairwise comparisons 
showed that use of both group functioning and welfare differed significantly from use of 
both autonomy and gender stereotypes at ps < .001. The interaction effect revealed that 
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participants used more references to group functioning and welfare when they thought the 
group would not like the deviant and more references to autonomy and gender 
stereotypes when they thought the group would like the deviant, see Table 3. Use of 
autonomy and welfare differed significantly at ps < .001 between those participants who 
thought the group would like versus would not like the deviant who wanted to gossip.  
Thus, participants recognize the psychological harm that gossiping can cause, while also 
understanding that the group would want people who also share their group norms.  
Finally, in the condition where the group wanted to gossip and the deviant wanted 
to be impartial, a main effect for reasoning, F (3, 849) =38.50, p < .001, η
2 
= .12, and an 
interaction effect for reasoning by group favorability evaluation, F (3, 849) = 17.29, p < 
.001, η
2 
= .05, were found. When the deviant wanted to be impartial, most participants 
relied upon group functioning reasoning, ps < .001, but made frequent references to 
welfare.  When participants thought that the group would like the deviant member, they 
use all four forms of reasoning, but when they thought the group would not like the 
deviant member, they used mostly group functioning reasoning, see Table 3.  They used 
more group functioning reasoning when they thought the group would not like the 
deviant, p < .001, and more welfare and autonomy when they thought the group would 
like the deviant, ps < .01. Thus, participants’ reasoning reveals that they balance 
information about the group’s goals, the welfare of others and gender stereotypes when 
making decisions about group favorability. 
Individual Favorability Towards the Deviant Member 
 How do participants balance information about group loyalty, group norms, 
gender stereotypes and their sense of fairness when individually evaluating group 
115 
 
members who deviate from group norms about aggressive behavior? It was expected that 
participants themselves, would be most influenced by other’s welfare, showing strong 
support for deviants who advocate for avoiding aggression when their groups are 
aggressive.  In order to test these hypotheses, 4 separate 2 (Gender: male, female) X 2 
(Age Group: 9, 13 year olds) X 2 (Version: conform, resist) ANOVAs were conducted 
for individual favorability in each of the conditions.   
 When the deviant wanted to play rough when the group wanted to play nicely, an 
age effect was found, F (1, 278) = 15.48, p <.001, η
2
 = .05, revealing that adolescents 
showed more support for the rough deviant (M = 3.61, SD = 1.83) than did younger 
children (M = 2.67, SD = 1.77).  Similarly, when the deviant wanted to play nicely when 
the group wanted to play rough, an age effect was found, F (1, 280) = 5.27, p < .05, η
2
 = 
.01. Here, a complimentary pattern was found: younger children showed more support for 
the nice deviant (M = 4.92, SD = 1.60) than did adolescents (M = 4.43, SD = 1.64).  
Additionally, a gender effect was found for the nice deviant, F (1, 280) = 6.46, p <.05, η
2
 
= .02, revealing that female participants (M = 4.91, SD = 1.48) were more favorable to 
the nice deviant than were male participants (M = 4.22, SD = 1.74). This may suggest an 
implicit adherence to gender stereotypes, with male participants showing less support for 
a deviant who advocates for an action that is counter-stereotypic for boys.   
 In the impartial condition, there was also an age effect, F (1,282) = 8.59, p < .05, 
η
2
 = .03, revealing that younger children are more supportive of the deviant who wants to 
be impartial (M = 5.33, SD = 1.14) than are adolescents (M = 4.83, SD = 1.52).  There 
were no effects for the gossip condition.  All participants agree that the deviant who 
gossips will not be liked (M = 2.62, SD = 1.72).  Younger children, however, were more 
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supportive, than were adolescents, of both deviant members who challenged the 
aggressive behavior of the group.  This may indicate the increasing social pressure to 
adhere to group norms in adolescence or a greater recognition of the benefits to the group 
of adhering to these norms. 
 Next, in order to assess differences across conditions, a series of 2 (Gender: male, 
female) X 2 (Age Group: 9, 13 year olds) X 2 (Version: conform, resist) X 2 (Condition) 
ANOVAs with repeated measures on the last factor was conducted for each pair of 
conditions (for instance rough, nice).  The ANOVA conducted for the rough and nice 
conditions revealed an effect for condition, F (1,276) = 81.46, p <.001, η
2
 = .22, 
indicating that, as expected, participants were more positive towards the nice than the 
rough deviant.  Further, there was an age by condition interaction, F (1,276) = 16.97, p 
<.001, η
2
 = .05, that revealed that younger participants were more supportive of the nice 
deviant and less supportive of the rough deviant and the adolescents showed the reverse 
pattern.  The ANOVA conducted for the rough versus the gossip condition revealed an 
effect for condition, F (1,275) = 20.79, p <.001, η
2
 = .07.  This showed that participants 
were more positive towards the deviant who wanted to play rough than the deviant who 
wanted to gossip.  The ANOVA conducted on the gossip and the impartial condition 
revealed, as expected, that participants were more positive towards the impartial deviant 
than the gossip deviant, F (1,279) = 302.77, p < .001, η
2
 = .52.  Finally, the impartial 
versus nice ANOVA revealed an effect for condition, F (1,280) = 15.91, p < .001, η
2
 = 
.05, showing that participants preferred the impartial deviant over the nice deviant.  Thus, 
this set of analyses confirmed that participants are weighing these different conditions 
carefully and making reasoned evaluations of each condition.  The justification data will 
117 
 
provide further insight into exactly what factors they weigh when making these 
evaluations, but it is interesting to note that all of the version effects were non-significant, 
which indicates that gender stereotypes about aggressive behavior were not at play in 
children’s and adolescents’ evaluations.  
Justifications for Individual Favorability Towards the Deviant Member 
What reasons do children and adolescents use to justify how much they like these 
deviant members? Analyses were conducted in order to test hypotheses concerning 
differences in children’s and adolescents’ reasoning about individual favorability towards 
the deviant member by participants who liked versus did not like the deviant member.  
Participant responses to individual favorability towards the deviant member were divided 
into a dichotomous variable (not okay, okay) using a mid-point split of 3.5. The top four 
forms of reasoning used by participants to reason about individual favorability towards 
the deviant member were group functioning, autonomy, welfare, and personal 
identification with the target (e.g., “well, I don’t like to gossip either”).  Note that, for 
group favorability, gender stereotypes were in the top four forms of reasoning, but for 
individual favorability they were much less frequently used.  This indicates that, while 
participants believe groups may be motivated by stereotypes in their decision-making, 
they are not as influenced, personally, by such stereotypes.  Four separate 2 (Gender: 
male, female) X 2 (Age Group: 9, 13 year olds) X 2 (Version: conform, resist) X 2 
(Individual Favorability: okay, not okay) X 2 (Justification: group functioning, 
autonomy, welfare, personal identification) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last 
factor were conducted, one for each condition (rough, nice, gossip and impartial). 
118 
 
The ANOVA conducted for the rough condition revealed a main effect for 
reasoning, F (3, 837) = 26.01, p < .001, η
2 
= .08, indicating that participants referenced 
welfare most frequently, with less frequent references to group functioning, autonomy 
and personal identification with the target, ps < .001, see Table 4..   Additionally, there 
was a reasoning by age interaction, F (3, 837) = 8.01, p < .001, η
2 
= .02.  This revealed 
that younger participants made many more references to welfare (M = .63, SD = .47) than 
did adolescents (M = .28, SD = .44), p < .001.   Further, there was an interaction for type 
of reasoning by individual favorability evaluation, F (3, 837) = 37.73, p < .001, η
2 
= .11. 
Participants used more group functioning reasons when they were favorable to the rough 
deviant than when they were not favorable, p < .05.  They also used more autonomy 
reasoning when they liked the rough deviant than when they did not like the rough 
deviant, p < .001.  Finally, they used more welfare reasoning when they did not like the 
rough deviant than when they liked the rough deviant, p < .001, see Table 4.  
For the nice deviant, a main effect for reasoning was found, F (3, 843) = 10.32, p 
< .001, η
2 
=.03. Participants used more welfare reasoning than group functioning, p < .05, 
autonomy or welfare, ps < .001.  Additionally, an age by reasoning interaction was found, 
F (3, 843) = 4.71, p < .01, η
2 
= .01, which revealed that children used more welfare, (M = 
.55, SD = .50), p < .001, and less personal identification, (M = .08, SD = .27) p < .05, 
reasoning than did adolescents (Mwelfare = .28, SD = .44, Mpersonal = .17, SD = .37). Finally, 
there was an interaction for reasoning by individual favorability evaluation, F (3, 843) = 
5.86, p = .001, η
2 
= .02.  This revealed that participants used more group functioning and 
autonomy reasoning when they did not like the nice deviant, ps < .01, and more welfare 
reasoning when they do like the nice deviant, p < .01 see Table 4.  
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A main effect for the gossip condition was found, F (3, 840) = 26.78, p < .001, η
2 
= .08. This revealed that participants used more welfare reasoning than any other form of 
reasoning, p < .01.  Additionally, they used more autonomy than group functioning 
reasoning, p < .05, see Table 4. There was also an age group by reasoning interaction, F 
(3, 840) = 4.83, p < .01, η
2 
= .01. Children used more references to welfare (M = .66, SD 
= .46) than did adolescents (M = .43, SD = .48), p < .05, and adolescents used more 
references to personal identification (M = .21, SD = .39) than did children (M = .06, SD = 
.19), p < .05. Finally, there was a reasoning by individual favorability interaction, F (3, 
840) = 30.86, p < .001, η
2 
= .09. This revealed that participants used more references to 
autonomy when they liked the deviant who gossips and more references to welfare when 
they did not like this deviant, ps < .001 see Table 4. Finally, for the impartial condition, 
there was an effect for reasoning, F (3, 849) = 10.42, p < .001, η
2 
= .03.  This revealed 
that participants used more references to welfare than group functioning, or autonomy, ps 
< .001, and personal identification with the target, p < .05 see Table 4.  Overall, 
participants’ individual evaluations of the deviant members were heavily influenced by 
their sense of welfare.  Interestingly, there was also a consistent age-related pattern with 
children being more focused on welfare, while adolescents showed greater concern with 
their own personal identification with the target’s behavior.  
Group Favorability Versus Individual Favorability 
 Did participants evaluate these deviant members differently than how they 
expected groups would evaluate the deviant members?  It was expected that participants 
would expect that groups would be very loyal to their norms, while participants 
themselves would attend more to the moral valence of the deviant member’s behavior.  
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Participants would show more support for the deviants who wanted to challenge 
aggression than they would expect groups to show.  In order to test these hypotheses, 4 
separate 2 (Gender: male, female) X 2 (Age Group: 9, 13 year olds) X 2 (Version: 
conform, resist) X 2 (Question: group, individual favorability) ANOVAs with repeated 
measures on the last factor were conducted, one for each condition (nice, rough, 
impartial, and gossip).   
 The ANOVA conducted for the rough condition revealed a significant difference 
between the individual and the group favorability, F (1,275) = 5.74, p < .05, η
2
 = .02.  
Participants were slightly more favorable to the deviant member than they expected 
groups would be, see Figure 5. The ANOVA conducted for the nice deviant revealed, as 
expected that participants were much more favorable toward the nice deviant member 
than they expected groups to be, F (1,280) = 97.36, p < .001, η
2
 = .25, see Figure 5.  
 The ANOVA conducted for the gossip condition was non-significant: individuals 
did not like a deviant member who wanted to gossip and thought that groups would also 
not like this deviant.  For the impartial condition, there was an effect for question, F 
(1,282) = 255.72, p < .001, η
2
 = .47, showing that participants were much more positive 
towards an impartial deviant than they expected the group to be, see Figure 5.   Thus, as 
expected, participants were more favorable toward deviant members who resist 
aggression than they expected the group to be. 
Likelihood of Exclusion 
 Do children and adolescents expect that someone who challenges the group’s 
norms about aggressive behavior will be excluded from the group?  It was expected that 
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exclusion would be viewed as a consequence for challenging the group, given children’s 
frequent experiences with social exclusion.   
 As a first test of this hypothesis, 4 one sample t-tests were conducted, one for 
each condition, against a neutral test value of 3.5. Results indicated that participants did 
generally expect that exclusion would be likely for the deviants who wanted to act in an 
aggressive manner (gossip: t (287) = 4.98, p < .001, d = .59, M = 3.99, SD = 1.71, and 
rough: t (284) = 3.09, p < .01, d = .58, M = 3.81, SD = 1.72).  For the impartial (M = 3.40, 
SD = 1.69) and nice (M = 3.68, SD = 1.69) conditions, the t-tests were non-significant, 
indicating that participant responses did not differ from the neutral mid-point of 3.5. 
Thus, participants thought that someone who challenged the group by advocating for 
gossiping or playing rough would be excluded from the group, but were unsure if 
someone who challenged the group to be impartial or to be nice would be excluded, see 
Figure 6.  
In order to test for differences by age group, gender and version, 4 separate 2 
(Gender: male, female) X 2 (Age Group: 9, 13 year olds) X 2 (Version: conform, resist) 
ANOVAs were conducted for likelihood of exclusion in each of the conditions.  The 
ANOVAs revealed age effects for the rough condition (F (1, 275) = 6.85, p < .01, η
2
 = 
.02).  Here children (M = 4.2, SD = 1.79) were more likely to expect exclusion of the 
rough deviant than were adolescents (M = 3.63, SD = 1.67). The nice condition showed a 
similar age effect, F (1, 275) = 8.68, p < .01, η
2
 = .03, children: M = 4.13, SD = 1.62, 
adolescents: M = 3.47, SD = 1.68.   Finally, in the gossip condition (F (1, 278) = 14.96, p 
< .001, η
2
 = .05), an age effect also revealed that children (M = 4.55, SD = 1.68) were 
more likely to expect exclusion than were adolescents (M =3.74, SD = 1.67).  This 
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revealed that children were more likely to expect exclusion than were adolescents, in all 
conditions except the impartial condition, see Figure 7.   
Overall, these results indicate that participants, especially children, do fear 
exclusion as a consequence for challenging the group, but that they are also attuned to the 
moral valence of the behavior a deviant advocates.  They expect that one is less likely to 
be excluded if one is advocating that the group avoid aggression than if they encourage 
the group to engage in aggression. 
Justifications for Likelihood of Exclusion  
 How do children reason about their evaluations of the likelihood of exclusion?  
Do they always expect that groups will focus on group functioning?  Are there 
differences in reasoning between those participants who expect exclusion to occur and 
those who do not?  In order to address these questions, analyses were conducted using a 
dichotomous variable created with a 3.5 median split on participants’ likelihood of 
exclusion.  For each condition, analyses were conducted on the top 4 forms of reasoning: 
group functioning, welfare, gender and the inclusion of diverse perspectives. For each 
condition, a 2 (Gender: male, female) X 2 (Age Group: 9, 13 year olds) X 2 (Version: 
conform, resist) X 2 (Likelihood of Exclusion: likely, not likely) X 2 (Justification: group 
functioning, welfare, gender, diverse perspectives) ANOVA with repeated measures on 
the last factor was conducted  
 The ANOVA conducted for the rough deviant revealed an effect for justification, 
F (3, 828) = 68.92, p < .001, η
2 
= .20.  This revealed that participants used more group 
functioning reasoning than any other form, ps < .001, and used more references to 
protecting others’ welfare than references to diverse perspectives or gender stereotypes, 
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ps < .001, see Table 5.   Additionally, there was an interaction for reasoning by likelihood 
of exclusion, F (3,828) = 9.06, p < .001, η
2 
= .03. This showed that participants 
referenced others’ welfare when they expected that the deviant member who wanted to 
play rough would be excluded more than when they thought the deviant would not be 
excluded, p < .001.  For the condition where the deviant member wanted to play nicely, 
an effect was found for reasoning, F(3, 825) = 114.45, p < .001, η
2 
= .29, which revealed 
that participants primarily made references to group functioning, ps < .001.  Thus, in both 
the rough and the nice condition, participants focused on group functioning, but also 
attended to other’s welfare, especially when the deviant advocated playing rough. 
For the gossip condition, there was an effect for reasoning, F (3,837) = 88.13, p < 
.001, η
2 
= .24, which revealed, similarly to the rough condition, that participants used 
more group functioning reasoning than any other form of reasoning, ps < .001 and used 
more welfare reasoning than reasoning about gender stereotypes or diverse perspectives, 
ps < .001, see Table 5. Further, there was an interaction between type of reasoning and 
likelihood of exclusion evaluation, F (3,837) = 14.56, p < .001, η
2 
= .05.  This revealed 
that participants used more references to group functioning when they thought the deviant 
would not be excluded than when they thought the deviant would be excluded, p < .05.  
Participants made more references to others’ welfare when they thought that the deviant 
who wants to gossip would be excluded than when they thought this deviant would not be 
excluded, p < .001. Finally, they made more references to the benefits of including 
diverse perspectives when they thought the deviant would not be excluded than when 
they thought that the deviant who wants to gossip would be excluded, p < .05.  
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For the impartial condition, there was also an effect for reasoning, F (3,840) = 
74.86, p < .001, η
2 
= .21.  This showed that participants used more references to group 
functioning than any other category, ps < .001.  There was also an interaction between 
reasoning and likelihood of exclusion, F (3,840) = 19.21, p < .001, η
2 
= .06. This revealed 
that group functioning reasoning was used more by participants who thought that the 
impartial deviant would be excluded than those who thought this deviant would not be 
excluded, p < .001.  References to the inclusion of diverse perspectives were more 
common among participants who thought the impartial deviant would not be excluded 
than among those who thought that the impartial deviant would be excluded, p < .001.  
Finally, participants who thought the impartial deviant would not be excluded referenced 
others’ welfare more than those who thought the impartial deviant would be excluded, p 
< .01. Thus, children and adolescents weigh different concerns when thinking about if 
someone will be excluded for challenging their group.  Group functioning was always a 
primary concern.  Further, those who expected that deviants who advocated for 
aggression would be excluded focused more on others’ welfare.   
Likelihood of Exclusion by Group Favorability Evaluation 
 If you expect that the group will not like the deviant, are you more likely to 
expect that the deviant will be excluded? In order to address this question, a dichotomous 
variable was created using a mid-point split of 3.5 on group favorability to establish a 
variable which captured participants who thought that a group would not like versus 
would like a deviant member.  Then, 4 separate a 2 (Gender: male, female) X 2 (Age 
Group: 9, 13 year olds) X 2 (Version: conform, resist) X 2 (Group Favorability: like, not 
like) ANOVAs were conducted on likelihood of exclusion, one for each condition.  The 
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ANOVA conducted for the rough (F (1,266) = 35.46, p < .001, η
2 
= .11), condition 
revealed an effect for group favorability, showing that participants who thought that 
groups would not like a deviant were more likely to expect that the deviant would be 
excluded (M = 4.26, SD = 1.62) than those who thought that groups would like a deviant 
(M = 2.95, SD = 1.59), see Figure 8. Similarly, for the nice condition (F (1, 267) = 38.13, 
p < .001, η
2  
= .12), those who thought the group would like the deviant were less likely 
to expect exclusion (M = 3.01, SD = 1.60)  than those who thought the group would not 
like the deviant (M = 4.27, SD = 1.54).  Finally, the same pattern was shown in the 
impartial condition (F (1,272) = 41.14, p < .001, η
2  
= .13): like: M = 3.98, SD = 1.64, not 
like: M = 2.62, SD = 1.44.While the main effect for group favorability for the gossip 
condition was not significant (like: M = 4.22, SD = 1.64, not like: M = 3.22, SD = 1.72), 
there was a significant interaction between group favorability evaluation and age group, 
F (1,270) = 4.04, p < .05, η
2 
= .01.  This revealed that 9 year olds thought that a deviant 
member who wanted to gossip would be excluded regardless of the whether the group did 
(M = 4.55, SD = 1.67) or did not (M = 4.54, SD = 1.81) like the deviant member, while 13 
year olds recognized that the group’s favorability toward the deviant member would have 
a greater impact on their evaluation (Mlike = 2.91, SD = 1.56, Mnot like = 4.05, SD = 1.61).   
Thus, participants used their understanding of groups and group desires when evaluating 
the likelihood of exclusion, and this skill may become more pronounced with age in some 
contexts. 
Inclusion Choice 
 Children and adolescents are concerned about the group excluding someone who 
challenges the group’s norm.  However, what do children decide if asked to make a 
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choice between including someone who aligns with the group’s norm but who is from a 
gender outgroup or someone who challenges the group norm, but is from the ingroup?  
For instance, would they prefer to include a boy in a girls group who would play nicely 
like the girls group, or would they rather include a girl who would play rough?  Is 
maintaining the group norm central enough that children and adolescents will support 
including an outgroup member in the group?  Further, how does this change depending 
on the group norm?  
 In order to address these questions, one sample t-tests were conducted against a 
test value of .50 for each condition on the proportion of participants who chose to include 
an outgroup member (by gender) who shared the group norm.  This was done in order to 
assess whether participants were willing to include a gender outgroup member in order to 
preserve the group norm.  Results indicated that for the rough, nice and impartial 
conditions, participants were likely to chose an outgroup member significantly more than 
chance (rough: t (277) = 3.24, p = .001, d = .19, M = .59, SD = .49, nice: t (277) = 11.65, 
p < .001, d = .70, M = .79, SD = .41, and impartial: t (282) = 19.53, p < .001, d = 1.16, M 
= .88, SD = .32, see Figure 9).    For the gossip condition, participants did not vary from 
chance in their responses: M = .51, SD = .50. Thus, participants generally showed a 
willingness to include a gender outgroup member into the group in order to preserve the 
group norm.  Interestingly, this is even the case when the group plays rough, perhaps 
reflecting a recognition of the benefits to the group of playing rough in a sports context.  
 In order to assess difference by age, age group and version, 4 separate 2 (Gender: 
male, female) X 2 (Age Group: 9, 13 year olds) X 2 (Version: conform, resist) ANOVAs 
were conducted for inclusion choice in each of the conditions.  There were no differences 
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for the rough condition or the gossip condition.  For the impartial condition, a gender 
effect was found, F (1,272) = 6.69, p < .01, η
2
 = .02.  This revealed that female 
participants (M = .93, SD = .25) were more likely to include the outgroup member who 
wanted to be impartial into the impartial group than were male participants (M = .82, SD 
= .38).  This is in line with previous research which suggests that female participants are 
often more inclusive than are male participants.  For the nice condition, there was a 
version effect, F (1, 268) = 7.07, p < .01, η
2
 = .02, which revealed that participants were 
more likely to include a girl into a boys group that wanted to play nicely (M = .85, SD = 
.36) than a boy into a girls group that wanted to play nicely (M = .73, SD = .45). This 
may reflect status differences, suggesting that participants see it as less acceptable for a 
boy to enter a girls group than a girl to enter a boys group, or an attention to the 
stereotype that girls play nicely.  
  The next ANOVA conducted for inclusion choice was a 2 (Gender: male, female) 
X 2 (Age Group: 9, 13 year olds) X 2 (Version: conform, resist) X 2 (Condition: rough, 
nice) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor.  This revealed a significant 
effect for condition, F(1, 261) =  23.37, p < .001, η
2
 = .08.  This revealed, as expected, 
that participants were more willing to include an outgroup member who was nice into a 
group than an outgroup member who was rough.  Finally, a 2 (Gender: male, female) X 2 
(Age Group: 9, 13 year olds) X 2 (Version: conform, resist) X 2 (Condition: gossip, 
impartial) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor was conducted for inclusion 
choice. A significant condition effect was found, F (1,269) = 95.69, p < .001, η
2
 = .26, 
which revealed that participants were more willing to include an impartial outgroup 
member into a group than an outgroup member who wanted to gossip.  Overall, these 
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results reveal, that, as expected, participants were more likely to include non-aggressive 
outgroup members into non-aggressive groups than aggressive outgroup members into 
aggressive groups, but that they are balancing information about group membership and 
group norm in making these decisions. 
Justifications for Inclusion Choice 
 In order to better understand the reasoning behind participants’ inclusion choices, 
participants’ justifications for inclusion choice were examined. In order to address these 
questions, analyses were conducting using dichotomous variable created with a 3.5 
median split on participants’ likelihood of exclusion.  For the each condition, analyses 
were conducted on the top 4 forms of reasoning: group functioning, welfare, gender and 
the inclusion of diverse perspectives. For each condition, a 2 (Gender: male, female) X 2 
(Age Group: 9, 13 year olds) X 2 (Version: conform, resist) X 2 (Inclusion Choice: 
ingroup, outgroup) X 2 (Justification: group functioning, welfare, gender, diverse 
perspectives) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor was conducted.  
 The ANOVA for the rough condition revealed a main effect for reasoning, F (3, 
804) = 68.12, p < .001, η
2
 = .20, see Table 6. This revealed that participants were more 
likely to use group functioning than any other form of reasoning, ps < .001, and that 
participants also referenced welfare more often than the inclusion of diverse perspectives 
or gender stereotypes, ps < .001. There was also an inclusion choice by reasoning 
interaction, F (3,804) = 14.55, p < .001, η
2
 = .05. This revealed that participants who 
chose the ingroup member made more references to welfare and to the inclusion of 
diverse perspectives than those who did not, ps < .01.  Additionally, those who chose the 
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outgroup member who wanted to play rough focused more on group functioning than 
those who chose the ingroup member, p < .001. 
 The ANOVA for the nice condition revealed a main effect for reasoning, F (3, 
804) = 36.00, p < .001, η
2
 = .11.  This indicated that participants used more group 
functioning reasoning than any other category, ps < .001. The ANOVA for the gossip 
condition revealed a main effect for reasoning, F (3, 828) = 70.39, p < .001, η
2 
= .20, 
which revealed that participants used more references to group functioning than any other 
form of reasoning, ps < .001, and more references to welfare than to stereotypes or the 
inclusion of diverse perspectives, ps < .001 see Table 6. Additionally, there was a 
inclusion choice by reasoning interaction, F (3, 828) = 19.74, p < .001, η
2 
= .06.   This 
revealed that participants who chose the ingroup member used more references to gender 
stereotypes (p < .05) and welfare (p < .001) and fewer references to group functioning (p 
< .001) than those who chose the outgroup member.  
 Finally, the ANOVA for the impartial condition revealed a main effect for 
reasoning, F (3, 819) = 7.89, p < .001, η
2 
= .02. This showed that participants used more 
group functioning reasoning than any other form of reasoning, ps < .01.  Overall, the 
reasoning results showed that participants frequently relied upon group functioning when 
deciding who to include in the group.  However, for the rough and the gossip condition, 
when participants chose to include the ingroup member who advocated for non-
aggressive behavior, they relied more upon welfare.  Thus, participants were attuned to 
both the group norm and the moral valence of that norm when making their decision.  




Interpretative Theory of Mind Descriptive Statistics 
For the interpretative theory of mind measure, scores were calculated on a 6 point 
scale from 0 = no theory of mind to 6 = full theory of mind. All participants performed 
very well on the interpretive theory of mind measure (M = 4.87, SD = 1.37). Further, 
performance was equally strong in both age groups (children: M = 5.00, SD = 1.35, 
adolescents: M = 4.81, SD = 1.38).   
Interpretative Theory of Mind and Individual and Group Favorability  
 The results, thus far, indicate that children and adolescents reason very carefully 
about their evaluations of group members who want to challenge the group.  In particular, 
they recognize that group perspectives may not be the same as their own individual 
perspectives.  What is not known, however, is if group or individual perspectives are 
related to social-cognitive skills?  Do children with more advanced abilities to recognize 
that two people may come to different conclusions about the same information 
(interpretative theory of mind) show an increased ability to take the perspective of either 
the group or the deviant member?  In order to address these questions, multiple 
regression analyses were conducted for each condition using the interpretative theory of 
mind scale (from 0 = no theory of mind to 6 = full theory of mind), age and the 
interaction between age and interpretative theory of mind as predictor. Both age and 
theory of mind were centered prior to analyses and the interaction term was computed by 
multiplying age by theory of mind. First, age and theory of mind were entered into the 
model, and then age, theory of mind and the interaction term were entered into the model.  
For all analyses, the age by theory of mind interaction term was non-significant, so 
results presented will be for Model 1, with age and theory of mind included. For group 
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favorability, the regressions for each of the conditions except the impartial condition 
were non-significant.  For the impartial condition, the multiple regression with age and 
theory of mind as predictors was statistically significant (R
2
 = 0.03, F (2,276 ) = 4.994, p 
< 0.01), with theory of mind as the only significant predictor.  Interpretative theory of 
mind accounted for 3.5% of the variance in group favorability toward the deviant 
member who wanted the group to be impartial.  The unstandardized regression 
coefficient (β ) for interpretative theory of mind was 0.20, meaning that for each 
additional unit increase in interpretative theory of mind skill, group favorability towards 
the impartial deviant increased 0.20 units.  Thus, interpretive theory of mind played a 
small role in explaining group favorability evaluations. 
 For individual favorability, the regressions conducted for the deviants who 
advocated for aggressive behavior, in the rough and the gossip conditions, were non-
significant.  However, the regressions conducted for the impartial and the nice deviant 
members were significant.  For the nice deviant, the multiple regression with age and 
theory of mind was statistically significant (R
2
 = 0.04, F (2,274 ) = 5.75, p < 0.01),  with 
both variables accounting for variation. The model accounted for 4% of the variance in 
individual favorability toward the deviant member who wanted the group to be nice.  The 
unstandardized regression coefficient (β ) for interpretative theory of mind was 0.15, 
meaning that for each additional unit increase in interpretative theory of mind skill, 
individual favorability towards the nice deviant increased 0.15 units.  The unstandardized 
regression coefficient (β ) for age was -0.08, meaning that for each additional unit 
increase in age, individual favorability towards the nice deviant decreased 0.08 units. For 
the impartial deviant, the multiple regression was statistically significant (R
2
 = 0.060, F 
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(2,276 ) = 8.883, p < 0.001), with both age and theory of mind as significant predictors. 
The model accounted for 6% of the variance in individual favorability toward the deviant 
member who wanted the group to be impartial.  The unstandardized regression 
coefficient (β ) for interpretative theory of mind was 0.20, meaning that for each 
additional unit increase in interpretative theory of mind skill, individual favorability 
towards the impartial deviant increased 0.20 units. The unstandardized regression 
coefficient (β ) for age was -0.07, meaning that for each additional unit increase in 
interpretative theory of mind skill, individual favorability towards the impartial deviant 
decreased 0.07 units. Thus, interpretative theory of mind competence accounted for a 
small amount of the variance for individual evaluations of the non-aggressive deviants.   
Discussion 
Gender Stereotypic Activities  
 The novel findings from this study indicate that children and adolescents rely 
upon stereotypes when evaluating peers who challenge their group norms regarding 
gender stereotypic social activities.  Specifically, results revealed, across many measures, 
children’s and adolescents’ gender stereotypic expectations about girl-typed activities 
such as ballet, influenced their judgments about when and whether children should 
challenge peer group norms.   Participants expected that a boy who wanted to challenge 
his group to try ballet was least likely to resist the group and they asserted that they 
would be less likely to resist the group if they were the boy who wanted to do ballet.  
These findings are explained, in part, by their assertion that groups would really dislike a 
gender non-conforming boy and that they, too, individually, would like a gender non-
conforming boy the least.  These results confirm the presence of a shifting standard 
133 
 
(Biernat & Manis, 1994), whereby challenging gender stereotypes by moving down the 
status hierarchy (boys acting in stereotypically female ways) is less acceptable than 
moving up the status hierarchy (girls acting in stereotypically male ways).   
While girls encounter more societal barriers regarding exclusion (such as from 
participating in sports and math), boys encounter more psychological obstacles in terms 
of choice of activities. There are fewer barriers for boys, who are not literally excluded 
from girl-typed activities such as ballet, but the impacts on social favorability from peers 
is more pronounced than when girls desire to engage in boy-typed activities. For instance 
prior research with children has found that boys who engage in gender non-conforming 
behavior are judged more harshly than are girls who engage in gender non-conforming 
behavior (Smetana, 1986; Zucker, Wilson-Smith, Kurita, & Stern, 1995). Additionally, 
research with adolescents which examined perceptions of straight and gay peers who 
were gender conforming or gender non-conforming also confirms that boys who are 
gender non-conforming are judged the most harshly by their peers, regardless of their 
sexual orientation (Horn, 2007; Horn, 2008).  Interestingly, research also indicates that, 
especially for boys, gender non-conformity in terms of activities is often judged less 
harshly than gender non-conformity in terms of appearance (Blakemore, 2003; Smetana, 
1986).  The current study assessed activities with strong visual associations (ballet and 
football).  It is possible that participants were considering both the activity itself and the 
appearance of someone engaging in these gender non-conforming activities.  In the 
current study, participants who did not condone challenging the group’s gender 
stereotypes used stereotypes when reasoning about decisions to act in gender non-
conforming ways.  In particular, participants not only mentioned stereotypes citing who 
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should engage in each activity, but, also made assumptions that engaging in gender non-
conforming activities also suggested sexual identity and orientation.   Thus, participants 
were attuned to differences in societal expectations and referenced assumptions 
underlying stereotypes.   
It is important to note, however, that while participants themselves were also least 
favorable toward the boy who wanted to do ballet, significant differences were found 
between individual and group favorability in both the football and ballet conditions.  In 
other words, participants believed that their peers would be more negatively influenced 
by counter-stereotypic behavior and by challenging the group than would they, 
individually.  Further, while participants believed that groups would use gender 
stereotypes as a reason to dislike someone who challenged their group’s gender norms, 
participants themselves did not rely upon stereotypes. For both individual and group 
favorability, participants who rated favorability negatively made frequent reference to 
group functioning, discussing for instance, how engaging in a different activity would 
disrupt the group.  However, for individual favorability, they cited their own personal 
preferences (i.e., “I wouldn’t like to do ballet, either.”) while for group favorability, they 
cited stereotypes (i.e., “Because most girls are girly and want to do girly things like 
ballet”).   
Those participants who liked the deviant member of the group or expected the 
group to like the deviant member frequently cited autonomy (i.e., “it’s okay to be 
different”).  Interestingly, however, they also frequently mentioned the benefit of 
including diverse perspectives in a group (i.e., “it’s good to encourage them to try 
something new.  It will open their minds”).  This form of reasoning indicates that those 
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children and adolescents who support challenging gender stereotypes recognize the 
power that peers can have and see their peers as potential positive influences who can 
change group perceptions.  Future research should further explore this type of reasoning 
to unpack precisely under what conditions children do perceive the benefits of including 
diverse perspectives and if inclusion of such perspectives can actual shape or change 
group norms.   
Age-related differences were documented which indicate that, with age, group 
norms may become more embedded and, thus, more difficult to change, however.  
Specifically, younger children were more likely to expect that their peers would 
challenge the group and were more likely to assert that they, too, would challenge the 
group.  Even though much research highlights a heavy focus on autonomy in adolescence 
(Smetana & Metzger, 2008) and popular culture assumes that teens are apt to rebel, peer 
pressure also plays a formidable role during adolescence (Brechwald & Prinstein, 2011) 
and peer cliques are firmly established during adolescence (Brown, 1990).   This may 
explain, then, why younger children were more likely to expect peers to challenge their 
groups.  Interestingly, however, children also did not differ in their assumptions of how 
likely their peers would be to challenge the group and how likely they said they would be 
to challenge the group.  Adolescents, on the other hand, indicated that they were more 
likely to challenge the group than they expected their peers would be.  This may suggest 
a greater sophistication by adolescents, who are able to understand that while they would 
really like to challenge gender stereotypes, their peers may not be so willing to do so.  
This finding extends previous research which indicates that adolescents may be more 
attuned to differences between individual and group perspectives than are children when 
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considering resource allocation decisions (Mulvey et al., under review). While in this 
study, all participants distinguished between group and individual favorability of the 
deviant members, younger children did not distinguish their own expectations for 
resisting the group from their understanding of how likely peers would be to challenge 
the group.  Thus, together these findings indicate that children may show deficits in 
distinguishing their own view from that of another individual or group that manifest 
differently depending on the context.  
This study also documented gender differences between how likely boys and girls 
were to resist group norms and to expect peers to resist group norms. In both the football 
and ballet conditions, girls asserted that they would individually be more likely to 
challenge the group than they expected a peer would be.  For boys, there were no 
differences between their expectations for themselves and a peer.  Thus, it may be that 
female participants have more personal experience with stereotypes limiting their 
opportunities and thus are both more attuned to the likelihood that others will use 
stereotypes as well as more likely to resist these stereotypes themselves.   
Children and adolescents also showed a nuanced understanding of the 
repercussions for challenging the group and for exhibiting gender non-conforming 
behavior.  Participants generally did not think that challenging the group’s norms 
regarding gender stereotypic social activities would be grounds for exclusion from the 
group, except in the condition where a boy challenged his boys’ group to do ballet.  No 
previous research has examined the consequences in terms of social exclusion for 
challenging one’s group, however research has indicate that boys who counter gender 
stereotypes are judged more harshly by their peers than are girls who counter gender 
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stereotypes (Smetana, 1986; Zucker et al., 1995). Participants focused primarily on group 
functioning when making these decisions, though gender stereotypes did play a role for 
those participants who believed that the deviant would be excluded from the group.  
These results indicate that children should be willing to challenge their group’s norms 
regarding gender stereotypic activities, however.  Though this may be more difficult for 
boys, children and adolescents do not believe that challenging the group’s stereotypic 
norms will absolutely result in exclusion. Thus, children and adolescents may very well 
be able to influence their peers and help to eradicate gender stereotypes. 
This suggestion that peers may be able to influence their group is supported by 
findings on inclusion in the present study.  Gender stereotypes did not prove to be a 
barrier when considering who to invite to join your group.  Instead, participants asserted 
that a group would be willing to allow an opposite gendered child to join their group 
playing football 80% of the time and would allow an opposite gendered child to join their 
group doing ballet 60% of the time. While there were differences between the ballet and 
football conditions, participants were, generally willing to include an outgroup member 
into their group.  Thus, children may perceive that it is more difficult to encourage the 
entire group to change its norm to one which is gender non-conforming, than it is to 
accept a gender non-conforming child into a group with an established norm.  This is 
supported by the lack of version effects, even in the ballet condition. While participants 
asserted that boys who challenged the group to engage in ballet would be treated the most 
harshly by their group, there were no differences between boys and girls who wanted to 
join a group of opposite gender children whose norm was to play ballet.  Additionally, 
these findings suggest that future research should examine if seeing individual children 
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who challenge gender stereotypes by engaging in non-stereotypic activities can, in fact, 
change attitudes about gender stereotypes or serve as an example which normalizes non-
stereotypic activities.  
Gendered Forms of Aggression 
 While gender stereotypes drove many of the evaluations given by children and 
adolescents of a peer who challenges group norms involving gender stereotypic social 
activities (football and ballet), this was not the case for gendered forms of aggression.  
Most notably, while participants did still exhibit knowledge of the stereotype associating 
boys with physical aggression and (less so) girls with relational aggression, and while 
gender stereotypes did still play a significant role in participants’ reasoning about their 
evaluations in some conditions, participants did not systematically evaluate gender non-
conforming challenges to aggressive behavior as less acceptable than gender conforming 
challenges.  On the other hand, evaluations of challenges to gendered forms of aggression 
were driven largely by the valence of the challenge: participants showed support for 
deviance which also countered aggression (physical and relational) and less support for 
deviance which encouraged aggressive behavior.   
 Children and adolescents asserted that they would be more likely to challenge 
their groups to be impartial when the group gossips and to be nice when the group plays 
rough than they were to challenge the group to engage in gossip or to play rough.  
Further, they individually asserted that they would be more likely to challenge the group 
than they expected a peer to be.  These findings indicate that children and adolescents are 
driven to challenge aggressive behaviors.  Further, it is important to note that the 
proportion of participants asserting that peers would challenge group norms was 
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generally quite high with rates of close to 70% or higher; this was paralleled with the 
findings for participants’ own perspective (how they would react).  Thus participants did 
believe that their peers would stand up to groups and challenge norms involving gendered 
forms of aggression.  They also asserted that they would do the same.  Interestingly, 
unlike in the gender stereotypic activities context, there were no systemic age-related 
differences.  This may suggest that while adolescents expected peers to be more reserved 
in the context of stereotypic activities than did children, the strong moral dimension to 
group norms involving aggressive behavior may have impacted the judgments of both 
children and adolescents, with all participants indicating high levels of resistance.  Given 
the consistent findings indicating the powerful influence of peers and the pervasive role 
of peer pressure (Brechwald & Prinstein, 2011), these results provide an optimistic 
picture.   
Children and adolescents want to challenge aggressive group norms and expect 
that their peers will also often challenge such behaviors.  This is centrally important as 
research has shown that bystanders can make a difference in reducing incidences of 
bullying and aggression (Barchia & Bussey, 2011; Salmivalli et al., 2011; Trach, Hymel, 
Waterhouse, & Neale, 2010).  What these findings indicate is that we should look not 
only to third - party bystanders, but also to those children and adolescents who are 
actually part of peer groups which engage in aggression.  Just because the group supports 
an aggressive norm does not mean that the members of this group agree with that norm, 




 Favorability Judgments. The results also indicated that children and adolescents 
believe that groups will adhere to their norms and dislike deviant members.  Specifically, 
ratings for group favorability of a deviant were always negative—in all conditions they 
never crossed the mid-point.  This confirms previous research on developmental 
subjective group dynamics (Abrams & Rutland, 2008), which has extensively 
demonstrated that groups do not like deviant members, especially in the context of social-
conventional group norms.  However, it also extends recent research which showed that 
groups also do not like deviants when the group norms are moral (Killen, Rutland, et al., 
2012).  The Killen, Rutland, et al. (2012) study demonstrated that groups will not like 
deviants who reject group norms involving equal or unequal distribution of resources.   
The current study extended this finding to a different morally relevant context: 
aggression.  The current study also extended these findings by demonstrating that groups 
dislike deviants regardless of if they deviate in gender stereotype conforming or non-
conforming ways.  However, the findings also reveal that participants do think that 
groups will attend to the nature of the norm; they were significantly more negative about 
deviants who advocated for aggressive behavior than about deviants who urged their 
group to reject aggressive behavior.  Finally, participants also exhibited a careful 
awareness of group dynamics.  They perceived that groups would be more favorable to a 
deviant who suggests that the group play rough than to a deviant who suggests that the 
group be impartial and avoid gossip, perhaps recognizing the ostensible benefit in terms 
of winning a sporting game that playing rough could garner. Participants’ reasoning 
about group favorability also reflected their keen awareness of group dynamics: across all 
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conditions they focused on how the deviant’s behavior would impact the functioning and 
conventions of the group in their justifications. 
 When rating their own individual favorability toward the nice and rough deviant 
members, children and adolescents exhibited age-related differences.  Younger children 
were more supportive of the nice and impartial deviants and less supportive of the rough 
deviant than were adolescents.  This finding extends findings indicating that younger 
children show greater support for equal distribution of resources than do adolescents 
(Almås, Cappelen, Sørensen, & Tungodden, 2010; Killen, Rutland, et al., 2012) by 
indicating that children show greater support for a wide range of behaviors that align with 
moral principles.  The reasoning results indicate, that these differences are driven by 
differing foci in adolescents and children: children focused more on the harm to others 
that playing rough could cause while adolescents focused more on how playing rough or 
nicely would impact the group’s ability to function.  An important extension to this 
research would be to compare findings from normative populations and from highly 
aggressive populations.  For instance, children who are part of groups for which 
aggression is the defining characteristic, such as gangs, will likely make much different 
judgments and may even be more likely to condone stereotypes associated with gender.  
 Gender differences also emerged for individual favorability ratings for the nice 
deviant: female participants were more supportive of this deviant than were male 
participants.  This pattern aligns with gender stereotypes suggesting that playing nice is 
more acceptable for females while playing rough is more acceptable for males.  Thus, 
even though research has shown that associations between boys and physical aggression 
may be founded largely on stereotypes (Card et al., 2008; Lansford et al., 2012), 
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implicitly these stereotypes appear to still influence individual evaluations.  Findings 
such as these, which reveal that boys are less supportive of playing nice than are girls 
may help to explain why mean differences in rates of physical aggression (with boys 
demonstrating higher rates) were still found in the meta-analysis conducted by Card et al. 
(2008).  This finding could also be explained by recent research that indicates that girls 
who are aggressive (physical or relational) are more likely to be rejected and excluded 
than are boys who are aggressive (Kochel et al., 2012).  If being physically aggressive is 
more societally condoned for boys, this may be reflected in lower favorability ratings by 
boys’ of gender non-conforming avoidance of physical aggression.   
 The results of analyses conducted to assess if participants were individually more 
favorable to the deviants than they expected groups to be were significant for the nice, 
rough, and impartial conditions.  This confirms previous research indicating that children 
and adolescents can distinguish between individual and group perspectives regarding 
deviant members (Killen, Rutland, et al., 2012).  Further, it is of note that this distinction 
was not only found in the non-aggressive conditions (nice and impartial), but also in the 
rough condition.  In this case, participants recognize that while the group will focus on 
the fact that this individual is deviating from the group’s norm, they individually 
understand that this deviant may, in fact, be trying to help the group win the soccer game. 
 Exclusion. While these results reveal that groups will not like deviant members, 
the study also provided insight into the consequences for deviance.  Much previous 
literature has assessed the acceptability of exclusion.  Pervasive findings, even cross-
culturally (Hitti et al., 2011), show in most situations that children reject exclusion as 
morally unacceptable, citing harm to the target of exclusion (Killen, 2007; Killen & 
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Rutland, 2011).  In the current study, participants assessed how likely it was that the 
member who challenged the group’s norm would be excluded for encouraging the group 
to act differently.   
Results regarding exclusion revealed critical age-related differences.  Children 
believed that dissenting members would be excluded from the group in almost all 
conditions (all except impartial), while adolescents were more neutral in their judgments.  
This suggests, importantly, that younger children may be more concerned about 
exclusion as a potential consequence for challenging the group than are adolescents.  This 
is counter intuitive, as much research has shown that adolescents are more focused on 
group functioning. It may be, however, that children’s social groups are more fluid and 
less fixed than are adolescents’, which could explain why they perceive exclusion to be 
more likely.  However, previous research indicates that children perceive exclusion to be 
harmful to the target of exclusion, often citing other’s welfare in their reasoning (Killen 
& Rutland, 2011) and that exclusion can have harmful negative consequences in terms of 
the excluded child’s mental health and academic motivation (Buhs & Ladd, 2001; Buhs 
et al., 2006).  Thus, even if children’s social groups are more fluid than are adolescents’ 
groups, exclusion from a group will still cause harm.  These results, then, indicate that a 
significant barrier to challenging one’s group, especially for children, is concern over 
social exclusion.   
In addition to the age-related differences, there were also findings suggesting that 
all participants believed that group members who challenge the group to engage in 
aggressive behavior (rough and gossip conditions) will also be subject to exclusion.  This 
is important as it suggests that children and adolescents think that groups with positive 
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moral norms will actively work to preserve these norms by excluding children who incite 
aggression.  This is supported by findings indicating that children with externalizing 
problems and who exhibit aggressive behavior are more likely to be rejected by their peer 
groups (Rubin et al., 2006).   
An interesting future extension of this research would be to examine how 
likelihood of exclusion would vary based on the social status of the dissenting member. 
For instance, many social groups include a leader or a group of leaders.  Research with 
children indicates that children and adolescents who are perceived to be more popular 
also often exhibit aggressive behaviors, especially relationally aggressive behaviors 
(Rose, Swenson, & Waller, 2004).  Additionally, research with adults indicates that one’s 
social role in a group can impact how the group responds to deviance from group norms 
(Abrams, De Moura, Marques, & Hutchison, 2008; Pinto, Marques, Levine, & Abrams, 
2010). The findings from the current study which indicate a relation between group 
favorability and exclusion also indicate the importance of further examining one’s social 
role in a group.  Participants asserted that if the group did not like a deviant, they were 
more likely to exclude this deviant.  In this study, the group favorability question focused 
specifically on favorability in the context of challenging the group.  Future research 
should also examine if groups differ in their responses to well-liked or popular group 
members who challenge the group and to more marginalized group members who 
challenge the group.  
 Another way to examine how groups would respond to challenges to their group 
norm is to examine if groups would rather include someone into their group who shares 
their gender identity (maintaining a homogenous gender group identity) but challenges 
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their group norm, or someone who shares their group norm, but is of the opposite gender.  
Results for inclusion choice indicate that as expected, participants were more likely to 
include non-aggressive outgroup members into non-aggressive groups than aggressive 
outgroup members into aggressive groups.  In fact, they included outgroup members 
more than at chance for all groups except these gossiping group which suggests that 
participants balanced information about group membership and group norm in making 
these decisions.  Interestingly, their reasoning often focused on group functioning, but 
those participants who chose to maintain the gender composition of the group often did 
explicitly reference the importance of maintaining a gender identity in the group.  
 Children employ complex social reasoning skills in all of their evaluations of 
group members who challenge the norms of their groups involving aggression.  Though 
they did not overwhelming use stereotypes in their evaluations, participants balanced 
information about gender, group composition and functioning and moral principles in 
their evaluations.   
Theory of Mind. An additional question in this study was whether any of the 
variance in participants’ responses could be accounted for by their social-cognitive 
capacities, in particular interpretative theory of mind.  Interpretative theory of mind 
(Carpendale & Chandler, 1996) was chosen as it is a more complex form of theory of 
mind, which would be more appropriate for the age groups tested in this study.  However, 
participants at both age-groups exhibited a high level of competence on the measure.  At 
the same time, associations were found between interpretative theory of mind and 
individual favorability ratings for the impartial and nice deviant members.  This suggests 
that increased perspective-taking abilities may enable one to better understand why 
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someone would challenge the group, and thus to respond appropriately to such 
challenges.  Yet,  relations were only found for the individual favorability ratings, 
indicating that interpretative theory of mind aided participants in understanding the 
dissenting member’s perspective, but not, for instance, the group’s perspective.  This 
indicates that more work needs to be done to better understand what social-cognitive 
skills are employed when making decisions in group contexts and evaluating group 
dynamics.  This is especially true given that other theory of mind measures, specifically 
theory of social mind (Abrams et al., 2009), have been demonstrated to relate to 
children’s understanding of group dynamics.  In the future, researchers should consider 
other measures of social cognition and examine their relation to understanding of group 
dynamics. In particular, executive functioning has been show to develop through 
adolescence, and thus may be a good candidate (Gogtay et al., 2004).  Further, it may be 
useful to examine differences between populations of children who have been trained 
using Shure’s (1992) I Can Problem Solve Methods versus those who have not.  
Additionally, examining differences in children’s mindfulness (Greenberg & Harris, 
2012) or social information processing skills (Dodge & Coie, 1987) may be useful. 
Across many of the measures in the current study, participants did, however, exhibit skill 
in distinguishing group and individual perspectives and understanding the nuances of 
social decision-making.  
Conclusions 
Contributions to the Literature 
  The findings from this study revealed the complexity of children’s social lives and 
the challenges they face in responding to peer group norms with which they may not 
147 
 
agree, whether because they are founded upon stereotypes or because they cause harm to 
others.  Gender segregation frequently occurs in children’s lives.  Research on the role of 
teachers in perpetuating gender segregation highlights the powerful role that functional 
labeling of gender can have (Patterson & Bigler, 2006).  Further, children do spend much 
of their time with peers of the same gender and their affiliations with same gendered 
peers are stable over time (Martin & Fabes, 2001).  Even more concerning, the more 
children affiliate with peers of the same gender, the more gender differentiated their 
behavior is (Martin & Fabes, 2001).  However, in the current study, children and 
adolescents were quite willing to include someone of the opposite gender into their own 
group.  This is an important new finding as it indicates that children do not always desire 
or prefer single-gender groups. This is especially important given research that indicates 
that when in mixed-gender contexts, children may be more willing to engage in non-
stereotypic activities (Goble, Martin, Hanish, & Fabes, 2012).  The results for the gender 
stereotypic activities indicate, however, that while children are optimistic about 
challenging gender stereotypes, these stereotypes still persist and do impact behaviors 
and social-decisions.  Counter-stereotypic behavior was judged negatively especially for 
boys.   This suggests that status differences between boys and girls still play a pervasive 
and pernicious role in children’s lives and that we should be particularly attuned to how 
stereotypes can limit opportunities not only for girls, but also, importantly, for boys.  
The results for the gendered forms of aggression confirm that associations 
between each gender and particular forms of aggression are likely just stereotypes as 
children and adolescents did not show the same types of distinctions between girls and 
boys challenging each type of aggression as they did for girls and boys challenging each 
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type of social activity.  This provides important confirmation that new research findings 
indicating that the previously identified associations between gender and aggression may 
be unfounded (Card et al., 2008).  Recent research has been conducted which documents 
that behaviorally boys engage in more physical aggression than do girls, but that there are 
no differences in rates of relational aggression.  The current study included measures of 
judgments and reasoning, with findings suggesting that children evaluate aggressive 
behavior and deviance from group norms about aggression by focusing on the moral 
valence of the behavior and not on the gender of the individual engaging a particular 
behavior.  Differences between evaluations of boys and girls groups were not 
documented in this study.  Further, the study indicates that children and adolescents are 
willing to challenge their groups and that they expect their peers to do so as well, 
especially in support of non-aggressive behavior.  However, results also revealed that 
children and adolescents do perceive social exclusion to be a very real consequence for 
challenging the peer group.  This reveals the social competency of children: they are 
aware of the potential consequences in terms of exclusion, but are still hopeful that they 
and their peers will challenge the group.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
 This study provides greater understanding of children’s willingness to challenge 
their group, their expectations about their peers, and their understanding of the 
consequences of challenging the group.  However, it does include limitations.  For 
instance, likelihood of challenging the group was measured using a dichotomous 
variable, which cannot capture subtle nuances in difference in likelihood of challenging 
the group in different contexts. Future research should use a likert scale to measure 
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likelihood of resistance.  Additionally, the gender stereotypic social activities tested, 
football and ballet, involve very strong gender stereotypes. Future research should 
examine a greater range of gender stereotypic activities.  An additional limitation is that 
the only consequence for challenging the group which was tested was exclusion. It is 
possible that children did not think that they would be excluded for challenging the 
group, but rather that they may be teased or shunned for a short time.  It would be 
interesting in the future to allow children to spontaneously generate possible 
consequences as well as to assess if they think the group will listen to the deviant 
member.  
Future research should work to continue to identify what factors contribute to 
children actually challenging the group (as opposed to just asserting a desire to do so).  
Additionally, this study examined middle childhood and adolescence.  An important 
future direction would be to examine these patterns in younger children.  This extension 
would allow for an examination of the origins of a willingness to challenge the group.  
Further, using a younger sample may capture more relations with social-cognitive skills, 
as there is more variation in social cognitive abilities, for instance in theory of mind 
abilities, in younger children. In addition to examining different age groups, it would be 
interesting to test for differences by ethnic or cultural group.  For instance, some cultural 
groups may hold much stronger gender stereotypes and thus, in those cultures, 
challenging these stereotypes may be viewed more negatively. Finally, future research 
should examine individual differences in children themselves, to help identify what types 
of children are likely to challenge their groups and to be effective in actually changing 




This study has implications for educators, and parents, in particular.  The new 
findings indicate that parents and teachers should support children’s autonomy within 
their social groups and allow them to negotiate social contexts without immediate 
intervention. Children and adolescents do want to challenge stereotypic and aggressive 
peer group norms and they are optimistic that their peers will do the same. Parents and 
teachers should allow peers to resolve these conflicts on their own, recognizing the 
sophistication of children’s understanding of social group dynamics. At the same time, 
parents and teachers should work to create spaces whereby children can feel comfortable 
challenging gender stereotypes and gender segregation.  The results also indicate that 
children and adolescents may be concerned about social exclusion as a consequence for 
challenging the peer group.  Thus, parents and teachers should create opportunities for 
children to practice challenging peers, for instance through classrooms which are open to 
discussion and debate, to give children the skills needed to follow through on their desire 
to challenge unacceptable peer group norms and overcome concerns about exclusion.   
 In conclusion, this study provides evidence that children are willing to challenge 
gender stereotypic group expectations and norms, but that they are also often concerned 
about consequences such as exclusion.  Further, this study reveals the complexity of 
children’s and adolescents’ understanding of group dynamics and the sophistication of 












Figure 1: Task Design 
 
 Version 1 CRC: Conform, Resist, 
Conform 
Version 2 RCR: Resist, Conform, Resist  




Group Norm: conform to stereotype 
“Let’s do ballet, that’s for girls.”   
Deviant Behavior:  advocate rebellion  
“People think football is only for boys, let’s 
do football.”  
Group Norm: advocate rebellion 
“People think football is only for boys, let’s do 
football.”  
Deviant Behavior:  conform to stereotype 




Group Norm: conform to stereotype 
“Let’s do football, that’s for boys.” 
Deviant Behavior:  advocate rebellion  
“People think ballet is only for girls, let’s 
do ballet.”  
Group Norm: advocate rebellion 
“People think ballet is only for girls, let’s do 
football.” 
Deviant Behavior:  conform to stereotype 
“Let’s do football, that’s for boys.” 




Group Norm: Impartiality 
“It’s important not to gossip all the time, 
even though we won’t find out why those 
kids act that way.” 
Deviant Behavior:  Gossip 
“It’s okay to gossip all the time, because 
we don’t know why those kids act that 
way.” 
Group Norm: Gossip 
“It’s okay to gossip all the time, because we 
don’t know why those kids act that way.” 
Deviant Behavior: Impartiality 
“It’s important not to gossip all the time, even 





Group Norm: Gossip 
“It’s okay to gossip all the time, because 
we don’t know why those kids act that 
way.” 
Deviant Behavior: Impartiality 
“It’s important not to gossip all the time, 
even though we won’t find out why those 
kids act that way.” 
Group Norm: Impartiality 
“It’s important not to gossip all the time, even 
though we won’t find out why those kids act 
that way.” 
Deviant Behavior:  Gossip 
“It’s okay to gossip all the time, because we 
don’t know why those kids act that way.” 
 Moral Story C (Conform)  Moral Story R (Resist)  





“It’s important to play nicely, even if you 
don’t score as many points.”  
Deviant Behavior: Aggressive 
“It’s okay to push and shove just to score 
points.” 
“It’s okay to push and shove just to score 
points.” 
Deviant Behavior: Caring  
“It’s important to play nicely, even if you don’t 




Group Norm: Rough 
“It’s okay to push and shove just to score 
points.” 
Deviant Behavior: Caring  
“It’s important to play nicely, even if you 
don’t score as many points.”  
Group Norm: Caring 
“It’s important to play nicely, even if you don’t 
score as many points.”  
Deviant Behavior: Aggressive 




Table 1: Summary of Hypotheses and Analyses  
Measure Analysis and Hypothesis 
Likelihood of 
Resistance 




) X 2 (gender: male, female) X 2 (stereotype norm: 
conforming, resisting) ANOVA. 




) X 2 (gender: male, female) X 2 (stereotype norm: 
conforming, resisting) X 2 (condition) ANOVA with repeated measures 
on the last factor, for each pair of conditions. 
 It is expected that participants will be more likely to expect targets will 
resist the group when the group is stereotype non-conforming than when 
the group conforms to stereotypes.    Further, resistance will be less 
likely for the gender stereotypic activities when the group adheres to 
stereotypes than when they do not.  It is expected that participants will 
least expect resistance from a boy who wants to do ballet when his 
group wants to do football. It is expected that children will see deviance 
as more likely than will adolescents.  It is expected that participants, 
themselves, will be more attuned to challenging aggressive behavior 
than will they expect their peers to be.  Thus, it is expected that 
participants will rate their own likelihood of resistance to aggressive 










) X 2 (gender: male, female) X 2 (stereotype norm: 
conforming, resisting) X 2 (question: likelihood of resistance, individual 
likelihood of resistance) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last 
factor, for each condition. 
 It is expected that participants, themselves, will be more attuned to 
challenging aggressive behavior than will they expect their peers to be.  
Thus, it is expected that participants will rate their own likelihood of 
resistance to aggressive norms to be higher than the ratings they provide 











) X 2 (gender: male, female) X 2 (stereotype norm: 
conforming, resisting) ANOVA. 




) X 2 (gender: male, female) X 2 (stereotype norm: 
conforming, resisting) X 2 (condition) ANOVA with repeated measures 
on the last factor, for each pair of conditions. 
 
Participants will likely expect that groups will not like dissenting 
members, but this will vary if the dissenter is resisting or condoning 
aggression.  Further, groups will be more favorable to dissenting 
members who resist aggression, as aggression will likely be viewed as a 
moral transgression.  There may be a shifting standard, with participants 
asserting that groups will find deviance towards non-conforming 









) X 2 (gender: male, female) X 2 (stereotype norm: 
conforming, resisting) X 2 (group favorability: ok, not okay) X 3 
(reasoning: top three forms of reasoning) ANOVA with repeated 
measures on the last 2 factors, for each of the 6 conditions. 
Participants will cite group functioning, stereotypes, and other societal 
justifications when asserting that the group will not like dissenting 
members who resist stereotypes. 
Participants will cite moral reasons when asserting that the group will 









) X 2 (gender: male, female) X 2 (stereotype norm: 
conforming, resisting) ANOVA. 




) X 2 (gender: male, female) X 2 (stereotype norm: 
conforming, resisting) X 2 (condition) ANOVA with repeated measures 
on the last factor, for each pair of conditions. 
Participants will support dissenting members who adhere to generic 
moral principles and resist aggression, regardless of the their gender. 
Non-conformity may be seen as more positive for girls, than for boys, 
because participants may believe that boys should not move down the 









) X 2 (gender: male, female) X 2 (stereotype norm: 
conforming, resisting) X 2 (group favorability: ok, not okay) X 3 
(reasoning: top three forms of reasoning) ANOVA with repeated 
measures on the last 2 factors, for each of the 6 conditions. 
Participants will reference moral reasons when supporting the dissenting 
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members who avoid aggression, and will reference harm, in particular, 
when evaluating the dissenting members who engage in aggression 
more negatively. 
With age, participants will reference autonomy, saying that it is up to 
the dissenting member.   
Likelihood of 
exclusion 




) X 2 (gender: male, female) X 2 (stereotype norm: 
conforming, resisting) ANOVA. 




) X 2 (gender: male, female) X 2 (stereotype norm: 
conforming, resisting) X 2 (condition) ANOVA with repeated measures 
on the last factor, for each pair of conditions. 
 Participants will identify exclusion as a likely repercussion for resisting 
the group by encouraging the group to avoid aggression. 








) X 2 (gender: male, female) X 2 (stereotype norm: 
conforming, resisting) X 2 (group favorability: ok, not okay) X 3 
(reasoning: top three forms of reasoning) ANOVA with repeated 
measures on the last 2 factors, for each of the 6 conditions. 
 Participants who believe exclusion is likely will cite group functioning 
and stereotypes more often than those who do not.  
 




) X 2 (gender: male, female) X 2 (stereotype norm: 
conforming, resisting) ANOVA. 




) X 2 (gender: male, female) X 2 (stereotype norm: 
conforming, resisting) X 2 (condition) ANOVA with repeated measures 
on the last factor, for each pair of conditions. 
Dissenting member who go against moral principles (by gossiping and 
playing rough) are less likely to be included.   
Inclusion choice: 
reasoning 




) X 2 (gender: male, female) X 2 (stereotype norm: 
conforming, resisting) X 2 (group favorability: ok, not okay) X 3 
(reasoning: top three forms of reasoning) ANOVA with repeated 
measures on the last 2 factors, for each of the 6 conditions. 
 Reasoning will likely focus on moral reasons when participants choose 
to include the non-aggressive target, regardless of if the target is 












Table 2: Percentage of Participants Affirming Stereotypes Regarding Who Usually 
Engages in Each Type of Activity or Behavior 
 
 Age Group Gender 
 9 year olds 13 year olds Females Males 
Football 75.6 82.6 75.8 86.1 
Ballet 85.6 83.6 79.1 89.8 















Figure 2: Likelihood of Exclusion of the Deviant Member 
Nice 61.1 64.3 59.6 67.2 
Gossip 47.8 57.0 51.0 58.1 


















Figure 3: Deviant who Wants to do Ballet: Reasoning by Exclusion Likelihood 













Football  Ballet 

























































Deviant  Who Wants to do Ballet:  







Figure 4: Likelihood of Resistance Versus Individual Likelihood of Resistance to Group 































Likelihood of Resistance Versus Individual Likelihood of Resistance 
Likelihood of Resistance 





Table 3: Means and Standard Deviations for Proportion of Justifications Used for 
Evaluations of Group Favorability Toward the Deviant Member 
 Group 
Functioning 
Autonomy Welfare Gender 
Rough      
     Not Okay .40 (.47) .03 (.17) .41 (.47) .05 (.21)  
     Okay .37 (.48) .21 (.41) .14 (.34) .08 (.26)  
     Total .39 (.47) .09 (.28) .32 (.45) .06 (.22)  
Nice      
     Not Okay .50 (.49) .02 (.15) .07 (.22) .04 (.19)  
     Okay .32 (.46) .14 (.35) .12 (.32) .00 (.00) 
     Total .42 (.49) .08 (.26) .09 (.27) .02 (.14) 
Gossip     
     Not Okay .37 (.47) .01 (.10) .44 (.48) .05 (.20) 
     Okay .25 (.43) .21 (.41) .10 (.30) .14 (.34) 
     Total .34 (.46) .06 (.23) .36 (.47) .07 (.25) 
Impartial     
     Not Okay .59 (.47) .04 (.18) .11 (.29) .11 (.29) 
     Okay .28 (.44) .17 (.37) .24 (.41) .12 (.32) 
     Total .46 (.48) .09 (.28) .17 (.35) .12 (.31) 
Note. Okay and Not Okay evaluations of favorability are based on a midpoint split of 3.5 for responses 






Table 4: Means and Standard Deviations for Proportion of Justifications Used for Evaluations of 
Individual Favorability Toward the Deviant Member 





Rough      
     Not Okay .13 (.32) .01 (.09) .63 (.46) .12 (.30)  
     Okay .25 (.43) .62 (.44) .11 (.31) .17 (.38)  
     Total .19 (.38) .13 (.33) .39 (.47) .14 (.34)  
Nice      
     Not Okay .24 (.42) .04 (.21) .18 (.38) .21 (.39)  
     Okay .14 (.33) .21 (.40) .41 (.48) .13 (.32) 
     Total .16 (.36) .17 (.37) .36 (.47) .15 (.33) 
Gossip     
     Not Okay .08 (.26) .03 (.17) .64 (.46) .16 (.35) 
     Okay .14 (.34) .36 (.48) .17 (.35) .17 (.36) 
     Total .09 (.29) .13 (.32) .50 (.48) .16 (.35) 
Impartial     
     Not Okay .20 (.40) .02 (.15) .31 (.46) .15 (.34) 
     Okay .06 (.23) .18 (.37) .45 (.47) .17 (.36) 
     Total .08 (.27) .16 (.36) .42 (.47) .17 (.35) 
Note. Okay and Not Okay evaluations of favorability are based on a midpoint split of 3.5 for responses 





















































































Deviant: Rough Deviant: Nice Deviant: Gossip Deviant: Impartial 































Deviant: Rough Deviant: Nice Deviant: Gossip Deviant: 
Impartial 
Likelihood of Exclusion 
by Age 
9 to 10 





Table 5: Means and Standard Deviations for Proportion of Justifications Used for 








Rough      
   Not Likely .58 (.49) .04 (.18) .09 (.26) .06 (.23)  
    Likely .44 (.48) .01 (.11) .36 (.47) .07 (.23)  
     Total .50 (.49) .02 (.14) .23 (.41) .07 (.23)  
Nice      
   Not Likely .56 (.49) .09 (.27) .11 (.30) .03 (.17)  
    Likely .59 (.48) .02 (.14) .10 (.28) .08 (.27) 
     Total .58 (.49) .05 (.21) .10 (.29) .06 (.22) 
Gossip     
   Not Likely .61 (.47) .06 (.23) .06 (.21) .07 (.24) 
    Likely .49 (.49) .00 (.00) .36 (.46) .03 (.15) 
     Total .54 (.48) .02 (.15) .23 (.40) .04 (.19) 
Impartial     
   Not Likely .40 (.47) .15 (.36) .16 (.34) .09 (.27) 
    Likely .67 (.45) .00 (.00) .07 (.25) .10 (.28) 
     Total .53 (.48) .08 (.27) .12 (.31) .10 (.27) 
Note. Likely and Not Likely evaluations of favorability are based on a midpoint split 
of 3.5 for responses to a Likert scale ranging from 1 = Really Not Likely to 6 = 


















































Dichotomous Group Favorability 
Likelihood of Exclusion by Dichotomous Group Favorability Evaluation 
Not Okay 
Okay 
*** *** *** 
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Group: Rough Group: Nice Group: Gossip Group: Impartial 















Rough      
    Ingroup  .33 (.46) .09 (.29) .03 (.45) .13 (.26)  
    Outgroup .66 (.46) .01 (.09) .13 (.33) .07 (.28)  
     Total .52 (.48) .04 (.19) .20 (.39) .09 (.27)  
Nice      
    Ingroup  .40 (.48) .09 (.29) .07 (.24) .15 (.33)  
    Outgroup .56 (.49) .15 (.34) .13 (.33) .06 (.21) 
     Total .52 (.49) .13 (.33) .11 (.31) .08 (.25) 
Gossip     
    Ingroup  .34 (.45) .07 (.24) .33 (.45) .13 (.31) 
    Outgroup .65 (.46) .03 (.16) .16 (.36) .05 (.17) 
     Total .50 (.48) .05 (.20) .24 (.41) .09 (.25) 
Impartial     
    Ingroup  .34 (.47) .06 (.21) .03 (.17) .34 (.45) 
    Outgroup .48 (.49) .18 (.37) .16 (.35) .08 (.25) 
     Total .46 (.49) .16 (.36) .14 (.33) .11 (.29) 
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Appendix B: Sample Tasks 
 
Gender Exclusion Task 
Let’s get started! 
 




1 – What color do you want to be your group color?  __________________ 
 


























These groups of friends have to choose an afterschool activity and can pick between 
football or ballet.   
 




Always likes to choose ballet because they say: “We like to do ballet, that’s for girls.” 
 
Your group, the boys group,  
 
    
 









Now remember, their group, the girls group, 
  
  
Always likes to choose ballet because they say: “We like to do ballet, that’s for girls.” 
Kay, who is also in this group, wants to be different from the other members of their 
group. She thinks “People think football is only for boys, let’s play football.”  
 
Q0: What do you think she would do? 
 
Tell the group what she thinks         
 
Go along with the group and not tell them what she thinks  
 
Q0B: What would you do? 
 
Tell the group what you think         
 
Go along with the group and not tell them what you think  
 
Q1:Let’s say she tells their group what she thinks.  How okay or not okay will they 
think what she says is? 
 
1  2  3  4  5   6 
Really Not Okay        Really Okay 
  








Q2: Now, what about you? When you hear her, how okay or not okay do you think what 
she says is? 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
Really Not Okay        Really Okay  
 







Remember, Kay says:  “People think football is only for boys, let’s play football.” The 
group has to decide what to do.   
Q3: Do you think the girls group will tell her she can’t be in the group anymore?    
    NO   YES  
How much? 
 1  2  3  4  5  6 
    Can Really Stay       Really Cannot Stay   
       






Some new kids want to join the group.  There is only room for one more member. They 
have to choose who to invite to join. Remember, their group says: “We like to do ballet, 
that’s for girls.” 
Q1: Who should their group invite: 




Donald, who wants to be in this group and would say  “I like to do ballet.”  
   
KAREN   DONALD  
 
 








Your group, the boys group,  
    
Always likes to choose football because they say: “We like to play football, that’s for 
boys.”  
 
Marcus, who is also in this group, wants to be different from the other members of his 
group. He thinks “People think ballet is only for girls, let’s do ballet.” 
Q0: What do you think he would do? 
 
Tell the group what he thinks         
 
Go along with the group and not tell them what he thinks  
 
Q0B: What would you do? 
 
Tell the group what you think         
 
Go along with the group and not tell them what you think  
 
Q1: Let’s say he tells your group what he thinks.  How okay or not okay will they think 
what he says is? 
 
1  2  3  4  5   6 
Really Not Okay        Really Okay 
 










Q2: Now, what about you? When you hear him, how okay or not okay do you think what 
he says is? 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
Really Not Okay        Really Okay 
 






Remember, Marcus says:  “People think ballet is only for girls, let’s do ballet.” 
 The group has to decide what to do.   
Q3: Do you think the boys group will tell him he can’t be in your group anymore?    
    NO    YES      
How much?  
 1  2  3  4  5  6 
    Can Really Stay        Really Cannot Stay 







Some new kids want to join the group.  There is only room for one more member. They 
have to choose who to invite to join.  Remember, your group says: “We like to play 
football, that’s for boys.” 
Q1: Who should your group invite: 




Sally who wants to be in the group and would say “I like to play football.” 
 
   FRANK            SALLY   







INTRODUCTION:  M-R  
Let’s say there are some kids at school who always sit alone, and act differently from the 
other kids.   
 
Their group, the girls group,  
  
  
Says: “Even though you don’t know why those kids act that way, you shouldn’t always 
gossip about those kids.” 
 










Now remember, their group, the girls group, 
     
Says “Even though you don’t know why those kids act that way, you shouldn’t always 
gossip about those kids.” 
Betsy, who is also in this group, wants to be different from the other members of their 
group. She thinks “It’s okay to gossip all the time, because we don’t know why those kids 
act that way.” 
Q0: What do you think she would do? 
 
Tell the group what she thinks         
 
Go along with the group and not tell them what she thinks  
 
Q0B: What would you do? 
 
Tell the group what you think         
 
Go along with the group and not tell them what you think  
 
Q1: Let’s say she tells their group what she thinks.  How okay or not okay will they 
think what she says is? 
 
1  2  3  4  5   6 
Really Not Okay        Really Okay 
   










Q2: Now, what about you? When you hear her, how okay or not okay do you think what 
she says is?  
1  2  3  4  5  6 
Really Not Okay        Really Okay  






Remember, Betsy says:  “It’s okay to gossip all the time, because we don’t know why 
those kids act that way.” The group has to decide what to do.   
Q3: Do you think the girls group will tell her she can’t be in their group anymore?    
    NO  YES  
How much? 
 1  2  3  4  5  6 
    Can Really Stay        Really Cannot Stay 






Some new kids want to join the group.  There is only room for one more member. They 
have to choose who to invite to join. Remember, their group: “Even though you don’t 
know why those kids act that way, you shouldn’t always gossip about those kids.” 
Q1: Who should their group invite: 
Katelyn, who wants to be in this group and would say “It’s okay to gossip all the 




David, who wants to be in this group and would say “Even though you don’t 
know why those kids act that way, you shouldn’t always gossip about those kids.” 
  KATELYN         DAVID   








Remember, your group, the boys group, 
    
Says: “It’s okay to gossip all the time, because we don’t know why those kids act that 
way.” 
 
 Jacob, who is also in this group, wants to be different from the other members of his 
group. He thinks “Even though you don’t know why those kids act that way, you 
shouldn’t always gossip about those kids.” 
Q0: What do you think he would do? 
 
Tell the group what he thinks         
 
Go along with the group and not tell them what he thinks  
 
Q0B: What would you do? 
 
Tell the group what you think         
 
Go along with the group and not tell them what you think  
 
Q1: Let’s say he tells your group what he thinks.  How okay or not okay will they think 
what he says is? 
 
1  2  3  4  5   6 
Really Not Okay        Really Okay 
   










Q2: Now, what about you? When you hear him, how okay or not okay do you think what 
he says is? 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
Really Not Okay        Really Okay  






Remember, Jacob says:  “Even though you don’t know why those kids act that way, you 
shouldn’t always gossip about those kids.” The group has to decide what to do.   
Q3: Do you think the boys group will tell him he can’t be in your group anymore?    
    NO    YES 
How much?  
 1  2  3  4  5  6 
    Can Really Stay        Really Cannot Stay                






Some new kids want to join the group.  There is only room for one more member. They 
have to choose who to invite to join. Remember, your group that says: “It’s okay to 
gossip all the time, because we don’t know why those kids act that way.” 
Q1: Who should your group invite: 
Arthur who wants to be in the group and would say “Even though you don’t 




Emily who wants to be in the group and would say “It’s okay to gossip all the 
time, because we don’t know why those kids act that way.” 
 
   ARTHUR  EMILY  













These are groups of friends at your school.   
 
     
When playing soccer, their group, the girls group, says “Even though you want to score 
points, you shouldn’t always push and shove.” 
 
     
 
When playing soccer, your group, the boys group, says “It’s okay to push and shove just 







   
  
Now remember, their group, the girls group, says “Even though you want to score points, 
you shouldn’t always push and shove.” 
 
Stephanie, who is also in this group, wants to be different from the other members of 
their group. She thinks “It’s okay to push and shove just to score points.” 
 
Q0: What do you think she would do? 
 
Tell the group what she thinks         
 
Go along with the group and not tell them what she thinks  
 
Q0B: What would you do? 
 
Tell the group what you think         
 
Go along with the group and not tell them what you think  
 
Q1:Let’s say she tells their group what she thinks.  How okay or not okay will they 
think what she says is? 
1  2  3  4  5   6 
Really Not Okay        Really Okay   
 










Q2: Now, what about you? When you hear her, how okay or not okay do you think what 
she says is?  
1  2  3  4  5  6 
Really Not Okay        Really Okay  
 






Remember, Stephanie says:  “It’s okay to push and shove just to score points.” The group 
has to decide what to do.   
Q3: Do you think the girls group will tell her she can’t be in their group anymore?    
    NO                       YES 
How much? 
 1  2  3  4  5  6 
    Can Really Stay        Really Cannot Stay 






Some new kids want to join the group.  There is only room for one more member. They 
have to choose who to invite to join. Remember, their group says: “Even though you 
want to score points, you shouldn’t always push and shove.” 
Q1: Who should their group invite: 
 
 Alice who wants to be in the group and would say “It’s okay to push and shove 




Gary who wants to be in the group and would say “Even though you want to 
score points, you shouldn’t always push and shove.”? 
   ALICE GARY   








Story 6:  
     
Now remember,your group, the boys group, always says “It’s okay to push and shove just 
to score points.” 
 
Michael, who is also in this group, wants to be different from the other members of his 
group. He thinks “Even though you want to score points, you shouldn’t always push and 
shove.” 
 
Q0: What do you think he would do? 
 
Tell the group what he thinks         
 
Go along with the group and not tell them what he thinks  
 
Q0B: What would you do? 
 
Tell the group what you think         
 
Go along with the group and not tell them what you think  
 
Q1: Let’s say he tells your group what he thinks.  How okay or not okay will they think 
what he says is? 
 
1  2  3  4  5   6 
    Really Not Okay        Really Okay 
    










Q2: Now, what about you? When you hear him, how okay or not okay do you think what 
he says is?   
1  2  3  4  5  6 
    Really Not Okay        Really Okay 
  






Remember, Michael says:  “Even though you want to score points, you shouldn’t always 
push and shove.” 
The group has to decide what to do.   
Q3: Do you think the boys group will tell him he can’t be in your group anymore?   
    NO   YES 
 How much? 
 1  2  3  4  5  6 
    Can Really Stay         Really Cannot 
Stay 





Some new kids want to join the group.  There is only room for one more member. They 
have to choose who to invite to join. Remember, your group says: “It’s okay to push and 
shove just to score points.” 
 
Q1: Who should your group invite: 
Molly, who wants to be in this group and would say “It’s okay to push and shove 




Dan, who wants to be in this group and would say “Even though you want to 
score points, you shouldn’t always push and shove.” 
   MOLLY    DAN  









Interpretative Theory of Mind Task 
Story 7: 
 
John and Allan are playing a game.  They are supposed to “wait for a ring” before they 
take the next turn. 
 
John says they should wait for the telephone to ring.   
 
Allan says they should wait for a ring that you wear.   
 
Q1. Is it okay for John to say they should wait for the telephone to ring and Allan to say 
they should wait for a ring that you wear? 
 
   YES            NO  
 





             
 
Q3: Now a group of boys comes over and hears about the game.  What will they say they 
should wait for: a telephone to ring, a ring to wear, or would you not know what they will 
say? 
 
  TELEPHONE RING  RING  TO WEAR   UNSURE 
 
 
















John and Allan see this picture. 
 
John says it is a duck.  Allan says it is a rabbit.  
 
Q1. Is it okay for John to say it is a duck and Allan to say it is a rabbit? 
 
   YES            NO  
 





             
 
Q3: Now a group of  boys comes over and sees the picture.  What will they say it is, a 
duck, a rabbit or would you not know what they will say? 
 
  DUCK    RABBIT  UNSURE 
 
 






















     CARD 1     CARD 2      CARD 3 
  
The penny is under the card with the block on it. 
 
John says it is under card 1.  Allan says it is under card 3.  
 
 
Q1. Is it okay for John to say it is under Card 1 and Allan to say it is under Card 3? 
 
   YES            NO  
 





             
 
Q3: Now a group of boys comes over and sees the picture.  Where will they say it is, 
under Card 1, Card 3 or would you not know what they would say? 
 
  CARD 1  CARD 3  UNSURE 
 
 














Gender Stereotype Task 
 
 
Q1. Who usually plays football ?  
BOYS  GIRLS  BOTH  
Q2. Do you play football ?  
YES   NO  
 
Q3. How many of your friends play football?  
NONE  A FEW  SOME  MOST  
 
Q4. Who usually does ballet?  
BOYS  GIRLS  BOTH   
Q5. Do you do ballet?  
YES   NO  
 
Q6. How many of your friends do ballet?  
NONE  A FEW  SOME  MOST  
 
Q7. Who usually gossips? 
BOYS  GIRLS  BOTH  
 
Q8. How many of your friends gossip?  
NONE  A FEW  SOME  MOST  
Q9. Who usually avoids gossip? 
BOYS  GIRLS  BOTH  
 
Q10. How many of your friends avoid gossip?  
NONE  A FEW  SOME  MOST 
 
Q11. Who usually pushes and shoves? 
BOYS  GIRLS  BOTH  
 
Q13. How many of your friends push and shove?  
NONE  A FEW  SOME  MOST  
 
Q14. Who usually plays nice? 
BOYS  GIRLS  BOTH  
 
Q15. How many of your friends play nice?  
NONE  A FEW  SOME  MOST  
 
Q16. How many of your friends are boys?  




Appendix C: Coding System   
Justification Categories for Coding Surveys: Gender and Aggression Study  
Below are the justification codes to use for the Transcribed Interview Protocol for each 
participant.  These codes are recorded on the accompanying Justification Coding Sheet.   
There are four groups of categories: Moral, Social-Conventional, Psychological, and 
Undifferentiated. Each category has subcategories. Definitions and Ex:s are below.  
Moral: Justification codes 1 – 2 are referred to as “Moral” because justice, fairness or 
rights of a victim are involved. Includes all positive and negative references to the moral 
domain.  
Social-Conventional: Justification codes 3-6 are “Social-conventional” because group 
functioning, group identity, rules and authority form the basis for the response. Includes 
all positive and negative references to group functioning.  
Psychological Justifications 7-9 are “Psychological” because they involve focus on 
individual concerns.  
Undifferentiated: Category 10 is undifferentiated (“It’s bad”; “It’s good; He’s weird.”). 
Justification 11 is for “Other” responses that do not fit in any other category (keep notes 
on “Other”).  
Missing or Uncodable: Justification 99 is for missing data or uncodable.  
CODING DECISIONS: You may use two codes if the response warrants two codes.  If 
more than two are indicated, choose the two most developed codes/reasoning.  
   CATEGORIES  
I.        Moral Domain  
1. Concern for Other’s Welfare 
A. Psychological Harm: References negative intentions towards others (teasing or 
being mean); acknowledgment of how it feels to be excluded.  
              EX:  It will hurt his feelings.  
EX:  Gossip always makes someone feel bad. 
             EX:  She’s jealous.  
 EX: Gossip is mean. 
EX: If he kicked me out I would be upset.  
EX: How would they feel if it happened to them. 
B. Physical Harm:  References physical harm to another. 
EX:  She’ll hurt someone else if she pushes. 
EX:  If you push and shove, someone might get hurt.  
EX: It’s mean/bad to push or shove. 
EX:  It’s nicer to not hit. 
C. Fairness/Equity/Rights: Appeals to principles regarding fairness, equity, and 
rights.  
EX: That wouldn’t be fair to kick him out. 
EX: It’s never right to kick someone out of a group.  
EX: It’s not fair to talk about someone behind their back.   
EX: It’s the right thing to do. 
 
II.    Societal Domain  
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2. Group Functioning and Conventions: Conventions of the group designed to 
promote the group/encourage group functioning. Recognizing that the act does 
not disrupt the group.  
EX: It’s just a game.  
EX: Doesn’t hurt the group.  
EX: He’s not doing what they want him to do.  They outnumber him.   
             EX: They all want to play one way.  He needs to go along.             
EX: You need to follow the rules of the club.  
EX: It’s good for the group.  
EX: He was only thinking about the group  
EX: She fits in. (She is the child matching the norm and NOT gender)  
EX: Then you know who’s in the group  
EX: He’s going against the group.   
             EX: He didn’t do what the group said to.  
                          EX: You need to follow the rules. (If group norm matches social norm)  
 
3.  Inclusion of Diverse Perspectives  
EX: She will change their minds. (Unless references fairness)  
EX: He can teach the group. 
EX: She’ll be able to support the deviant member.  
 
4. Gender Group Identity/Stereotypes: Appeals to group identity as boys or girls.  
A. General/Non-stereotypic: 
 EX: She’s a girl!  
        EX:  He fits in. (He is the child matching the gender of group and NOT 
the  
Norm).       
EX: She would be out of place (She is the child matching the gender of 
group and NOT the norm). 
B. Adhering to Stereotypes: Appeals to gender stereotypes.  
EX:  He’s acting gay.  
  EX:  That’s such a girly thing to do.        
EX: Well, girls are supposed to play nicely. 
EX:  Football is only for boys.   
EX:  Girls always gossip, so they’d like her. 
 
III.   Psychological Domain  
5. Autonomy: Individuality and personal choice.  
              EX: It’s good to be different.  
              EX: She’s just trying to be different.                
   EX: She’s being honest/telling the truth (if about football/ballet). 
 
6. Personal Identification with the target:  




EX:  Well, I never gossip about others.  
B. Societal Domain: involves conventions or activities.  
EX: I prefer football, too. 
 
IV.Other  
7. Undifferentiated  
EX: It’s good.  
EX: He’s nice  
              EX: You can’t kick her out. (Use only if no further reasoning is 
given)  
8. Other  
99. Uncodable 
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